Location: CLT 701
Date/Time: 19th April 2011, 14:00
In this talk, I will first briefly introduce the research work I had done in the past. It covers three main areas: biometrics, cryptography and the interface between the two. In particular, I'll focus on my latest work on how to ensure tallying integrity in large-scale DRE-based electronic voting. The Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) is a widely deployed voting system that commonly uses touch-screen technology to directly record votes. In the USA, 32% voting machines had been electronic in 2008. India moved to fully DRE election in 2004 and Brazil started its first fully DRE election in 2002. However, a lack of tallying integrity has been considered the most contentious problem with the DRE system. In the talk, I will present a cryptographic protocol to ensure the tallying integrity -- even if the DRE machine is completely corrupted. Essentially, this protocol shifts from having to trust DRE software to "software independence". In other words, it does not matter how the software is written inside the system, by checking the cryptographic output of the software, voters can get strong assurance that the software is tallying votes correctly.
Published: 25th March 2011