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Rose Wabuti

An early-stage model for drive simulation software.

Email: r.l.wabuti2@ncl.ac.uk

Supervisors

Project description

We are investigating the principles of game theory to model an energy market. The market consists of renewable distributed generators of varying costs, battery storage systems and active load users. The model will analyse the decision making behaviour of these players while dispatching to a constrained grid.

We are exploring an oligopolistic market structure. In this structure, the system operator regulates the output through a pricing mechanism. We are adopting non-cooperative, Stackelberg game theory models. This is a leader follower, hierarchical, non-cooperative game theory decision making model. It is performed through a predefined sequence. Players make their moves sequentially and consecutively or hierarchically.

The model illustrates how distributed generators (DG) owners compete to deliver power output in a LIFO (last-in, first-out) setup.

In our model, the last generator to be connected knows the strategy of the previous generators before choosing its optimal supply. Our model achieves the optimal generation schedule through competitive dispatch of DG power to the grid. It considers the different cost functions associated with different DG technologies.

A well-formulated game model will generally converge to a Nash equilibrium. This is a solution of a non-cooperative game where everyone knows the strategies of the other players. No-one can gain by only changing their own strategy. Thus, it represents a stable and optimal solution where all participants are best profited without jeopardising the interests of others.

Interests

Active network management, energy markets, distributed generators.

Qualifications

  • MSc Power Distribution Engineering
  • Project Management Professional (PMP)