

Newcastle Working Papers
in Linguistics
Volume 15 (2009)

Concession on Different Levels of Linguistic
Connection: Typology of Negated Causal Links

AGNIESZKA LATOS



ISSN 2041-1057

© 2009 by the author

<http://www.ncl.ac.uk/linguistics/research/workingpapers/index.htm>

Concession on Different Levels of Linguistic Connection: Typology of Negated Causal Links*

AGNIESZKA LATOS

Abstract

This paper attempts a classification of concessive relations, often referred to as ‘anti-causal’ constructions¹, from a functional perspective. The focus of the paper is the distribution of concessive constructions on different levels of discourse. The theoretical starting-point of the analysis is the model of adverbial entity types elaborated by Hengeveld (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) and further developed by Crevels (2000) within the Theory of Functional Grammar. In accordance with the commonly accepted distinction between ideational and interpersonal functions of a language – which has a long tradition in linguistics, identifiable for instance with Bühler (1934), Halliday (1970) or Prandi (2004) – distinct concessive types have been identified and described.

1. Introduction

It is generally agreed that a standard sentence of the form *although p, q* carries an implicit assumption roughly equating to *normally, if p, then not q*. The implicit assumption encoded by the concessive connectors can be stated simply as *p implies not q* or *p leads the hearer to expect not q*. Consequently, by uttering (1) the speaker implicates that if the glass falls down off the table, it usually breaks:

- (1) Although the glass fell down off the table, it didn’t break.

In other words, the implicit assumption is based on the expected causal² relationship between the falling down of the glass and its breaking, which in this particular case is ‘frustrated’. Therefore, the concessive relation can be defined as a relation of unexpectedness between propositions *p* and *q*, consisting in the fact that a premise *p* implicates a consequence *not q*, and such an implication is unexpectedly

* The present paper is partly based on a chapter of my PhD thesis. I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Prof. Michele Prandi for insightful comments, fruitful discussions and incisive suggestions. I also thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful commentary on earlier drafts of this paper. All remaining mistakes or inaccuracies are, of course, my own.

¹ There are basically two senses in which the term *concession* is used at present: (i) ‘anti-causal’ relation based on the *if p, then not q* assumption, and (ii) discourse-pragmatic relation based on the Cardinal Concessive schema, involving the sequence of three actions: claiming, acknowledging and countering; the latter account of concession has been developed in the field of spoken language analysis (see, for instance, Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2000 or Barth-Weingarten 2003).

² The term *causality* denotes here a conceptual relationship between a contingent sufficient condition *p* (‘cause’) and its contingent effect *q* (see Prandi 2004). In spite of a widespread association of the cause/effect relation with phenomenon or events, the fundamental assumption of the present paper is that causality involves phenomenal *causes* as well as a variety of *motives* for human actions, including *motives for thinking and speaking* (see Section 3.1.).

violated by a consequence *q*. As we will see in the following, causality, the crucial semantic component of concession – and, more specifically, its semantic categorisation – forms the formal basis for a classification of concessive relations in the tradition of formal distinction between different levels of adverbial connection.

The idea that a natural language fulfils various tasks, or more specifically, functions has a long tradition mainly, but not exclusively, in European linguistics. Bühler's (1934) distinction between representational, expressive and conative functions, Jakobson's (1960) model of discourse functions, Halliday's (1970) tripartite distribution into ideational, interpersonal and textual functions are good examples here. All the above distinctions account for the fundamental differences between what is commonly called *cognitive meaning*, based on the speaker's experience of the real world, and socially motivated linguistic behaviour.

Within the context of a general tendency to consider and analyse language in terms of its use, the notion of linguistic *domains* or *levels* plays an important role in a number of functionally or cognitively oriented approaches. Following the fundamental claim that utterances belong to and function within distinct linguistic domains, different semantic-functional or discourse types have been further examined with regard to more specific linguistic elements or relations, such as adverbial clauses (e.g. Lyons 1977, Schiffrin 1987, Hengeveld 1990, 1993, Sweetser 1990).

My agenda is as follows. I begin by presenting Hengeveld's model (Section 2.1.) and its re-elaborated version by Crevels (2000) (Section 2.3.). I then discuss both proposals (Sections 2.2. & 2.3.) as well as other issues relating to adverbial connection (Section 3). I conclude with a suggestion of how different levels of concessive relations can be described in a more adequate and empirically stronger way (Section 4).

2. Functional Grammar: adverbial entity types

The classification of adverbial constructions proposed by Quirk *et al.* (1985) identifies two different adjunct types (predication versus sentence) and two disjunct types of a higher level of linguistic connection (attitudinal versus style). This distinction has been further elaborated within the Functional Grammar framework [henceforth FG] and yielded the general dichotomy proposed by Dik *et al.* between the representational level of the utterance which 'deals with the description of a SoA³ obtaining in some real or imaginary world to which speakers want to refer' and the interpersonal level which 'deals with the way in which the speaker presents the information concerning the situation referred to the addressee' (Dik *et al.* 1990: 27).

In line with this twofold repartition, Hengeveld (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998) elaborates his model of adverbial entity types, which was in turn adapted by Crevels (2000) to account specifically for concessive relations. Let us have a closer look at these two proposals.

2.1. Hengeveld's model of adverbial entity types

The first classification of the adverbial entity types to be discussed here was proposed by Hengeveld (1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998). In order to account for the expression of interclausal relations, Hengeveld identifies different semantic types of

³ The acronym SoA stands for *state of affairs*, which indicates something that 'can be the case in some world', and can be evaluated in terms of its existence (Dik 1997: 105).

adverbial clauses which are arranged hierarchically in five classes, denominated *orders*⁴. As we can see in Table 1, each class denotes a distinct entity and can be evaluated against different criteria:

Table 1: Entity types in Hengeveld's model

Type of entities	Description of entity	Source of evaluation
Zero Order	Property or relation	Applicability
First Order	Individual	Existence
Second Order	State of affairs	Reality
Third Order	Propositional content	Truth
Fourth Order	Speech act	Felicity

The zero order entity (Property/Relation) constructions describe a complex but single event. This entity, therefore, cannot be designated by adverbial clauses which form part of a concessive relation established between two independent events: the main clause event which occurs contrary to the expectation created by the adverbial clause event⁵. Similarly, the first order entity (Individual) is not relevant to adverbial constructions, since it can only be expressed by means of noun phrases and not by means of clauses.

States of affairs (henceforth SoA) are second order entities which can be located in space and time and evaluated in terms of their reality. SoAs exist whether they are thought about or not, thus they are defined as user-independent. In Hengeveld's view, the subordinate clause of the second order describes the main clause event without there being any intentional involvement on the part of an agent. Consequently, SoA adverbial types cannot host any expression of propositional attitude nor be subjected to illocutionary modifications:

- (2) The streets are wet because it is raining. (from Hengeveld 1993: 122)
 (3) ??The streets are wet because **honestly** it is raining.

Finally, concessive relations are classified by Hengeveld as third order entities (Propositional Content) which, unlike SoAs, cannot be located either in space or in time and may be evaluated only in terms of their truth. Let us consider:

- (4) He got the job although he had no qualifications. (from Hengeveld 1993: 123)

Propositional Contents are seen as mental constructs, thoughts about SoAs which only exist in the mind of their users; hence they are user-dependent. In (5) the reason adverbial clause does not cause the main clause event in a literal sense. Its propositional content, *her sister would visit her*, is considered to describe the fact which leads the participant, Jenny, to engage in the event presented in the main clause, that is, *Jenny went home*:

⁴ Hengeveld extends Lyon's (1977: 442-7) ontological distinction between first-order, second-order and third-order entities.

⁵ In their typological study of adverbial clauses, Thompson & Longacre (1985: 177) observe that concessive adverbial clauses are generally not renderable with a single non-anaphoric lexical item, i.e. one adverbial word.

- (5) Jenny went home because her sister would visit her. (from Hengeveld 1993:120)

Accordingly, the Propositional Content clauses are capable of hosting expressions of propositional attitude:

- (6) Jenny went home because her sister **might** visit her. (from Hengeveld 1993: 121, emphasis mine, AL)

Fourth order entities (Speech Act) are located in space and time and can be evaluated in terms of felicity. The source of explanation here is the speaker. As a consequence, the adverbial clause cannot be interpreted as the reason for which the event presented in the main clause took place. Rather, it is claimed to represent the consideration that leads the speaker to arrive at the conclusion contained in the main clause and can thus be seen as constituting a separate speech act:

- (7) Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her. (from Hengeveld 1993: 120)

Since explanation clauses have an illocutionary component, illocutionary modifications may be expressed within them:

- (8) Jenny isn't here, for **honestly** I don't see her. (from Hengeveld 1993: 121)

The validity of the proposed classification of adverbial clauses or *satellites*, to use FG term, has been demonstrated not only by semantic arguments, but also in relation to systematic formal differences between the identified groups of adverbial clauses pertaining to the different layers of the model. In the present paper, I will focus on the formal criteria advanced by Hengeveld, leaving out of my discussion the particulars concerning the proposed systematic correlations between the adverbial types and the linguistic format used for their expression.

2.2. Some critical remarks on Hengeveld's model

From an overall perspective, the classification proposed by Hengeveld seems to provide us with categories based on clear-cut distinctions between the types of entity designated by adverbial constituents. However, the categorization of adverbial constructions according to this multi-layered model is not always unproblematic. To me, the main theoretical problem concerning Hengeveld's proposal is the definition of the discriminative criteria which account for the distribution of adverbial types on different levels of linguistic connection. The proposed categories or formulas are not clearly defined; first, because they refer, at least partially, to some specific semantic features of single interclausal relations, and second, because, as remarked by Vet (1998), it is not always clear to what kind of reality the formulas proposed by Hengeveld or parts of them refer⁶.

⁶ In Vet's opinion: [...] the formulas [of the layered structure of the clause developed by Dik and Hengeveld, AL] are at least partially uninterpreted. As a consequence, the model does not entirely account for one of the main functions of human language, namely that it makes it possible to speak about entities outside the language and which exist independently of the language (Vet 1998: 1).

For instance, unlike causal relations, classified as three different semantic types pertaining to three distinct orders:

- (9) The fuse blew because we had overloaded the circuit. (Cause: second order)
 - (5) Jenny went home because her sister would visit her. (Reason: third order)
 - (7) Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her. (Explanation: fourth order)
- (all examples from Hengeveld 1993: 120)

the concessive relation is described by Hengeveld as if it were strictly a third-order entity, namely Propositional Content⁷ (but Crevels 2000).

Moreover, applying his formulas (see Section 2.1.), it is unclear whether (10) should be classified as a second order or as a third order entity, and whether (11) and (12) both belong to the third order or do not. Of course, we can regard both subordinate clauses in (13) and (14) as separate speech acts; yet by a careful comparison we could notice that they differ in some respect, too. I shall return to this issue later.

- (10) The fuse didn't blow although we had overloaded the circuit. (Concession: second order)
- (11) Jenny didn't go home although her sister came to visit her. (Concession: third order)
- (12) Jenny didn't go home, although she knew that her sister might visit her. (Concession: third order)
- (13) Jenny is here, although I don't see her. (Concession: fourth order).
- (14) Jenny is here, although I'm sure you already know it. (Concession: fourth order).

To begin with, Hengeveld's problem with interpreting concessive relations at the second order layer, that is a SoA, is caused, in my opinion, by confusing two concepts which, though related, should be kept apart: intrinsic semantic structure of a given adverbial relation and its entity status, namely, its pertinence to one of the different orders or levels of linguistic connection. The entity status should be ascribed to an adverbial relation on the basis of clear and independent criteria. Let us consider again examples (4) and (5), repeated below for convenience:

- (4) He got the job although he had no qualification. (from Hengeveld 1993: 123)
- (5) Jenny went home because her sister would visit her. (from Hengeveld 1993: 120)

One may wonder whether the above constructions, classified by Hengeveld as Propositional Content expressions, should be considered only as pure mental constructs, or if they can also be interpreted as referring to the two SoAs that occur in the real world, since the fact that he does not have the necessary qualifications to do the job and the fact that he got it anyway in (4) can occur independently of what we may think about it. We can agree with Hengeveld that in (5) the adverbial clause does not cause the main clause event in any literal sense; it rather represents a SoA that provides the motivation for the occurrence of the event conveyed by the main clause. Similarly, the

⁷ Hengeveld subsequently recognized this problem: '[...], a problem in the analysis of Concession clauses is that they may have a second order interpretation' (Hengeveld 1998: 417, notes), but offered no explanation for it.

concessive contrast expressed in (4) cannot be seen as a complex event which occurred in a literal sense. The relation is created by the speaker who presents two co-existing SoAs as incompatible given her expectation that the occurrence of the SoA in the subordinate clause should normally prevent the realization of the SoA in the main clause.

Yet, his proposal to interpret the constructions such as (4) and (5) as expressing an ‘idea’ or ‘consideration’ which is not a SoA any more but becomes a Propositional Content remains imprecise and vague. According to Hengeveld, the source of the reason adverbial clause, classified as a third order entity, is not the speaker but the main clause participant Jenny. This would imply that the propositional contents of the third-order adverbial clauses refer to the main clause participant’s consideration rather than to the speaker’s idea; in other words, (5) may be paraphrased with *Jenny went home because* (she knew/expected that) *her sister would visit her*. There is however a notional problem here. Hengeveld’s definition of third-order entities as ‘mental constructs, thoughts about states of affairs that only exist in the mind of their USERS [emphasize mine, AL]’ (Hengeveld 1998: 345) would imply the opposite, i.e. that the propositional contents of such constructions refer rather to the speaker’s thought or consideration: (I conclude that) *Jenny went home because* (I know/expect that) *her sister would visit her*. In addition, it leads, in my view, to an erroneous formal distinction between SoA and Propositional Content level. In fact, the propositional contents conveyed by both terms of an interclausal relation - *p* and *q* – always denote simple SoAs (see also Vet 1998)⁸.

Furthermore, in (4) the implicit semantic relation does not hold between the SoAs described in the two clauses but, as pointed out by Iten (1998), between the SoA described by the subordinate clause and the negation of the main clause, i.e. *normally if p, then not q*. Iten’s (1998: 4) intuitive remark: ‘[...] it is quite likely that there is no real-world use of *although*, AT LEAST NOT IN THE SAME WAY IN WHICH THERE IS A REAL-WORLD USE OF *BECAUSE*’ [emphasis mine, AL] has been well formalized by Prandi (2004). According to his proposal, we can say that in (5) the causal relation is:

both coded by the conjunction *because* and explicitly asserted. [...] It is explicitly asserted because the content of the interclausal link – the relationship of consequence [*if p, then q*, AL] - exactly coincides with the overt meaning of the conjunction. (Prandi 2004: 40)

Unlike (5), in (4) the encoded meaning (frustrated causal relation) and the explicit meaning, i.e. the occurrence of the SoA *p* and the occurrence of the SoA *q*, do not coincide, since the complex sentence (4) does not explicitly assert *normally if p, then not q*. This, of course, does not prevent the concessive relation from being interpretable at the Content or SoA level, that is, as conjoining two assertions referring to the two distinct SoAs - the fact that somebody does not possess necessary qualifications and the fact that he has got the job.

⁸ In Vet’s proposal (1998), Nuclear Prediction and Core Prediction both describe an event type (a SoA type) which is ‘grounded’ by the tense operator at the Propositional Content layer (a possible fact); in this way the layer SoA does not appear as an independent entity, but as an integral part of Propositional Content. Only at the Utterance Content layer, the speaker’s attitudes are ascribed to Propositional Contents.

Although Crevels (2000) apparently ‘corrects’ this problem and classifies concessives both at Content and Epistemic level, she actually does not ask why the distinction between SoAs, or events, and Propositional Contents, as proposed by Hengeveld (1998: 345), is if not groundless, at least confusing. Let us now examine more closely this issue. Following the formulas of Hengeveld’s proposal, we can assume that both (15) and (16) refer to the second order entity (SoA), since the real-world causality connects the two clauses: the headache is the real-world cause of John’s falling asleep and the rain is the real-world reason for which John uses his umbrella:

- (15) John fell asleep because he had a headache. (Cause)
 (16) John has opened his umbrella because it is raining. (Reason)

The real-world connection is also proved by the fact that neither (17) nor (18) can host any expression of attitudinal or illocutionary modification:

- (17) ??John fell asleep because he **probably** had a headache.
 (18) ??John has opened his umbrella because **honestly** it is raining.

In (15) the subordinate clause describes the main clause event as having occurred without any intentional involvement of the agent, John. But unlike (15), in (16) the propositional content of the adverbial clause leads the participant of the main clause, John, to engage in the main clause event. The construction (16) expresses, hence, a propositional attitude, i.e. the decision of the agent to perform an action. This latter characteristic of (16), according to Hengeveld’s categorization, corresponds rather to the description of the third order entities (Propositional Contents). So in (16) the reality of the causal connection is an argument for considering the whole construction as a SoA, whereas the intentionality of John’s acting seems to be a justification for its classification as a Propositional Content.

First, we can assume that the difference between (15) and (16) reflects only the existence of two different types of the real-world causality: phenomenal cause and motive for doing⁹. As Luraghi (2005: 609) points out, in the area of causality we should differentiate between the SoAs where ‘a cause co-occurs with an intentionally acting agent, and those in which it does not’. Unlike phenomenal causality, the Motive for Doing relation is characterised by an intentional involvement on the part of an agent. The distinction has been introduced by Daneš (1985) and developed further on by Prandi (1996, 2004), who explains it in the following way:

The distinction between causes and motives is deeply rooted in the most basic categories of our natural ontology. Cause is relevant to the description and explication of complex chains of phenomena in the natural world, whereas motive is relevant to description and explication of free and responsible human action. (Prandi 2004: 308)

⁹ Following the terminology introduced by philosophers of language (see, for instance, Davidson (1963), Danto (1965), and Searle (1983); cf. Prandi 2004: 316) and adopted by Daneš (1985) and Prandi (2004), in the present paper the term *motive* – indicating the intentionality of human behaviour as opposed to the phenomenal cause – has been preferred to the term *reason*, probably more common in the specialized literature.

Let us consider the following examples:

- (19) The glass broke because it fell down off the table.
- (20) Matt broke the glass because Sharon kissed Mike passionately.

(19) expresses a relation of phenomenal cause, that is, the falling down of the glass (which is the cause here) makes the glass break. In this type of causality the cause-effect relation is characterised by a strong relationship of necessity and a clear and strict temporal succession between cause and effect, that is, the cause happens before its effect (see also Previtera 1996).

(20) expresses the second type of causal relation, the relation between a human action and a motive. Unlike phenomenal cause, motive implies a free and conscious decision by the subject to carry out an action. Contrary to the fixed temporal succession in Phenomenal Cause relations, the temporal structure in Motive for Doing relations is complex and two-layered (Prandi 2004: 319). This means that besides the cause-effect sequence in which a motive represents a real fact preceding the action as in (21), Motive for Doing relations can comprise other temporal configurations as well. In such structures, which are specific to motivation, a motive chronologically follows the main action since it refers to a future event: prediction (22) or intention (23):

- (21) I took my sister's raincoat because mine got lost.
- (22) I took the raincoat because it was going to rain.
- (23) I took the raincoat because I didn't want to get wet.

The difference between cause and motive becomes more evident when the same semantic relation expressed by means of a complex sentence is consistently reformulated and placed at the higher textual connection layer thanks to the test of anaphoric substitution, as proposed by Prandi (1996, 2004). The reformulation consists in replacing the main clause event or state of affairs with a form of the verbs *happen* or *do this/do so*. The subject of *happen* or *do this/do so* represents an anaphoric substitute for the process or action presented in the main clause. In this way, the original relationship between the main clause and the subordinate clause realized in the hypotactic structures is expressed through an anaphoric relationship across the two juxtaposed sentences:

- (24) The glass broke. It happened because it fell down off the table.
- (25) Matt broke the glass. He did this because Sharon kissed Mike passionately.

The reformulation strategy allows us to verify which of the two real-world causalities is expressed by the adverbial clause. As shown by means of the reformulations in (24) and (25), these examples differ in that (24) expresses a phenomenal causality, while (25) indicates a motive for doing.

Second, Hengeveld postulates that unlike second order entities describing the real SoAs which 'exist whether they are present in the speaker's mind or not, propositional contents are mental constructs and represent rather thoughts about states of affairs' (1998: 345). It is unquestionable that the distinction between such entities is crucial, but in the light of what has been said so far it would seem that their delimitation should be formulated in a different way. Whereas the former account for relations

between SoAs or events in the represented world and such real-world relations exist independently of the speaker, the latter account for relations between communicative moves within the conversation exchange and thus represent relationships between mental entities or speech acts that do not exist independently of those who are expressing or performing them. The idea has been developed by Sweetser (1990) in her three-term distinction in the domain of adverbial clauses.

- (26) a. John came back because he loved her.
 b. John loved her, because he came back.
 c. What are you doing tonight, because there's a good movie on.
 (all examples from Sweetser 1990: 77)

Given different uses of the English conjunction *because*, Sweetser (1990: 77) proposes distinguishing between the Content Domain (26a), in which 'real-world causality connects the two clauses: that is to say, his love was the real-world cause of his coming back'; the Epistemic Domain (26b), in which '(b) is normally understood as meaning that the speaker's knowledge of John's return (as a premise) causes the conclusion that John loved her', and finally the Conversational Domain (26c), where the because-clause indicates the cause of the speech act conveyed by the main clause.

The distinction between content reading and epistemic reading is certainly an essential one, as it signals a different formal status of both relations. Unfortunately, in Sweetser's view, the ascription of content rather than epistemic interpretation to an adverbial sentence depends not on the form of a construction but on a pragmatically motivated choice. In other words, the evaluation whether an adverbial construction belongs to the Content domain or to the Epistemic domain is formally arbitrary in her model. Examining the specific properties of adverbials with reference to different semantic readings, she only suggests that, in the case of English causal and adversative conjunctions which do not require a comma separating the clauses, the commaless reading is more suitable with a content-conjunction interpretation, while an epistemic-conjunction is a more plausible reading when a comma appears between the clauses¹⁰.

This observation, though rather simplified, can also imply that Epistemic adverbial clauses in comparison to Content adverbial clauses exhibit different functional behaviour and that these functional patterns depend on what kind of relation they establish within the sentences in which they occur. Challenging Sweetser's notion of pragmatic ambiguity, Lang (2000), for instance, shows that there are more level-specific structural differences and that adverbial clauses distributed across the three domains behave differently. A similar hypothesis has been formulated by Crevels (2000), who, following Sweetser's domain theory, has extended Hengeveld's model and proposed a classification of concessives in relation to both different semantic levels of adverbial connections and the way in which they are formally expressed. Let us examine this proposal.

2.3. Crevels' classification of concessive relations

Extending Hengeveld's functional model to five layers (a textual level has been added), Crevels (2000) claims that concessive constructions can form four different

¹⁰ See also Chafe (1984): bound (commaless) versus free adverbial clauses.

kinds of relation in correspondence with second, third, fourth and fifth order entities; that is to say, Content, Epistemic, Speech Act and Textual levels, respectively. The proposed layering of concessive relations reproduces to a certain degree Sweetser's (1990) tripartition into Content, Epistemic and Speech act domains, and it can be briefly described and exemplified as follows.

In the Content domain, the SoA conveyed by the concessive clause constitutes a potential obstacle for the realization of the SoA presented in the main clause, as illustrated in (27) and (28), whereas in the Epistemic domain, the concessive clause indicates an unfavourable argument for the expression of the speaker's belief or conclusion, as in (29):

- (27) She's just had a baby although she's forty-eight. (from Crevels 2000: 30)
- (28) John left his wife even though he loves her very much. (from Crevels 2000: 30)
- (29) Although I know that John really loves his mother, he ought to go and live somewhere else. (Crevels 2000: 32)

The content expressed by Speech Act concessives should normally prevent the speaker from performing the main clause speech act (30). In addition, The Speech Act domain comprises two subtypes of concessive relations: rhetorical and evaluating, as exemplified in (31) and (32), respectively:

- (30) Although I understand your problems, get the work done tomorrow! (from Crevels 2000: 76)
- (31) I repeat that although Franco didn't like the theatre, he did like the movies and, that, for sure, he was no illiterate. (from Crevels 2000: 33)
- (32) A: Do you consider yourself the critical conscience of the public and political powers?
B: Sometimes I do, although the truth is that it isn't exactly like that. (from Crevels 2000: 33)

Finally, Textual concessives represent modifications of a whole preceding text unit based on an unforeseen turn in the discourse context, as in (33). Such a modification can sometimes assume a rectifying character like in (34):

- (33) A: From which point on did you have the feeling that you'd lost your privacy, your anonymity?
B: I still don't consider myself a popular figure, but I think that I have lost my privacy since the time I sometimes hear my name being called from behind me, or catch a look more intense than other looks...Even though one always gains other things... (from Crevels 2000: 34)
- (34) Well, actually, I force myself to read for a while every day before going to sleep. This has turned into a habit, although the truth is that nowadays I read very little time. (from Crevels 2000: 33)

As we can notice, the distinction between real-world relations and pragmatically motivated ones is signalled by the separation of the Content domain in (28) from the Epistemic domain in (29). In the Epistemic domain, the inferential process of abduction leading the speaker from the premise to the logical conclusion expressed in the main

clause is ‘denied’ and this operation has the illocutionary force. In Speech Act relations, as in (30), a speech act is performed in spite of the propositional content presented in the subordinate clause. Finally, in the Textual domain, exemplified by (33), concessive relations occur within a larger discourse context, since concessive units modify a whole preceding text which can be composed of various sentences.

The main problem, in my view, concerns the categorial status of textual concessives defined as higher order entities. The motivation which leads to identify this level is purely a matter of size and not of order. In other words, Content, Epistemic and Speech Act concessives are distinguished from Textual ones not because they are semantically different or can be used to perform diverse communicative functions, but because the concessive relation is established ‘outside’ two single clauses between bigger portions of text. This is exactly the reason why Rectifying concessives (34) seem to be semantically identical to Evaluating concessives (32), classified by Crevels as a subtype of Speech Acts concessives. Although in (32) the concessive link operates over two grammatically linked clauses and in (33) it is established thanks to cohesive means between more than two sentences, in both examples an *if p, then not q* assumption is missing. In such cases the concessive relation consists rather in rectifying the validity of the assertion expressed in the main clause (32) or through the sequences of previously uttered sentences (34) (see also König 1994, Pander Maat 1998b).

Consequently, whereas it is a truism that in the representational domain language is used for conceptualizing reality and that in the interpersonal domain it serves the individual to convey the content for specific social purposes within his/her social activity and interaction, it is somehow difficult to accept the idea that a third, superordinate function of language, namely textual one, can exist beyond the previously mentioned levels. Rather, as suggested by Widdowson (1980: 235-237), it is necessary to assume a twofold distinction between principal functions of language. While the former function serves individuals to conceptualize reality and to ascertain some control over their environment, the latter:

[...] provides the means for conveying basic conceptual propositions, for setting them in correspondence with those in the minds of other people, and for using concepts to get things done in the business of social interaction. (Widdowson 1980: 236)

The second function comprises not only the use of propositions to perform illocutions of different kinds, that is, the interpersonal aspect of communication in Halliday’s terms (1970), but it also includes the adjustment of propositions so ‘that they fit into the changing situation of shared knowledge’ (Widdowson 1980: 236) or, in other words, the *textual* aspect of communication, to use Halliday’s term again. As a consequence, textually expressed concessive relations should not be seen as distinct order entities, but rather as part of the single interpersonal domain of human communication.

Moreover, another, more subtle, problem should be pointed out here. In the Speech Act domain, two different concessive constructions are included. In the first construction type as in (30), the main clause speech act is performed in spite of the propositional content presented in the concessive clause. In the second type, called rhetorical concessives (31), the conclusion expressed in the main clause is uttered, though the premise contained in the concessive clause should actually impede its

enunciation; hence the inferential process seems to be blocked. So, we can state that Rhetorical concessives involve the same kind of logical operation on which Epistemic concessives (29) are based, which therefore implies that both types of constructions belong to the same discourse level.

Given the above problems, we may conclude that though this formal proposal has reduced significantly the observed incompatibilities of Hengeveld's adverbial entity type model, it has not solved them completely. It seems, then, that the classification elaborated by Crevels is in need of refinement and elaboration. Haegeman's and Prandi's suggestions on the different functional layers of adverbial connection could probably help us to find a possible solution to these theoretical problems in accordance with the conceptual/ communicative dichotomy postulated in the literature.

3. Different functional behaviours of adverbial clauses

According to Haegeman¹¹ (1985), there are two types of adverbial clauses which should be distinguished on the discourse level:

- (35) a. He studies linguistics because he's always been interested in languages. (Reason)
- b. He studies linguistics, because I saw him read Chomsky's book the other day. (Motivation of statement)
- (36) a. You'll get there if you leave now. (Condition)
- b. If you saw him yesterday, why are you phoning now? (Motivation of question)

(all examples from Haegeman 1985: 4)

She explains that the semantic difference between the (a) and (b) sentences can be described in terms of Content versus Epistemic adverbial clauses. The subordinate clauses in (a) specify circumstances of the event's occurrence, whereas the adverbial clauses in (b) qualify the status of the main propositions (Haegeman 1985: 4).

Haegeman claims that there is also evidence for the Content versus Epistemic distinction on the syntactic level: 'central' versus 'peripheral' adverbial clauses. Central adverbial clauses show generally a tighter syntactic integration and are more embedded within the whole construction. For instance, (a) sentences allow clefting of the subordinate clause and are subject to more tense-mood-aspect constraints. Peripheral adverbial clauses are less tightly integrated and depend rather on a higher node S which refers to the Expression or Utterance node (Haegeman 1985: 37).

This formal difference between the two kinds of adverbial relations, postulated by Haegeman, has also been observed by Prandi (1996). In his study of adverbial clauses of purpose he distinguishes between adverbials indicating a purpose connected with the propositional content of the main clause (37a/b) and adverbial clauses expressing instead the motivation leading the speaker to utter the main clause (38a/b):

¹¹ In her attempt to elaborate X-bar theory, Haegeman (1985) has provided a crucial insight into the use of adverbial clauses. This is exactly the reason why I begin with her observations, regardless of the fact that her analysis is developed within the framework of generative grammar.

- (37) a. Ho tagliato due tavole per costruire una libreria.
 AUX-PRS-1SG cut-PST-PTCP two boards to construct-INF INDF bookshelf
 'I cut two boards to build a bookshelf.' (from Prandi 1996: 75)
- b. Ho tagliato due tavole. L' ho fatto per costruire una libreria.
 AUX-PRS-1SG cut-PST-PTCP two boards DEM-SG-M AUX-PRS-1SG
 do-PST-PTCP to construct-INF INDF bookshelf
 'I cut two boards. I did this to build a bookshelf.' (from Prandi 1996: 75)
- (38) a. Per essere sincero, quella persona non mi piace.
 To be-INF frank that person NEG 1SG-DAT like-PRS-3SG
 'To be frank, I don't like that person.' (from Prandi 1996: 81)
- b. Quella persona non mi piace. Lo dico per essere sincero.
 That person NEG 1SG-DAT like-PRS-3SG DEM-SG-M say-PRS-1SG
 to be-INF frank
 'I don't like that person. I say this to be frank.' (from Prandi 1996: 81)

Applying the anaphora test of substitution, it is possible to observe some differences in the formal behaviour of both types of adverbials. Adverbials which express a propositional content purpose can be reformulated by means of a pro-predicate *do this* or *do so* containing a form of the verb *do* as in (37b). The pro-predicate contained in the reformulation maintains the same subject of the original structure and perfectly substitutes the predicate of the main clause; thus the reformulation does not change the functional position of the adverbial of purpose with respect to the main clause, but emphasizes it.

Conversely, adverbials which express motivation of statement can generally be reformulated only by means of *verbum dicendi*, as in (38b). The implicit motivation of the statement imposes the correspondence not between the subject of the adverbial of purpose and the subject of the main clause, but rather the correspondence between the subject of the adverbial of purpose and the subject of the whole statement which neither necessarily nor typically corresponds to the grammatical subject of the main clause. In the reformulation effectuated by introducing the form of the verb *say*, the adverbial of purpose does not form any functional relation with the main clause, but it depends on the predicate of the verb *say*.

Contrary to the reformulation in (37b), which emphasizes the functional relation between the main clause and the subordinate clause, the reformulation by means of the verb *say* in (38b) indicates that such a functional and structural relation is missing in the original construction (38a). Prandi argues that the predicate *do this/do so*, being a potential substitute for the predicate of the main clause, forms a paradigmatic relation with the sentence it replaces, while the verb *say* functions as a potential constituent of the whole construction, thus forming a syntagmatic relation with the sentence:

- (39) Per essere sincero, dico che questa persona non mi piace.
 To be-INF frank say-PRS-1SG that this person NEG 1SG-DAT like-PRS-3SG
 'To be frank, I say that I don't like that person.' (from Prandi 1996: 83)

Consequently, when a syntagmatic relation holds between the two clauses forming a sentence, such a construction does not allow clefting of the subordinate clause, since clefting emphasizes the original structure of the sentence and thus implies that its constituent is integrated within the functional structure; consider:

- (40) a. ^{??}É per essere sincero che quella persona non mi piace.
 be-PRS-3SG to be-INF frank that that person NEG 1SG-DAT like-PRS-3SG
 ‘It is to be frank that I don’t like that person.’ (from Prandi 1996: 84)
- b. É per essere sincero che dico che questa persona
 be-PRS-3SG to be-INF frank that say-PRS-1SG that this person
 non mi piace.
 NEG 1SG-DAT like-PRS-3SG
 ‘It is to be frank that I say that I don’t like that person’. (from Prandi 1996: 84)

The introduction of the verb *say* in (39) explicitly indicates the main action realized by this structure, that is, the speech act which is characterised by the content *I don’t like that person* and by the purpose it is performing, namely, *to be frank*. As shown below, the reformulation of this new construction by means of a pro-predicate of the verb *do* becomes possible again:

- (41) Dico che questa persona non mi piace. Lo
 say-PRS-1SG that this person NEG 1SG-DAT like-PRS-3SG DEM-SG-M
 faccio per essere sincero.
 do-PRS-1SG to be-INF frank
 ‘I say that I don’t like that person. I do so to be frank.’ (from Prandi 1996: 83)

We may conclude, therefore, that the formal distinction between two main entities in the domain of adverbial clauses, i.e. Content relations versus Epistemic/Speech Act relations, corresponds to the distinction between two different functional behaviour types of such constructions at the syntactic level: paradigmatic relations versus syntagmatic relations¹².

3.1. Two principal domains of adverbial relations

It is clear from what has been said so far that Epistemic/Speech Act adverbial clauses, although apparently identical in form to Content adverbial clauses, need to be recognized as a separate category because their function is not to modify the main clause but to modify the illocution which the speaker is performing. A similar division has been previously suggested by Halliday and Hassan (1976: 250) with their formal distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ concessive relations and by Borkin (1980: 50), who identifies two types of concessive constructions, namely, concessive sentences

¹² Such a conclusion is further confirmed by the study on German concessive and causal clauses (Günthner 1996) in which the analysis of the data reveals that speakers tend to use syntactically integrated adverbial clauses when the construction operates within the Content domain and syntactically non-integrated adverbial clauses when causal or concessive constructions operate within the Speech Act or Epistemic domain.

which describe dissonance of an empirical nature as in (42a) and those expressing dissonance of a rhetorical nature as in (42b) (see also König 1994):

- (42) a. Even though he had not eaten for days, he looked strong and healthy. (from Borkin 1980: 50)
 b. Even though this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be greater. (from Borkin 1980: 50)

Accordingly to the conceptual/communicative distinction between Content and Epistemic/Speech Act relations, we can assume as follows. In the representational domain - the realm of conceptual formulations of propositions - adverbial clauses describe relations regarding the representation of some real or imagined worlds. In the interpersonal domain – the realm of communicative use of propositions - they form a part of the illocution¹³ and are concerned with the particular way in which the speaker expresses or organizes the represented content (see also Kroon 1998, Risselada 1998).

Moreover, we can propose to make a further distinction in both domains. In the domain of real-world relations, as mentioned previously, it is possible to distinguish between two different types of real-world causality: Phenomenal Cause and Motive for Doing. The distinction may be illustrated by examples (24) and (25), repeated below for convenience:

- (24) The glass broke. (It happened) because it fell down off the table.
 (25) Matt broke the glass. (He did this) because Sharon kissed Mike passionately.

It is also necessary to make a further distinction in the domain of interpersonal relations, namely, the one between Epistemic relations and Speech Act relations. As stated above, the domain of interpersonal relations is concerned not with real-world relations but with illocutions; thus it includes constructions expressing Motives for Thinking and Speaking, or generally Motives for Speaking. This kind of motive, treated very often as a unique category, needs to be spilt into two distinct subcategories (Previtera 1996). Let us consider the following examples:

- (43) He hasn't returned home yet, because he doesn't answer the phone.
 (44) Using mobile phones is dangerous to human health because they harm our brain.
 (45) Are you going to the post office? Because I have to send a letter.
 (46) I felt the urge to let you know the final disposition of my problem, because your help was so invaluable in reaching the solution.

In (43) and (44) the subordinate clause expresses the cause or rather the motivation that induces the speaker to think and hence to enunciate the propositional content of the main clause. The logical operation is based on the inferential process of abduction¹⁴ which leads from the clue, that is to say, from the effect, *he doesn't answer the phone*, perceived by the speaker to the logical conclusion about its possible and

¹³ Similarly, Knott & Sanders (1998) propose the two-term distinction in their classification of coherence relations. They assume that every relation is coherent on semantic or pragmatic grounds. The relation is said to be semantic if the clauses are related in terms of their propositional content; if they are related because of their illocutionary force the pragmatic relation occurs.

¹⁴ In Peirce's terms (1932) (cf. Prandi 2004: 317).

most typical cause, *he hasn't returned home yet*, as in (43). Similarly, in (44) the conclusion expressed in the main clause, i.e. the speaker's negative opinion about using mobile phones, is inferentially derived from the premise, i.e. the speaker's knowledge about the harmfulness of mobile phones to the human brain. In both examples the subordinate clause is added to support the acceptability of a judgment expressed in the main clause and, at the same time, to reinforce the credibility attributed to the speaker who produces the utterance. Rhetorical concessives seem to function in a similar way.

In (45) and (46), the subordinate clause justifies a speech act which is taking place, and hence it improves its acceptability in the communicative context¹⁵. The distinction between these two categories, exemplified by sentences (43), (44) and (45), (46) respectively, seems to be based on their different linguistic properties. In the first type of relation, called here for simplicity Epistemic relation, subordinate clauses express facts which support the SoA designated by the propositional content of the speech act and thus represent Propositional Satellites which, as correctly pointed out by Verstraete (1990: 120-123), operate on the argumentative level. In the second type of relation, called here Speech Act relation, adverbial clauses show a motivation for why the speech act is carried out, and therefore they are classified as Speech Act Satellites.

Pander Maat (1998a) presents some additional arguments for the relevance of this distinction. First, he suggests that it is not always possible to express Speech Act relations by means of a connector:

- (47) a. The beer is in the fridge, I'm busy.
 b. ^{??}The beer is in the fridge, **because** I'm busy. (from Pander Maat 1998a: 179)

Second, he observes that the Epistemic relation has a clear negative counterpart, as in (48b), while the Speech Act relation does not always provide for its negation (49):

- (48) a. The neighbours are at home, because their lights are on.
 b. The neighbours are not at home, although their lights are on. (from Pander Maat 1998a: 179)
 (49) ^{??}The beer is not in the fridge, (although) I'm busy. (from Pander Maat 1998a: 180)

In the light of this, it seems reasonable to assume that interpersonal relations can be divided into two subcategories: Epistemic relations expressing the motivation for a judgment or conclusion and Speech Act relations which express the motivation for a speech act performed in the main clause.

In conclusion, while in the representational domain both the events together with their causes and the actions related to their motives have to be necessarily expressed in an explicit way (see (24), (25)), in the interpersonal domain, the actions are unexpressed (see examples from (43) to (49)). This is why their motives described in the adverbial subordinate clauses can be seen to relate not to the main clause but to the act of communication which is taking place, namely, the unexpressed speaker's action of thinking or speaking:

¹⁵ For further discussion on Speech Act adverbials see also Thompson & Longacre (1985: 203) and Lakoff (1998: 472-480).

What distinguishes speaking and thinking from normal actions is not a conceptual specificity, but a privilege in expression. Whereas a normal action has to be expressed in order to be connected to a motive, the action of thinking and speaking can be connected to a motive even if it is not actually framed in words but offered by direct ostension. (Prandi 2004: 318)

Therefore, the relationship between such clauses is not semantic and paradigmatic but rather pragmatic and syntagmatic in nature. This general property is shared by all constructions belonging to the interpersonal domain and, as described previously, consists in the absence of a structural relationship between the two clauses which can be signalled by a pause in intonation or a comma in written texts. This functional pattern, in turn, implies a number of formal restrictions due to the pragmatic character of the relation.

We can mention, for example, the following two facts described by Prandi (2004: 318). First, the impossibility of connecting the subordinate clause to the main clause reformulated by means of the verb *happen* or the pro-predicate *do this/do so*; consider the logical incompatibility of (50) versus the consistency of (51) reformulated through the introduction of the verb *think*:

(50) ??He hasn't returned home yet. He didn't do it because he doesn't answer the phone.

(51) He hasn't returned home yet. I think so because he doesn't answer the phone.

Second, the impossibility of focusing the subordinate clause within a cleft sentence (52), unless the action of thinking and speaking is explicitly expressed (53):

(52) ??It is because he doesn't answer the phone that he hasn't returned home yet.

(53) It is because he doesn't answer the phone that I say (think) that he hasn't returned yet.

4. 'Revised' classification of concessive relations

In virtue of the formal categorization of adverbial constructions discussed above, I distinguish between two main domains of concessive connection: representational relations and interpersonal relations¹⁶. In each domain two minor categories can be identified: Denied Phenomenal Cause relations and Denied Motive for Doing relations in the representational domain; Denied Motive for Thinking and Speaking or Epistemic relation and Denied Motive for Speaking or Speech Act relation in the interpersonal domain (see Table 2). In the following, I will give a brief summary of the proposed categorization of concessive relations.

The distinction between representational and interpersonal domain reflects the existence of two different formal types of concessive relations which can be established between the main and the subordinate clause: in the representational domain the concessive clause expressing a Denied Phenomenal Cause or a Denied Motive for Doing forms a paradigmatic or structural relationship with the main clause, while in the

¹⁶ The terms have been proposed within the FG model of the hierarchical structure of discourse (see, for instance, Dik *et al.* 1990). In the present study the terms *representational* and *interpersonal* domain have been given slightly different meaning, especially the latter one.

interpersonal domain the concessive clause expressing a Denied Motive for Thinking and Speaking or a Denied Motive for Speaking bears no structural relationship to the main clause, but rather creates a syntagmatic relation with the speaker's act of thinking or speaking 'which however is not described by the expression, but is directly shown by the utterance act itself' (Prandi 2004: 317).

The classification of concessive sentences across the proposed categories is mainly based on the test of anaphoric substitution and consistency criterion. In other words, the assignment of a concessive construction to one of the four relations crucially depends on the possibility of its consistent reformulation by introducing the verb *happen* or the pro-predicate *do this/do so* in the representational domain, and a verb of thinking (e.g. *think*) or speaking (e.g. *say*) in the interpersonal domain (Prandi 2004).

Table 2: Classification of concessive relations

Representational domain extra-linguistic real-world concessive relations		Interpersonal domain concessive relations between successive illocutions	
Denied phenomenal cause	Denied motive for doing	Denied motive for thinking and speaking	Denied motive for speaking

4.1. Representational domain

In the representational domain, the concessive connection indicates that the event or the SoA expressed in the concessive clause represents a real obstacle to but does not impede the realization of the SoA or event expressed in the main clause. Therefore, Representational concessives concern the real-world relations. Obviously, the real-world relations are taken to denote the two SoAs which may occur in a real or made-up world outside the language itself; for instance, *the real-world going out of Peter* and the *real-world rain*. Consequently, they do not represent the implicit cognitive or semantic relation holding between the SoAs described by the subordinate clause and the negation of the main clause, namely the *if p, then not q* implicature which is carried by concessive sentences and may be paraphrased in the following way: *Normally, p causes not q* (Denied Phenomenal Cause) or *Normally, p leads the agent to do not q* (Denied Motive for Doing). These two distinct types of 'blocked' causality are illustrated below:

- (54) The glass didn't break [it happened] although it fell down off the table.
- (55) He continued working [he did so] although he was tired.

4.2. Interpersonal domain

In the interpersonal domain, the concessive relation does not concern an event which can impede the realization of a SoA or event in the real, or extra-linguistic world, but it is concerned with the relations between two illocutions expressed in the form of a concessive connection. Interpersonal concessive relations may be established between two elements of the speaker's knowledge or mental concepts: premise and conclusion (Epistemic relation), or between a speech act and a background circumstance of its performance (Speech Act relation).

In Epistemic relations the concessive clause forms an obstacle to the expression of the judgment or conclusion presented in the main clause: *Normally, from p the speaker would conclude that not q.*

- (56) He is in his office [I think and say it] although he doesn't answer the phone.
 (57) Mobile phones are indispensable [I think and say it] although they can harm our brain.

Interestingly, Epistemic relations can be used for argumentative purpose, as we can see in (57). Such constructions, called sometimes Rhetorical concessives (König 1994: 681), are particularly used to concede the first assertion and emphasize the second one. Using a concession, the speaker states in advance what might have been an unfavourable argument for her belief, i.e. *harmfulness of mobile phones* in (57), and in this way she eliminates the possible inauspicious intervention and, at the same time, reinforces the credibility of what she uttered in the main clause, i.e. *that mobile phones are indispensable*. According to Azar (1997: 308-309), the reinforcement of the speaker's credibility is due to the argumentative mechanism which induces the hearer to believe that all possible objections have already been considered and rejected by the speaker. Along with this idea, in his comparison of 'causal' and restrictive¹⁷ concessives, Pander Maat (1998b) suggests that a 'causal' concessive clause increases the strength of assumption inferable from the main clause.

Finally, in Speech Act relations the concessive clause represents an impediment to the realization of the speech act performed in the main clause: *Normally, if p then the speaker would not be saying (asking, requesting, advising etc.) that q.* Consider the following examples:

- (58) Could you help me move this cupboard [I ask you] although you are tired?
 (59) It's not worth your effort [I advice you] although you are free to do as you like.

5. Conclusion

In summary, the starting point of this analysis was the FG model concerning the hierarchical structure of discourse, and specifically the proposed repartition of adverbial relations into SoA, Propositional Content, Speech Act, and Textual domains (Hengeveld 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998, Crevels 2000). This traditional layering of interclausal linkage applied to concessive relations appeared to be based on non-contiguous categories which cannot be isolated through any reliable and unfailing tests. Consequently, the need for a re-examination of this formal proposal arose.

After a survey of chosen theoretical proposals concerned with different levels of linguistic connection, I have classified concessive relations as four different semantic types: Denied Phenomenal Cause relations versus Denied Motivation for Doing relations in the representational domain, and Denied Motive for Thinking and Speaking relations versus Denied Motive for Speaking relations in the interpersonal domain.

In a Denied Phenomenal Cause relation a causal relationship between two SoAs or events in the phenomenal world is negated, e.g. *Although the glass fell down off the table, it didn't break*, whereas a Denied Motive for Doing relation involves a human

¹⁷ Unlike 'causal' concessives, restrictive concessives do not imply an *if p, then not q* assumption, but restrict the validity of an implication inferable from the previous assertion.

action motivated by a free and conscious decision by the agent to carry out an action in spite of an unfavourable SoA which has already occurred, is occurring or is expected to occur, e.g. *Although he was tired, he continued working.*

In the interpersonal domain, concessive relations occur between acts of thinking (Epistemic) or speaking (Speech Act) and SoAs expressed in concessive clauses. In an expression like *Although he doesn't answer the phone, he is in his office* a Denied Motive for Thinking and Speaking relation is established between the SoA *he doesn't answer the phone* (or premise) and the act of thinking itself *I know that he is in his office* (or conclusion). Similarly, in an utterance like *Although you are tired, could you help me move this cupboard?* a Denied Motive for Speaking relation occurs between SoA *you are tired* and the speech act itself *I ask if you could help me move this cupboard.* The proposed categories of concessive relations show different structural, semantic and pragmatic characteristics and can be distinguished thanks to consistent tests based on coherent reformulations through anaphora substitutions.

References

- Azar, M. (1997). Concession relations as argumentation. *Text* 17 (3), 301-316.
- Barth-Weingarten, D. (2003). *Concession in spoken English. On the realisation of a discourse-pragmatic relation.* Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.
- Borkin, A. (1980). On some conjuncts signalling dissonance in written expository English. *Studia Anglica Posnanensia* 12, 47-59.
- Bühler, K. (1934). *Sprachtheorie: die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache.* Jena: Fischer.
- Chafe, W. (1984). How People Use Adverbial Clauses. *Proceeding of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistic Society*, 437-449.
- Crevels, M. (2000). *Concession. A typological study.* PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam.
- Couper-Kuhlen, E. & Thompson, S. A. (2000). Concessive patterns in conversation. In Couper-Kuhlen, E. & Kortman, B. (eds.), *Cause, Condition, Concession, Contrast*, 381-410. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Daneš, F. (1985). Some remarks on causal relationship in language and text. *Recueil Linguistique de Bratislava* 8, 151-157.
- Danto, A. C. (1965). Basic Action. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2, 141-148.
- Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons and causes. *Journal of Philosophy* LX, 685-700.
- Dik, S. C. (1997). *The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part I: The Structure of the Clause.* Edited by Hengeveld, K. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. (2nd revised version).
- Dik, S. C. et al. (1990). The hierarchical structure of the clause and the typology of adverbial satellites. In Nuyts, J., Bolkestein, A. M. & Vet, C. (eds.), *Layers and levels of representation in language theory*, 25-70. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Günthner, S. (1996). From subordination to coordination? Verb-second position in German causal and concessive constructions. *Pragmatics* 6 (3), 323-370.
- Haegeman, L. (1985). Subordinating conjunctions and X'-syntax. *Studia Germanica Gandensia* 2, 134-138.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1970). Language structure and language function. In Lyons, J. (ed.), *New Horizons in Linguistics*, 140-166. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Halliday, M. A. K. & Hasan, R. (1976). *Cohesion in English.* London: Longman.

- Hengeveld, K. (1989). Layers and operators in Functional Grammar. *Journal of Linguistics* 25, 121-157.
- (1990). The hierarchical structure of utterances. In Nuyts, J., Bolkestein, A. M. & Vet, C. (eds.), *Layers and levels of representation in language theory*, 1-24. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- (1993). Semantic type, factivity and the expression of adverbial clauses. In Hengeveld, K. (ed.), *The internal structure of adverbial clauses. EUROTYP Working Papers Vol.5*, 119-132.
- (1997). Cohesion in Functional Grammar. In Connolly, J. C. et al. (eds.), *Discourse and Pragmatics in Functional Grammar*, 1-16. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- (1998). Adverbial clauses in the languages of Europe. In van der Auwera, J. (ed.), *Adverbial constructions in the languages of Europe*, 335-419. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Iten, C. (1998). The meaning of *although*: a Relevance Theoretic account. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 10, 1-29.
- Jakobson, R. (1960). Closing Statements. Linguistics and Poetics. In Sebeok, T. A. (ed.), *Style in Language*, 350-377. New York & London: Wiley.
- Knott, A. & T. Sanders. (1998). The classification of coherence relations and their linguistic markers: An exploration of two languages. *Journal of Pragmatics* 30, 135-175.
- König, E. (1994). Concessive clauses. In Asher, R. E. (ed.), *The encyclopedia of language and language universals*, 679-681. New York: Basil Blackwell.
- Kroon, C. (1998). A framework for the description of Latin discourse markers. *Journal of Pragmatics* 30 (2), 205-223.
- Lakoff, G. (1998). Performative Subordinate Clauses. *Proceeding of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistic Society*, 472-480.
- Lang, E. (2000). Adversative connectors on distinct levels of discourse: A re-examination of Eve Sweetser's three level approach. In Couper-Kuhlen, E. & Kortmann, B. (eds.), *Cause, Condition, Concession, Contrast*, 235-256. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Latos, A. (2006). *Factual concessive connectors: a contrastive analysis in Italian and Polish*. Munich: Lincom Europa.
- Luraghi, S. (2005). Prepositions in Cause expressions. In Calboli, G. (ed.), *Latina Lingua! Proceedings of the Twelfth International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics. Papers on Grammar IX*, Vol.2, 609-619. Roma: Herder Editrice.
- Lyons, J. (1977). *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pander Maat, H. (1998a). Classifying negative coherence relations and negative connectives. *Journal of Pragmatics* 30, 177-204.
- (1998b). Two kinds of concessives and their inferential complexity. In Knott, A., Oberlander, J., Moore J. & Sanders, T. J. M. (eds.), *Levels of representation in Discourse. Working Notes of the International Workshop on Text Representation*, 45-54. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.
- Peirce, Ch. S. (1932). *Collected papers. Vol. II: Elements of logic. Book II: Speculative grammar*. Edited by Hartshorne, Ch. & Weiss, P. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Prandi, M. (1996). I costrutti finali. *Studi Italiani di Linguistica Teorica e Applicata* XXV(1), 67-101.

- (2004). *The building blocks of meaning*. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Previtera, L. (1996). I costrutti causali. *Studi Italiani di Linguistica Teorica e Applicata* XXV(1), 29-46.
- Quirk, R. et al. (1985). *A comprehensive grammar of the English language*. London & New York: Longman.
- Risselada, R. (1998). The discourse functions of *sane*: Latin marker of agreement in description, interaction and concession. *Journal of Pragmatics* 30, 225-244.
- Schiffrin, D. (1987). *Discourse markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J. R. (1983). *Intentionality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sweetser, E. E. (1990). *From etymology to pragmatics. Metaphorical and cultural aspects of semantic structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, S. & Longacre, R. E. (1985). Adverbial clauses. In Shopen, T. (ed.), *Language typology and Syntactic Description*, Vol. II, 171-234. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vet, C. (1998). The multilayered structure of the utterance: about illocution, modality and discourse moves. In Hannay, M. & Bolkestein, A. M. (eds.), *Functional Grammar and Verbal Interaction*, 1-23. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Verstraete, J. Ch. (1990). The distinction between epistemic and speech act conjunction. *Belgian Essays in Linguistic and Literature*, 119-130.
- Widdowson, H. G. (1980). Conceptual and communicative functions in written discourse. *Applied Linguistics* 1 (1), 234-243.

Agnieszka Latos
Department of Interdisciplinary Studies in Translation, Languages and Cultures
University of Bologna
Corso Diaz 64
47100 Forlì
Italy

agnieszka.latos@unibo.it