Threat Analysis of Cryptographic Election Schemes (2006)

Author(s): Ryan PYA, Peacock T

    Abstract: We discuss some vulnerabilities, threats and counter-measures for voter-verifiable, cryptographic election schemes: Chaum [1], Neff [7] and Pret a Voter schemes [2]. Our analysis shows that such schemes are potentially prey to a wide variety of threats, both technical and socio-technical. On the other hand, counter-measures can be deployed to all the threats identified. This paper strives to take initial steps towards a more systematic threat analysis for such schemes. We briefly address the issue of how to ensure such threat analyses are as systematic and complete as possible.

      • Date: June 2006
      • Series Title: School of Computing Science Technical Report Series
      • Pages: 12
      • Institution: School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
      • Publication type: Report
      • Bibliographic status: Published

      Keywords: cryptographic voting schemes, threat analysis

      Staff

      Professor Peter Ryan