From totalization, through the non-subject, to the reclamation of resistance: A review of the debates on normative control, autonomy and the organizational self.

Karin Garrety*
School of Management and Marketing
University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
karin@uow.edu.au
Tel. 61 (0)2 4221 3565

Simon Down,
University of Newcastle Business School
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK
simon.down@ncl.ac.uk
Tel. 44 (0)191 222 6232
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Summary
The review organizes literature that is critical of normative control into three domains: (1) largely polemical works that characterise normative control as dangerous and totalizing because, by exploiting deep-seating fears and desires, it robs employees of autonomy; (2) Foucauldian research which, though it eschews the humanism of the first approach, also sees the phenomenon as totalizing; and (3) a variety of research, both polemical and empirical, that undermines the thesis that normative control is totalizing by demonstrating the variability and ambiguity of employee responses. Three purposes are served by our overview. Firstly, the extent to which meta-theoretical assumptions structure research is illuminated and criticized for promoting searches for ‘single truth’ explanations. Secondly, we show that the polemical nature of the debate has often encouraged overly homogenized interpretations of both ‘control’ and ‘organizational selves’, thereby inhibiting appreciation of the variability of control measures instituted in different sorts of organizations, and different responses to them. Thirdly, we surface the not always explicitly recognised centrality of autonomy to this area of critical literature. Some suggestions for further research reflecting these findings are made which emphasize the need for reflexivity about (1) researchers’ own value positions in relation to autonomy and control in organizations, and (2) the historical situatedness of these positions and the metatheories that support them.
Introduction

There is a long stream of criticism in sociology and related fields that laments the stifling instrumentalism of modern organizations, and their corrosive effects on individual freedom and creativity (Mills, 1951; Taylor, 1989; Weber, 1921/1968; Whyte, 1956). This criticism continues into the present day, but its focus has changed and widened as mechanisms of organizational control have evolved. Likewise, the grounds of critique have also evolved, as new theoretical perspectives have emerged, spread, been challenged, and faded away.

In this article, we review critiques of a form of organizational control that sprang into prominence during the early 1980s. This so-called ‘normative’ control is characterized by attempts to engender greater effort and commitment from employees by appealing to their thoughts, values and emotions (rather than actions), and if deemed desirable, altering these hitherto non-corporatized aspects of the self so that they are more closely aligned with company goals (Kunda, 1992, 11). These efforts often take the guise of ‘culture change’ programmes (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi, 1981; Peters & Waterman, 1982). Although managers prior to the 1980s had shown concern with the social and emotional aspects of work, in the form of concepts and practices such as ‘human relations’ and ‘Theory Y’, the ‘culture change’ literature of the 1980s advocated a more deliberate and systematic engineering of the subjective and emotional dimensions of employee experience (Ray, 1986; Willmott, 1993, 524).

According to Willmott (2003), a prominent critic of ‘corporate culturism’, management scholars were slow to turn their attention to this phenomenon. Those who had traditionally been critical of mainstream management ideologies initially regarded normative control as just ‘the latest re-heated managerialist panacea that merited no serious consideration’ (p. 73). However, articles and books critical of normative control began to trickle into the academic literature during the mid 1980s, and gathered pace in the following decade. As Willmott noted ‘there was something (comparatively) “new” and seductive, but also disturbing, in corporate culturism that invited closer consideration’ (p. 74).

In this article, we review critical responses to the phenomenon. By critical, we mean responses that are sceptical of the rhetoric and claims of those who advocate normative
control. We do not include works that support normative control as a mode of management, but highlight mistakes or inadequacies in implementation. Corporate attempts to alter the private recesses of subjectivity raise interesting and difficult questions about the nature of the contemporary self and its position(s) vis-à-vis the organizational power structures in which it is embedded. For instance: What are the capacities, limits and dangers of normative control? How does normative control work upon the self? What aspects of the self make it susceptible to this form of control, and what enables defence and resistance? Does it still make sense to talk about employee ‘autonomy’ in the workplace? If so, then what does it mean?

Critical scholars have interpreted the nature of normative control, and its impacts on employees, in markedly different ways. This diversity reflects different theoretical traditions – for example, humanism, or psychoanalytic or poststructuralist perspectives – and authorial purposes, such as polemics or reporting findings from empirical research. Within this diversity, we have identified three themes that have emerged in roughly chronological order. They are:

1. Critiques that presented normative control as a new and seductive but also dangerous and totalizing force that (potentially) robs employees of their autonomy.

2. A body of work informed by Foucault that emphasized how normative control, as a discourse, constituted particular forms of subjectivity. These works eschewed the humanism evident in the first set of critiques, but tended, like them, to present normative control as totalizing and inescapable.

3. Reactions against the idea that normative control is totalizing. These reactions took two main forms – theoretical/polemical works that questioned the assumptions of authors whose work was covered in themes 1 and 2, and reports of empirical work, which have demonstrated that employees’ responses to normative control are highly variable. Some of these works were also inspired by Foucault.

These themes overlap, sometimes within the same work (e.g. Barker, 1993; Casey, 1999; Casey, 1995; Willmott, 1993). Nevertheless, by conceptually separating them to some degree, we can construct a framework within which to explore the literature, and the debates that it has generated. As the three consecutive themes suggest, there has been a gradual move away from the idea that normative control is a unified, pervasive and potentially effective way to manipulate the hearts and minds of employees, to a recognition that its implementation is difficult and inevitably partial, and that employees are not so readily controlled.

In the following sections of the article, we work through the themes outlined above, tracing the main concerns of writers who have grappled with these issues, and identifying the theoretical tools that they have used. We highlight references to autonomy in order to illustrate how this intriguing but elusive concept lies at the heart of our attempts to theorize the position of the subject within or against organizational power. The phenomenon of normative control may have had variable effects in the organizations in which it was attempted, but it has had a significant impact on the fields of organizational studies and critical management. It has contributed to refinements in the way we conceptualise subjectivity and its relations to power. Important issues remain unresolved,
however. We discuss these in the final section of the article and suggest avenues for further research.

**Normative control as invasive and totalizing**

The articles in this section are mainly polemical in that they attempt to alert readers to the existence and putative dangers of normative control. In pursuing this goal, the authors often draw parallels between the techniques used in companies to engineer emotional commitment, and conditions and techniques found in other significant social institutions to which people form strong emotional ties, namely families and religious institutions.

In 1986, the *Journal of Management Studies* published an article (Ray 1986) rhetorically titled ‘Corporate Culture: The Last Frontier of Control?’ that is sometimes cited in later articles (Thompson & Ackroyd, 1995, 620) as one of the earliest critiques of the then fairly new drive to deliberately (re)engineer workplace cultures. Ray contrasted ‘culture control’ with two other modes of control – bureaucratic and humanistic. In bureaucratic control, managers attempt to increase productivity through the manipulation of rewards. In humanistic control, loyalty and productivity are enhanced by the provision of ‘satisfying’ tasks and congenial work groups. In culture control, however, loyalty to the firm is replaced by something deeper, namely ‘love of the firm and its goals’, which can be engineered by ‘manipulation of culture including myth [and] ritual’ (p. 293).

Ray drew on Durkheim’s concepts of the sacred and profane to explain the attraction of engineered cultures to managers and employees alike. With the erosion of traditional bonds of church and community, life seems increasingly ‘profane’ and meaningless. By developing ‘strong’ cultures, organizations can provide a ‘realm of the sacred’, or moral direction through ‘attachment to something larger than self’ (p. 290). By exploiting employees’ desires for meaning and connection, culture control ‘seems to contain possibilities of being extremely powerful in ensnaring workers in a hegemonic system’ (p. 293). Ray does not explicitly discuss what this might mean for worker autonomy, though she ends her article with an unusual observation that links culture control to potential resistance:

> The homogenization of emotion and sentiment may cut through divisions among workers and lead to intensified interaction and frequency of discourse. Increased employee demands and activism are among the possible consequences (p. 293).

Other critics of normative control have followed Ray’s lead in locating both its attractions and dangers in its capacity to exploit deep-seated desires, fears and neuroses. Schwartz (1987) provided a psychoanalytic analysis of ‘organizational totalitarianism’, which he characterized as ‘the process of defining people’s happiness for them’ (p. 41). In a sophisticated line of reasoning that is impossible to do justice to here, Schwartz drew on Freud’s concept of narcissism and the work of Melanie Klein to argue that deep-seated desires for love and connection drive employees to over-identify with organizations. This ‘alienates people from themselves and gives them over to others’ (p. 42). The resulting loss of a ‘real’ self leads to game playing, passivity, loneliness, shame and cynicism. There is a loss of ‘moral autonomy’ (p. 42). In totalitarian organizations, ‘productive work becomes less important than the maintenance of narcissistic fantasy’ (p. 52). According to Schwartz, totalitarianism was already entrenched in American industry by the 1980s. The
move towards deliberate culture management, he claimed, ‘may be a further development of the disease’ (p. 52).

Narcissism also featured in a critique put forward by Ezzy (2001). For Ezzy, promises of meaningful work and relationships through ‘strong’ cultures were hollow. Instead, a ‘simulacrum’ of community ‘encourages a narcissistic private individualism’ (2001, 636). This is exacerbated by long hours, which prevent employees from forming ‘real’ relationships outside work. The fact that cultural engineering plays on the supposed capacity of modern selves to ‘choose’ who they want to be is deeply problematic and compounds the trend towards individualism. The ‘choices’ are severely constrained, while the illusion of choice merely encourages a self-indulgent consumer mentality. Ezzy is wary of advocating either a disconnected autonomy (which promotes more individualism) or a romantic ‘return to community’ (which could turn out to be oppressive) as solutions. Instead, he promotes a socially negotiated communitarian ethic, based on care and respect for others.

It is not surprising that those who critique the attractions and dangers of normative control often comment on its parallels with family life (Casey 1999). After all, families are prime sites of normative control. They are arenas where dramas of dependence, autonomy and identity formation are played out. They satisfy primal needs, but can also be dysfunctional and painful. As Ray (1986) noted, religion is another social institution that can provide meaning and a sense of belonging. Some critics of normative control have highlighted similarities between religious and organizational practices to point out the dangerous seductiveness and potential for abuse in managerial attempts to provide meaning and emotional attachment through work. O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) for instance, point out that ‘strong culture’ companies use the same techniques as religious and political cults, namely participation as a means of generating commitment, symbolic action to convey a sense of purpose, consistent information to shape interpretations, and extensive reward and recognition systems to shape behavior (p. 179).

Unlike most of the critics covered in this review, O’Reilly and Chatman did not question cultural engineering per se, noting that ‘Culture as social control can, under certain circumstances, be an effective way of meeting legitimate strategic and even socially redeeming organizational objectives’ (p. 187). They adopt a functionalist perspective that assumes that management practices are, in themselves, morally and politically neutral. It all depends on how and to what ends they are used. Problems arise when cultural conditioning leads to ‘reduced adaptation, exploitation, and in extreme cases, harmful or unethical behavior’ (p. 160). The most severe problems occur when beliefs are internalized and critical thinking is constrained to such a degree that individuals can be induced to behave in unethical and harmful ways’ (p. 188). To illustrate, they gave the rather extreme examples of Nazi Germany and the Milgram experiments.

Towards the end of their article, they pointed out differences between cults and strong culture corporations, suggesting that these can ‘potentially ensure that members are empowered rather than oppressed, and effective rather than destructive behaviors emerge’ (p. 188). One of the differences, they claimed, is that
legitimate organizations are more likely to be honest about what the group stands for and expects from its members … This honesty can allow potential recruits to make informed choices about the values espoused by the organization and reduces the chance that individuals will unwittingly join groups that either violate their values, or are judged to be unethical (p. 188).

There is a strong assumption here that potential recruits and employees can and will exercise responsible moral autonomy against unethical organizational practices.

Other theorists noting parallels between religious practices and normative organizational control are less mild in their critiques. Ackers and Preston (1997) give many examples of the ‘religious tone’ (p. 677) that is evident in the rhetoric of culture change gurus. In building their argument they concentrate on management development, which they claim has moved from ‘training’ to ‘character formation’ (p. 679). Like practicing Christians, managers are exhorted to scrutinize their personalities and consciences, confess their ‘sins’ and work on improvement. Management development is thus entering ‘an emotional and existential terrain which was previously the province of religion, employing a rhetoric that appeals to similar ideals of self-discovery, faith and commitment’ (p. 689). These programs are clearly invasive:

It is one thing to be asked to address your own shortcomings in terms of the gap between actual and desired management behaviour; it is quite another matter to be boxed into considering ways in which your personality might be remoulded to fit that desired by your employer (p. 689).

Ackers and Preston present empirical data from interviews with managers who had attended such a program, and in common with many other empirical researchers, uncovered a range of responses from scepticism to enthusiasm. Even though it contains empirical data, we have included their article in this section rather than with other empirical work because their primary focus is not on employee responses, but on the nature of the power wielded by regimes of normative control, which they clearly find discomforting:

For the Biblical Israelites to worship the gold calf was a great blasphemy because it represented a loss of spiritual perspective. There is something equally disturbing and unauthentic about finding deep personal meaning inside the walls of the modern business organization (p. 695).

As a means of developing principles that might protect against the misuse of corporate power, Ackers and Preston seek ‘the rational ethical grounds’ for the ‘revulsion’ they feel with respect to such practices (p. 695). Like Ezzy (2001), they advocate respect for employees and their rights, including the right to self-determination. The relevant question for Ackers and Preston (p. 696) is ‘does that person freely give of their genuine personality or are they being coerced to do so by the force of power?’

Tourish and colleagues (Tourish & Pinnington, 2002; Tourish & Vatcha, 2005) have also commented on parallels between contemporary business practices and religious cults. Their arguments are similar to those already presented, though there is more emphasis in their work on the concept of transformational leadership and how the cultic tendencies of strong cultures stifle dissent. Tourish and Vatcha (2005) argue that the spectacular
collapse of Enron can be explained by the development of a culture that resembled a cult, with its elaborate initiation (recruitment) rituals, punishing work schedules, stifling of dissent, and the inculcation among employees of a belief that because they were the ‘brightest and best’ (p. 467), they were destined for a glorious future. Again, the underlying issue is framed in terms of autonomy:

Once people over-align themselves with a company, and invest excessive faith in the wisdom of its leaders, they are liable to lose their original sense of identity [and] tolerate ethical lapses they would have previously deplored (p. 476).

Ironically, although critics of normative control see the loss of employee autonomy as one of its principal dangers, the rhetoric of culture change gurus gives the impression that the opposite effect is achieved. That is, they celebrate autonomy as a means of generating employee commitment. Some critics have highlighted the contradictory aspects of this rhetoric. In his influential critique, Willmott (1993) cited the following two passages from the guru text In Search of Excellence:

There was hardly a more pervasive theme in the excellent companies than respect for the individual … These companies give people control over their destinies; they make meaning for people (Peters and Waterman 1982, 238-9, quoted in Willmott 1993, 526. Emphasis in original).

A set of shared values and rules about discipline, details and execution can provide the framework in which practical autonomy takes place … The institution provides the guiding belief and creates a sense of excitement, a sense of being a part of the best (Peters and Waterman 1982, 323, quoted in Willmott 1993, 524-5. Emphasis added.)

Within the rhetoric of normative control, freedom is allowed and even encouraged, but only within strict constraints. Individuals are respected, but only if they ‘buy into’ the organizational norms. The daily grind of work, which for most people is a mundane necessity composed of some boring and some interesting tasks, is artificially inflated into a source of ‘excitement’. Willmott makes a neat comparison between this rhetoric and the ‘doublethink’ invented by Orwell (1949) to describe a style of thought and communication practiced in the fictional totalitarian state of Oceania. Doublethink allows people to believe and communicate ‘facts’ that are patently false or contradictory. Thus, the ‘seductive doublethink of corporate culture [is] the simultaneous affirmation and negation of the condition of autonomy’ (p. 526). Doublethink is ‘a totalitarian remedy for the resolution of indeterminacy and ambiguity: thought control through uniform definition of meaning’ (p. 527).

Autonomy is a key issue for Willmott, and he mentions it frequently in his 1993 critique. Against the narrow, instrumental notion of autonomy proffered by the culture change gurus, Willmott develops a more sophisticated version (pp. 531-535) based on Weber’s (1921/1968, 25) distinction between instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value-racional action (Wertrationalität). Willmott describes the difference between these two as follows:

A person whose actions are governed by Zweckrationalität derives his or her subjective wants from the prevailing system of values that s/he takes as given.
These wants are then satisfied by calculating how they may be most effectively fulfilled. In contrast, action governed by Wertrationalität is directed by the person’s ‘self-conscious formulation’ of the values that orient his or her conduct (p. 532, italics in original).

Despite all its rhetoric about ‘values’, cultural engineering is basically concerned with instrumental rationality, that is, manipulating employee ‘wants’ in order to increase productivity. ‘Autonomy’ is just one of the ‘wants’ that can be manipulated. For Willmott, however, autonomy can only really be achieved by struggling to achieve Wertrationalität. This requires recognition of, critical reflection on, and conscious choice among, competing value systems (pp. 534-5).

Willmott admits that his critique is ‘unashamedly polemical’ (p. 535), and in this, he follows the style of most of the other works included in this section. Their primary objective is to expose the ideological nature of cultural engineering. Against these ideologies, they counterpose more desirable situations and avenues of resistance. These counter positions are heavily influenced by humanist assumptions. The exception is Willmott who, as a scholar influenced by post-structuralism (see below) carefully points out that he is not criticizing corporate culturism because it ‘denies or suppresses some essence of human nature’ (p. 539). Instead, it ‘has been criticized because it promotes practices and institutions that unnecessarily suppress and impede the nurturing of emancipatory contingencies’ (p. 540). These are fine points, however. Most of the critics included in this section do posit a human essence that can be set up against regimes of power. That is, employees have ‘real’ or ‘original’ selves that exist prior to or outside organizational power. They can exercise self-determination. These qualities can be stolen or distorted by normative control, but they can potentially be re-ignited in resistance. This is in marked contrast to analyses informed by post-structuralist theory, such as the work of Foucault, to which we now turn.

**The Influence of Foucault**

For Foucault, and those inspired by his work, individual subjectivity and its attributes, such as a sense of identity, autonomy and agency, should not be thought of as qualities that exist prior to, or outside of, power. Instead, they are produced by power (Knights & Willmott, 1989, 538), or more specifically, by the bodies of knowledge and practices that emanate from the institutions of schooling, medicine, law, psychology, and the social sciences, including management. These ‘regimes of truth’ tell us who we are, how we should behave and live our lives (Rose, 1996). Our sense of being autonomous and responsible for ourselves is not innate, but a product of the modern worldview (Knights, 2000a; Taylor, 1989).

There is a large body of work in critical management scholarship that is informed by the work of Foucault. Earlier work (Hollway, 1991; Knights & Willmott, 1989; Townley, 1993) was mostly concerned with explaining Foucault’s ideas to management scholars and promoting the relevance of his work to the discipline. As such, its focus was much broader than the somewhat pointed critiques of cultural engineering that we covered above. Indeed, Foucault’s analysis of power, which sees it as ‘ever-present in relations of all kinds’ (Hollway 1991, 10) can be applied to a very wide range of management practices. Hollway (1991), for instance, used a Foucauldian framework to trace the development of
work psychology from the scientific management of the early twentieth century to the cultural engineering of the 1980s.

Because the Foucauldian critique of power is so widely applicable, Foucauldian scholars do not make the same sort of marked distinction between 1980s cultural engineering and other forms of control as their humanist colleagues above. For humanists, cultural engineering was fundamentally different to earlier forms of control, because it systematically invaded a hitherto private realm of subjectivity. For Foucauldians, subjectivity is not private, at least not since the Enlightenment, but constituted by discourse. Cultural engineering is just another subject-producing discourse, following on from earlier management techniques. Miller and Rose (1995), for example, traced the tight nexus between managerial discourses and employee subjectivity through waves of ‘new’ techniques. During the first half of the twentieth century, scientific management and the human relations school conceptualized workers as ‘a productive force that should be utilized efficiently in the light of knowledge of its modes of activity, its capacities, and its aptitudes’ (p. 431). During the 1960s and 1970s, moves to improve the quality of working life through worker participation and job redesign were associated with a new worker identity, conceptualized as ‘an active and motivated individual, seeking autonomy, control, variety and a sense of worth’ (p. 441). With the push in the 1980s for ‘looser’ forms of control, worker subjectivity was again reconfigured, in terms of ‘the desire of all individuals to be creative, autonomous, and to strive to improve themselves and their performance if offered encouragement and reward’ (p. 456).

Some contemporary managerial techniques still rely on systems of surveillance external to the self (Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992), but increasingly the thrust has been towards the internalization of control, of inciting employees to practice ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1988). Individuals are exhorted to be self-governing and enterprising (du Gay, 1996). They are encouraged to nurture and harness their emotional energy, or ‘passion’ as the culture gurus would have it, for the good of themselves and the organization (Hatcher, 2003). The emphasis in these studies is on the careful explication of the means by which managerial discourses produce particular types of employees. Their critical thrust does not depend on full frontal attacks on the ‘evils’ of normative control, but in the way they denaturalize categories that would otherwise be taken for granted, such as subjectivity, identity and autonomy. Contrary to the arguments of humanist critics, normative cultural engineering does not invade or steal these attributes of the self, but rather channels them in particular directions.

Because they are not defending an original, ostensibly ‘free’ and ‘real’ self that can oppose organizational power from the ‘outside’, Foucauldian critiques tend to be more dispassionate and less obviously polemical than those of their humanist colleagues. Hatcher (2003), for instance, notes that discourses advocating the use and management of emotions at work create ‘new freedoms as well as new constraints’ (p. 408). The tone of Miller and Rose’s (1995) article is also quite neutral, and at one point even suggests that the emphasis on ‘self-development’ associated with cultural engineering makes it ‘profoundly ethical, for in equipping the authority of the manager with a psychological coloration, they make its exercise almost a therapeutic activity’ (p. 457). This is not to say that Foucauldian scholars are advocates of cultural engineering. There are Foucauldian analyses that highlight and celebrate resistance (e.g. Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Knights & McCabe, 2000a). We discuss these below.
Reclaiming resistance

The pessimistic arguments of humanist critics of cultural engineering, combined with the Foucauldian portrayal of subjects as inevitably constituted by power relations, created a perception that the new regimes of normative control were totalizing and inescapable. By appealing to workers’ deepest needs and wants, and by ‘colonizing’ their very sense of identity, control techniques had, apparently, become increasingly subtle and effective. Traditional avenues of resistance were closed off. We turn now to the considerable body of work that has challenged and undermined this position. We examine two strands within this work – polemical writings that have questioned the assumptions informing the ‘totalization’ thesis, and work based on empirical research, which has revealed that while many employees are indeed ‘sucked in’ by cultural engineering, many others are cynical, resistant and/or only superficially complaint.

Theoretical/polemical work

While their Foucault-inspired colleagues concentrated on the putative power effects of managerial discourses, critical management scholars working in psychoanalytic (Gabriel, 1999), critical realist (Newton, 1998) and labor process (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Thompson & Ackroyd, 1995) traditions maintained a more skeptical stance vis-à-vis the power of discourses. As the totalization thesis gathered momentum, these writers mounted a counter-argument to the effect that those who subscribed to the totalization thesis had seriously over-estimated the capacity of managerial rhetoric to control the subjective experiences and behavior of employees. For instance, Ackroyd and Thomson (1999) wrote:

What is problematic about many current accounts of corporate culture, teamworking or TQM is not the argument concerning what those who design the systems want, but the bizarre belief that they have almost no difficulty getting it (pp. 160-1).

Gabriel (1999) agreed, stating that many critiques of normative control ‘exaggerate the magnitude and totality of organizational controls, generating over-managed and over-controlled images of individuals, organizations and societies’ (p. 179).

Critics of the totalization thesis often attribute its emergence to the influence of Foucault. Following Foucault’s insights into the capacity of discourses to effect power through subjectivity, some scholars gave precedence to the content of managerial discourses, at the expense of careful observations of interactions between managers and workers in real-life workplaces. As a result, ‘the distinction between the intent and outcome of management strategies and practices is lost’ (Thompson and Ackroyd 1995, 629). Foucauldian scholars are seduced by images of panopticons and the disciplinary apparatuses found in the carceral institutions that formed the basis of Foucault’s analyses (prisons, asylums, hospitals), which they take as models for modern corporations. In doing so, they tend to neutralize distinctions among different types of control, and how different categories of workers, through historical circumstances and the differential possession of skills and other resources, are differently placed with respect to managerial powers (Gabriel 1999; Thompson and Ackroyd 1995).
These theoretical critiques have been very influential, and the claims contained within them have been supported and reinforced by empirical findings from research conducted in organizations in which normative control has been attempted. However, another factor that has helped undermine the totalization thesis is the ambiguity inherent in the Foucauldian framework itself. Different theoretical emphases can be found within Foucault’s work, which give rise to different readings of the capacity of individuals to manoeuvre within and against the power relations in which they are enmeshed (May, 1999; Starkey & McKinlay, 1998). Foucault’s earlier work (1973; 1977) concentrated on the disciplinary mechanisms of heavily institutionalized discourses and their associated practices. Foucault-inspired critiques that drew primarily on this tradition (e.g. Barker 1993; Townley 1993) gave the impression that power is totalizing (Newton 1998). In his later work, Foucault shifted his attention away from techniques of domination towards self-knowledge and the management of desires through ‘technologies of the self’ (1982; 1988). These later works are peppered with observations that draw a much less deterministic link between discourses/power and subjectivity. Individuals can choose among discourses and resist power:

Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized (Foucault 1982, 221).

It is thus possible to remain faithful to Foucault, while also exploring diverse and contradictory responses to control among employees. We consider work that has been done along these lines below.

**Empirical Work**

By now, there are many empirical studies that have been carried out in organizations that have attempted to institute normative control. We cannot include them all. However, we aim to cover some of the main themes that have emerged. To this end, we have organized empirical literature into three groups. We recognize that other groupings are possible, and that particular studies may not fit as neatly into categories as we would like. Nevertheless, the groups form a rough framework in which to explore the dominant themes.

We have titled the first group ‘Normative control is totalizing, but….’. Several large classic case studies (Casey, 1999; Casey, 1995; Hochschild, 1983/2003; Kunda, 1992) form the basis of this group. They were among the first empirical studies to illustrate how regimes of normative control impinge on the emotions, identities and behavior of employees. Like the polemical works covered earlier in this review, these studies present normative control as invading and corroding employee subjectivity and autonomy. However, their detailed empirical findings facilitated the development of a more nuanced picture, one that showed the heterogeneous effects of cultural engineering and the presence of spaces, however modest, for resistance and defense. However, in their quest to highlight the harm that normative control can do, these authors still depicted control as monolithic and pervasive. The second group of studies presents a different view. In their diverse ways, these works show the difficulties, contradictions and ambiguities that can arise when managers attempt to institute normative control. The focus here is primarily on the nature of power, including observations that older, bureaucratic forms persist. In the third group, the focus returns to employees’ diverse responses to normative control. Here,
we see a further movement away from the ‘totalization’ thesis, and an emerging preoccupation with employee identity as a vehicle through which to explore control and resistance.

**Empirical Work: (a) Normative Control is Totalizing, but...**

In 1983, when the craze for deliberately engineering ‘excellent’ cultures was just beginning, sociologist Arlie Hochschild published *The Managed Heart. Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Hochschild’s focus was on emotional labor, which she defined as ‘the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display’ (1983/2003, 7). While all ‘normal’ socialized humans perform emotional labor as part of everyday life, Hochschild was interested in people whose occupations demanded considerable work along these lines, such as flight attendants who are required to maintain a friendly demeanor, even when dealing with obnoxious passengers. The focus of this research is, therefore, somewhat different to most of the work covered in this review. We have included it because of its influence and the insightful way it drew attention to corporate practices that impinge on and distort, and even claim to own, employee emotions.

Hochschild identified two forms of emotional labor. The first is a distanced ‘surface acting’ in which ‘the expression on my face or the posture of my body feels “put on”. It is not “part of me”’ (p. 36). In the second, ‘deep acting’, workers consciously manipulate their feelings so that they can put on a more convincing act. Employees engaged in both types of labor are in danger of burnout and emotional numbness, as they lose touch with what they ‘really’ feel. For Hochschild, ‘real’ feelings are an orienting device. They allow people ‘to locate themselves or at least to see what their own reactions are to a given event’ (p. 22). In other words, access to ‘undistorted’ emotions facilitates autonomy.

In sorting her empirical data, Hochschild delineated different types of identification with company goals, a practice which many researchers after her would follow:

There are three stances that workers seem to take toward work, each with its own sort of risk. In the first, the worker identifies too wholeheartedly with the job, and therefore risks burnout. In the second, the worker clearly distinguishes herself from the job and is less likely to suffer burnout ... . In the third, the worker distinguishes herself from her act ... and sees the job as positively requiring the capacity to act; for this worker there is some risk of estrangement from acting altogether, and some cynicism about it ... The first stance is potentially more harmful than the other two, but the harm in all three could be reduced, I feel, if workers could feel a greater sense of control over the conditions of their working lives (p. 187).

For Hochschild, worker control involved a capacity to distance the self from the more intrusive aspects of work. Workers who are in control ‘clearly define for themselves when they are acting and when they are not; they know when their deep or surface acting is “their own” and when it is part of the commercial show’ (p. 188).

While Hochschild advocated distancing as a protection against encroachment, two landmark studies of cultural engineering that were published during the 1990s –Kunda’s *Engineering Culture* (1992) and Casey’s *Work, Self and Society* (1995; see also Casey
depicted distancing as problematic. Both these works were based on ethnographic studies of culture change in high technology firms. Kunda framed his analysis in terms of role embracement and distancing. In role embracement, workers accepted and enacted the beliefs, emotions and behaviours allocated to them by the cultural engineers (1992, 156). In distancing, they ‘assume[d] a reflective and openly self-conscious stance’ in order to comment, often cynically, on the culture and its effects on themselves and others (pp. 157-8). Distancing ‘is a declaration of autonomy … a hint that the self behind the role is not coterminous with the role’ (p. 188). However, because embracement was necessary for career advancement, Kunda found that many employees combined the stances, and were able to switch deftly between them, depending on the circumstances (p. 158).

Like Hochschild, Kunda was interested in the costs of this play-acting, and like her, he argued that employees caught up in it were in danger of losing touch with their ‘authentic’ selves (pp. 156-159). However, because the imposed culture at Tech encouraged ‘openness’ and irony, employees were robbed of a stance from which to launch an effective critique. Self-conscious differentiation between the acting and the ‘real’ self did not provide protection against encroachment, as it did for Hochschild. Instead, it created deep ambivalence (pp. 214-216). The typical ‘self’ at Tech was ‘fluctuating [and] ironic … at war with itself and with its internalized images of self and other’ (p. 221).

Casey’s study covered similar themes, but from a psychoanalytic perspective. Like others who have criticized cultural engineering from this perspective, she highlighted the dangerous seductions associated with the ‘family’ rhetoric that was used in ‘Hephaestus’, the organization in which she conducted her research. Tied to the company through emotional affiliation, ‘designer’ employees were expected to show ‘dedication, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and passion for the product and customer’ (1999, 161). The ‘family’ culture promoted strong identification, but was based on a ‘substitute sociality’ (pp. 181, 188-91) that promoted dependence and conformity. In her work, Casey often referred to cultural engineering as ‘colonizing’ the subjectivity of employees. Under this ‘assault’, employees developed a ‘fragile corporate self’ that was ‘acutely ambivalent and conflicted’ (1995, 150).

Casey identified three ‘psychic strategies’ (1995, 163) that workers used to deflect the discomforts created by intra-psychic conflict. Some mounted defenses against normative control by engaging in ‘small-scale resistances, retreats, rationalizations and blockages’ (p. 164). Outright dissent was rare and defensive employees tended to remain anxious and ambivalent. Another strategy was ‘collusion’, in which employees adopted the emotions and behavior allocated to them by the ‘designer’ culture. For Casey, this was a means of avoiding or denying altogether the conflicts that would otherwise be experienced (p. 169). A third strategy was ‘capitulation’, a stance that ‘contains elements of both defense and collusion’ (p. 175). Capitulated employees conformed to the behavioral norms of the culture, but maintained a distance that was often ironic and cynical. Again, distancing did not protect employees. The sense of independence it gave was illusory, as employees adopting this position were still under ‘disciplinary siege’ (p. 180). Like their colleagues, they were susceptible to anxiety and narcissist tendencies.

Clearly, Casey viewed cultural engineering as invasive and totalizing, despite finding that employees were by no means uniformly receptive to the prescribed norms and values. It was not the homogeneity of effects that made the culture totalizing, but the fact that employees could not escape its intrusions, no matter what they did:
In such a colonization, self-constituent processes of self-regulated emotional experiences and expression, and self-determined judgment and effectivity, are altered and usurped by the practices of the designed corporate culture (1999, 159).

Kunda, like Casey, noted that different employees responded differently to normative control (1992, 224 -5). However, like her, he did not consider this variability to be a sign of autonomy. Employees were trapped, despite the generous pay and tolerance of irony. In Kunda’s view, however, the regime did not ‘brainwash’ people. This metaphor was much too crude to describe the process. Instead:

the culture trap works in more insidious and perhaps more dangerous ways: the corporation does not necessarily ‘capture the soul’, but systematically undermines its foundation. Thus, for many at Tech, the authenticity of their own (and others’) experience is simultaneously prescribed and cast into doubt; life as theater becomes an all-encompassing reality; and the ability to establish a life and a self independent of the corporation's influence is diminished (p. 225).

The empirical studies included in this section provide a more nuanced picture of the effects of normative control than those whose critiques were based on polemics alone. Hochschild, Kunda and Casey did not find homogeneity and simple obedience, but complex, subtle, and often contradictory responses. Nevertheless, in exploring these responses, they tended to homogenize the mechanisms of organizational control, depicting them as unified, pervasive and ultimately quite effective. In the next two sections, we examine studies that challenged this view.

**Empirical Work: (b) The Rediscovery of Bureaucracy**

Compared to the works in the previous section, the studies included under this heading are quite diverse in their findings. We have grouped them together because they all, in one way or another, challenge the assumption that ‘culture change’ represents a new, coherent and effective set of practices that is replacing older rule-bound mechanisms of control. Although employee responses do figure in the articles included here, the overall emphasis is on using empirical data to explore the forms of control and resistance that emerge in organizations when cultural engineering is attempted. One of the main themes running through these works is that the effects of such programs do not necessarily reflect the intentions of their designers and implementers. When Harris and Ogbonna (2002) combined data from ten case studies of culture change in the UK retailing and services industries, they found eight ‘unintended outcomes’ of attempts to institute change. The programs sometimes degenerated into meaningless rituals, with behavioral compliance rather than deep-seated alteration of values being evident. Programs were sometimes hijacked and subverted by powerful groups. Cynicism was rife when programs were poorly designed and uncoordinated, and when managerial actions contradicted the rhetoric. The authors attributed these outcomes ‘to the vagaries of human nature’ and the fact that ‘either consciously or unconsciously, employees avoid or resist attempts to control their working lives and prescribe their values and beliefs’ (p. 46).

In a frequently cited longitudinal study of self-managed teams in a manufacturing company, Barker (1993) found another ‘unintended outcome’ of normative control. The teams in this company were initially set up with the intention that they be self-managed
through ‘a loosely held consensus about abstract values’ (p. 433). This seemed to work for a while, but over a period of a few years the teams developed strict rules for themselves that resembled those of the old bureaucratic regime. Barker was careful to distinguish this new ‘concertive’ control from the old bureaucratic form. In bureaucratic control, the centre of authority lay outside the team. With concertive control, it resided among the team members themselves (pp. 411, 431). Barker claimed that this form of control was ‘more powerful, less apparent, and more difficult to resist’ than ‘the former bureaucracy’ (p. 408). He noted the ‘ironic paradox’ evident in his findings: the promise of self-management had not produced freedom, but tighter control (p. 435). Contrary to the conclusions of Harris and Ogbonna above, Barker saw workers as controllable, and willing to participate in their own subjugation. This compliance was not achieved through ‘values’, however, but through a new form of control that combined bureaucratic rules with the capacity of normative control to infiltrate employee subjectivity where behaviour is governed by emotions of affiliation, guilt and shame.

Other researchers have also questioned the assumption that normative controls have effectively replaced bureaucracy. In a study of a large consultancy firm, Kärreman and Alvesson (2004) found that ‘technocratic’ controls such hierarchy, standardized work procedures and continuous performance appraisals existed alongside looser ‘socio-ideological’ forms. These forms were not apparently in conflict, nor was there any mention of cynicism or ambiguity. Instead, the two ‘layers of control … feed upon and inform each other’ (p. 171). The socio-ideological controls in this study were informal and seemed to develop out of employee interaction rather than being imposed from above. This may have alleviated tendencies towards cynicism. Such tendencies were, however, evident in a study of top-down culture change in a UK grocery chain. This program, whose rhetoric promoted ‘co-operation’, ‘common purpose’, ‘trust’ and ‘mutual exchange’ (Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003, 1160) was likened by one manager to ‘communism … do as I say, not as I do!’ (p. 1165). In this case, exhortations about openness and honesty were accompanied by increased surveillance and interference from head office.

Despite reporting difficulties in implementation, and noting how control mechanisms that are touted as ‘value-based’ are often intertwined with, or even masquerading as, more rule-bound regimes, the authors above still tended to see normative control as a relatively coherent and identifiable concept. Drawing on an ethnographic study of cultural engineering in a coke-making plant, McLoughlin et al. (2005) challenged the idea that normative culture change is an identifiable ‘thing’ that employees can variously resist, distort or comply with. Instead, because it is a dialectical process comprising both design and emergence, it is inherently unpredictable and ambiguous. Ambiguities ‘are not simply epiphenomena, a reaction to cultural change, but a characteristic of the enacted culture itself’ (p. 84).

It is evident in this section that there is diversity in the way academics have interpreted empirical data gathered from organizations implementing normative control. This may be due to variations in the types of organizations observed, the types of employees who work there, and the particular practices through which control was effected (or attempted). It may also be due to the ideological and theoretical predilections of the academics conducting the research. In theorizing the nature of control, academics must select among available data and make generalizations. In this process, there is considerable room for interpretation. Nevertheless, despite the diversity in the details, some consensus has
emerged. All the studies suggest that, contrary to claims made by advocates of cultural change, we are not witnessing dissolution of rule-bound forms of control in favor of newer regimes that effectively tether the hearts and minds of employees to organizational goals. Older forms of control persist, and there are considerable difficulties in implementing the new.

**Empirical Work: (c) Diverse Employee Responses**

In this final section we return to empirical work that concentrates on the actions and responses of employees. While Kunda (1992) and Casey (1995; 1999) incorporated diverse employee responses into their thesis that cultural engineering subtly and inevitably undermines employee autonomy, other researchers have regarded non-engagement, cynicism and resistance as signs that employees can evade and subvert organizational control. Such evasions were evident, for instance, in Van Maanen’s entertaining account (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989) of his time working as a ride operator in Disneyland, one of the companies heralded as ‘excellent’ by Peters and Waterman (1982). Despite management’s concerted attempts to engineer a uniformly friendly and dedicated workforce, small resistances abounded. These began at training, which was accompanied by ‘much satirical banter, mischievous winkings, and playful exaggeration’ (Van Maanen and Kunda 1989, 65). Ride operators conspired to organize maximum ‘time-outs’ from ride duty, in order to loaf, socialise and engage in ‘mating games’. Various ruses, such as the ‘seat-belt squeeze’ were used to punish difficult customers (pp. 62, 67). These strategies are similar to those celebrated as ‘Švejkism’ by Fleming and Sewell (2002). This is a pattern of behaviour named after a fictional soldier, Josef Švejk, who resisted army discipline through subtle and frequently invisible forms of opposition such as feigning ignorance, ‘foot dragging’ and displaying excessive but patently insincere compliance. Fleming and Sewell argue that Švejkism can operate as an ‘embodied ethic’ (p. 869) that can subtly undermine normative control.

There is some work that has attempted to systematically identify and account for the various responses evident among employees confronted with cultural change. This work confirms findings by Hochschild, Kunda and Casey that employees vary in their degrees of commitment. Harris and Ogbonna (1998) interviewed a range of employees from two UK companies in the retail sector that had undergone top-down cultural engineering. They differentiated employees along two axes – their ‘willingness to change’ and the strength of the subcultures to which they belonged. Scoring employees as high, medium or low along these axes yielded nine response types, ranging from active rejection (low willingness to change, high subcultural strength) to active acceptance (high willingness, low subcultural strength). The authors were ‘surprised’ by the ‘range of employee reactions which are between the two extremes’ (p. 89). In other words, they too found that many employees were ambivalent about change. Turnbull (2001) interviewed middle managers in a large engineering firm subjected to a ‘corporate values’ programme. She found six response types: evangelists, untouched professionals, critical thinkers, actors, skeptics and open cynics. She mapped these along two axes – committed/uncommitted and critical/uncritical (with a middle zone for the in-between). Thus between the extremes of the evangelists (committed, uncritical) and the open cynics (uncommitted, critical) we see more complex responses such as those of critical thinkers, who were committed to change but who openly questioned its directions and processes, and skeptics, a common response type characterized by commitment to the job, but not the change process.
Clearly there is much less ‘homogenization of emotion and sentiment’ resulting from cultural engineering than early critics, such as Ray (1986, 293), had feared. Poststructuralist and Foucauldian scholars, who have been somewhat unfairly blamed for the totalization thesis have also produced studies exploring diverse employee responses to normative control. The findings they present are similar to those already covered. However, they are framed in terms that reflect distinctive poststructuralist concerns, such as the nexus between subjectivity and power/knowledge/discourse. While the Foucauldian work covered earlier in this review tended to draw a unilinear and deterministic arrow from managerial discourses to worker subjectivity, studies that were based on empirical workplace data allow for multiple, often conflicting discourses and a greater sense of employee agency. Indeed, Knights and McCabe (Knights & McCabe, 2000a) explicitly stated that they, as scholars inspired by Foucault, were ‘anxious to remedy’ the ‘overly deterministic and omnipotent conception of power’ (p. 427) that was sometimes evident in the work of their colleagues. In their view, ‘because processes of interpretation are inescapable features of work organization and the self-formation processes of employee subjectivity, staff retain considerable discretionary autonomy’ (p. 422). Thus, in Collinson’s (1994) study, shop floor workers in a UK factory interpreted a US-inspired culture change effort as ‘Yankee bullshit’, while valorising their own craft knowledge as ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ (pp. 32-33). In a similar vein, Holmer-Nadesan (1996) found that female service workers at a university residence in the US refused to adopt the identities set out for them by cultural engineers. Instead, they drew on discourses of gender, class and family to craft alternative identities for themselves as surrogate mothers to the students in their care.

Foucault’s influence on critical management studies has encouraged an emphasis on issues associated with subjectivity and identity. In recent years, we have seen a stream of papers that have explored the workings of normative control through the identity struggles that they generate within and among employees (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2001; Knights & McCabe, 2000b; Sveningsson & Alvesson, 2003; Thomas & Linstead, 2002; Tracey, 2000). These studies disavow the idea that identities are fixed and stable. Instead, they are shifting – constructed and reconstructed within and against waves of organizational change. Scholars vary in the degree to which they emphasize fragility or resilience in processes of self-formation. Studies that highlight fragility and fragmentation include those by Collinson (2003) and Thomas and Linstead (2002). These authors depict organizational members as chronically subject to anxiety and insecurity as they are buffeted about by conflicting and ever-changing expectations and demands. In contrast, the workers described by Ezzamel et al. (2001) exhibited resilient identities as they resisted proposed changes to their workplace. They strongly identified with established modes of working that they were loathe to change. Resistance for them was not just instrumental, but an expression of ‘the robustness and vigour of [their] self-identity’ (p. 1067). Resourceful and relatively resilient selves were also identified among front-line service workers (Rosenthal, 2004), managers in the UK Public Services (Thomas & Davies, 2005) and highly-educated scientists in a consulting firm (Robertson & Swan, 2003). In these studies, employees are depicted as actively positioning themselves within and against discourses of control. While subjected to control, they are also able to utilize organizational resources to secure their identities and pursue their own interests.

To summarise, empirical investigations have indicated that employees vary in their responses to normative control. Although academics seem to agree on this point, they differ in their interpretations of this finding, and how they integrate it into their
conceptualizations of the nature and workings of normative control. For some, control remains pervasive and totalizing, and attempts to escape it through cynicism and small resistances are not signs of autonomy, but indications that individuals are ambivalent and/or the ‘system’ is robust enough to accommodate these ultimately futile gestures (Fleming & Spicer, 2003). For others, attempts to institute normative control are inevitably impartial and incomplete, as employees, through their capacities for interpretation and reflection, are always able to construct and adopt alternative positions. Rather than reinforcing control, these alternative positions are manifestations of autonomy.

Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research

In this review, we have described how scholars who are critical of normative control have presented and theorized its dangers, limits and impacts on the organizational self. In this final section, we highlight three interrelated features of the literature that could be carried into further research in this area. Firstly, there has been a distinct move away from the view that normative control is monolithic and totalizing. This change of emphasis is largely the result of empirical work, which has uncovered a range of employee responses, many of which challenge the notion that normative ‘culture change’ can effectively secure employee commitment. However, while the totalization thesis is no longer tenable, scholars, in their quest to grasp ‘the’ nature of contemporary control (for example, control is shifting, control is incomplete, and so on), have tended to downplay differences in the ways control is manifested in different types of organizations. While control is never total, the forms of regulation evident in McDonalds franchises are somewhat different to those operating among highly educated workers in small entrepreneurial companies, for instance. Likewise, the self-strategies through which teenaged McDonalds workers comply with, evade or resist control are likely to be quite different to those deployed by mature, skilled managers in senior positions. Comparative work along these lines could add considerable nuance to our understanding of how organizational control is effected in diverse situations, and how employees located in different organizational and social settings engage with it.

Secondly, the review highlights how interpretations of normative control and its impacts on the self are coloured by researchers’ pre-existing theoretical and ideological commitments. Thus, writers working in the psychoanalytical tradition appeal to deep-seated fears and desires in their explanations. Those influenced by Foucault emphasize how subjectivity is constituted through discourses, while those sympathetic to Labour Process Theory have sought to resurrect resistance. Indeed, much of the debate about normative control has taken place against a backdrop of rivalry between these latter two approaches (Jermier et al., 1994; Knights, 2000b; Thompson & Ackroyd, 1995). To carry the debate forward, we suggest that scholars avoid searching for one single ‘truth’ about control, but rather appreciate how different meta-theories about humans and the nature of control open up different explanatory possibilities, while closing off or discouraging others.

Thirdly, while the articles and monographs included in this review foreground normative control as the major issue of analytical concern, they also, with varying degrees of explicitness, invoke the notion of autonomy as a polemic resource and/or empirical finding. While there has been some explicit theorizing about the complex meanings of
autonomy in contemporary organizations (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Knights & Willmott, 2002), much more could be done along these lines. Again, a broader meta-theoretical approach holds promise. As several writers have pointed out, autonomy - as a ‘right’ to freedom, but also a form of self-governance and self-responsibility - has emerged over the past few centuries as a quintessential western value, a ‘moral source’ from which to launch critique (Taylor 1989, Knights and Willmott 2002). We see this most strongly in writers who mobilize a humanist conception of autonomy as an unalloyed ‘good’ that is being stolen and/or subverted by corporate forms of control. However, in deploying autonomy as a source of moral value, these writers often idealize and romanticize it. There is scope within critical management studies for a less romantic view. Autonomy is always exercised within constraints, and there are trade-offs, especially when it comes to paid employment. We give up our time and effort, invest our emotions and submit ourselves to manipulation, in exchange for money, and if we're lucky, mental stimulation, satisfaction and recognition. When can we say that (some degree of) autonomy is present in this situation, and when do the costs of the trade-offs become such that autonomy is seriously eroded? These issues reflect general tensions around the various meanings of autonomy, which have been well explored in philosophy and social theory (Beck, 2000; Christman, 1988; Dennett, 2003; Rössler, 2002). Rather than speak of autonomy in terms of absence or presence, it might be better to recognize and explore its multiple complex meanings, and to probe the 'degrees of freedom' (Rössler, 2002, 150) that are afforded by different organizational situations.

Our final suggestion for further research is also related to the notion of autonomy. As academics, we should recognize how our own attitudes to autonomy colour our interpretations of what goes on in organizations. Notwithstanding the influence of post-structuralist readings of autonomy, most of us, under the influence of western liberal democratic cultures, have learnt to value it, and the critique that it enables. Explicitly or implicitly, we celebrate resistance when we find it among the employees that we study, and lament its apparent absence. Accompanying this, however, is a relative lack of interest within the more recent empirically-informed literature in those employees who apparently willingly comply with mechanisms of normative control. Although these employees are not as numerous as early critics feared, they do appear. With the recent emphasis on recovering resistance, ambivalence and evasion, we have lost interest in those who are apparently successfully ‘controlled’. Perhaps it is time to reconsider them, but in ways that avoid homogenization, or using them as ciphers for ideology-based arguments. Careful empirical analyses of the dynamics that produce these forms of selfhood, combined with reflexive examinations of our own responses to what we find, may lead to new insights into what troubles us so much, as critical management scholars, about normative control.
References


