DISCOURSE ANALYSIS & SOCIO-SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING SPATIAL PLANNING

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this working-paper is to develop a theoretical framework for an analysis of the plans for the urban space in the European Union and Denmark. The concepts developed in this paper will thus be the foundation for the empirical analysis. Two main themes will be addressed. First a theoretical framework for discourse analysis is presented. Second the theme of ‘socio-spatial transformation processes’ is addressed, through an analysis of globalization, regionalisation and urbanisation processes.

**Key words:** Discourse analysis, socio-spatial change, urban space
PREFACE

This working-paper represents a stage in the work on a PhD-thesis concerning spatial planning at national and European levels. It is thus an expression of a ‘work in progress’, and therefore also more or less preliminary. Admitting to such a status, is also to welcome and critical comments, and thereby invite the reader to engage in an interactive process or exchanging viewpoints.

The paper is the one half of the work made during a stay as visiting research fellow at Centre for Research in European Urban Environments (CREUE), Department of Town & Country Planning, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, from March to May 1997. It contains the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, displayed in the CREUE working-paper with the title: *A ‘green room in the European house’: Converging discourses in European & Danish spatial planning*. For practical reasons, it has been chosen to split the two papers up, but it should be stressed that the one is the precondition for the other.

Two main themes are addressed. First a theoretical framework for discourse analysis is presented. Second the theme of ‘socio-spatial transformation processes’ is addressed, though an analysis of globalization, regionalisation and urbanisation processes. By ‘socio-spatial transformation processes’ is understood the economic, political, social and cultural changes that characterise the late-capitalistic world and its relation to space. The framework outlined on this theoretical background, is the foundation for the empirical analysis of the EU plans for the European urban space and the Danish nation-state’s plans for its national urban space.

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1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Has not the practice of revolutionary discourse and scientific discourse over the past two hundred years freed you from this idea that words are wind, an external whisper, a beating of wings that one has difficult in hearing in the serious matter of history?

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge

The act of public planning is thus a rhetorical activity. It consist of nothing but a discourse of what must be done

José Luis Ramirez, Skapande mening

All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth & Method

The radical social, economic, cultural and spatial changes that transform our societies these days are the background upon which one must try to understand any attempt to make plans for the urban space. This analysis’ approach, in the process of coming to understanding of a specific empirical phenomenon, will be one of ‘discourse analysis’. Since this by no means is a well defined area of research, some basic understandings and theoretical inspirations will be explicated.

1.1 Preliminary epistemologies

There is an old anecdote of the professor who is doing the final questionnaire of his student. The final question that will decide whether the student passes his exam or not it this question: ‘is the stove in the corner of this room inside the examinee or is it outside the examinee?’. Besides being a joke, it also points at the very heart of the philosophical discussion of the relation between language and reality. And thus also to the question of whether the ‘linguistic turn’ should be taken seriously or not, and how it effects the social sciences? Basically this work take its departure in a general definition of discourses as:

‘more or less coherent and repeatable linguistic and material practices, that results in specific power and rationality configurations’ (Pedersen 1995:204, authors translation)

Thus any discourse analysis should consider power and rationality in a field of interests and strategies, agents and institutions. This conceptualisation is fundamentally sociological in its substance, as it dismisses the idealistic conception of discourses as mere linguistic expressions. Nevertheless, the traditional sociological analysis of social actions must be reinforced with the insights of the ‘linguistic turn’ (Wittgenstein 1953/94, Heidegger 1927/92, 1954). Therefore any investigation into social reality should pay due respect to the fact, that our social world is linguistically constituted. That is not to say that the world is a pure socio-
linguistic construct. As the Danish philosopher Ole Thyssen has it, we can not put the Newtonian fall-law to a referendum (Thyssen 1993). But the point is that what exists, only exists consiously for-us in a symbolic mediated form called language. The point is condensed by Laclau & Mouffe’s position of ‘weak realism’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985/94) and the hermeneutical philosophy of Gadamer (1986a). Accordingly, the empirical world only exists meaningful for-us, in its imbeddedness in language. But the material side of the matter can not be left aside since:

‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under the circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past’
(Marx 1851:437)

A discourse analysis will have to consider assumptions about the world (ontology) as well as assumptions about knowledge of this world (epistemology). The social world is pregiven to each social science only indirectly and never with the immediacy of living intentionally (Schutz 1972:224). Which is the same as to say that any social analysis’ data are constructions of other peoples constructions (Geertz 1973/93:9). So the idea of analysing planning as discourses puts the concept of ‘re-presentation’ in the middle of the exercise. Planning documents, metaphors and maps are re-presentations of the spatial, as well as any attempt to conceptualise the socio-spatial is coming about by the means of linguistic re-presentations. On the background of this general definition, various theoretical approaches will now be examined in order to qualify and elaborate the theoretical foundation further. The point is, that in order to provide a more fine grained analytical tool, it is necessary to look into other analytical frameworks.

The logic is, that the three themes of the initiating definition (Pedersen 1995:204): language, material practice and power-rationality are addressed separately with special attention to other theoretical approaches. Then the ‘special case’ of socio-spatial discourse or social spatialisation is examined. Finally, the different positions are discussed, and a model is sketched.

1.2 Language, meaning & representation - the linguistic part of discourse analysis

As human beings we are always engaged in the act of making sense of our acts, practices and environment, and can thus be said to be interpreting. The comprehension of this Umwelt und Mitwelt is linguistically embedded (Gadamer 1986b:387). There is no social reality that does not bring itself to representation in a linguistically articulated consciousness (Gadamer 1986a:292). Which is not the same as denying a pre-linguistic level of human experience. However, such a level cannot be thought of or talked about, outside the realm of language:

A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there ...

A hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to
the text’s alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices’ (Gadamer 1960/89:267 & 269)

So the hermeneutical interpretation takes it as its fundamental principle, that the meaning of the text is the result of an interpretation, and this is dependent on the subject that makes the interpretation. And this ‘text’ is not a given object, but a phase in the execution of a communicative event (Gadamer 1986b:394). So the act of making sense of a text can be said to be an ‘productive act’ (Gadamer 1986a:282). We are thus beyond the confinements of positivism and its imagined objective truth. Instead the hermenutician is involved in a process similarly to a creative activity (Gadamer 1960/89:269). It should be noticed that the interpreter cannot project whatever sort of meaning into the text since the interpreting subject is bound to specific historical and social conditions that makes a frame for the interpretation. So the interpreting subject tries to understand the phenomenon or text from a specific position. This position is made up of the existential life experiences as well as the broader social conditions of the interpreter. Thus every act of coming to understanding by way of interpretation requires a confrontation with the interpreter’s pre-judices². Not in a negative sense, since the point is that we cannot understand anything without pre-judices. So when we seek a valid interpretation of a text, it is not a question of leaving our pre-judices behind, but rather to get them into ‘play’ with the specific text. So any interpretation is characterised by the dialolgical movement between text and interpreter, between part and whole. This is also what is termed the ‘hermeneutic circle’ (Gadamer 1960/89:XXXV). Such gaining understanding could be described by the metaphor of ‘fusion of horizons’. So in a way our understanding, whatever it is of a text or another person, is a result of the meeting of our horizons of language, experience and social positioning. This (spatial³) metaphor of ‘fusion of horizon’ also indicates that the hermeneutical act of interpretation is an act of ‘overcoming distances’:

‘When the interpreter overcomes the foreign element in a text his own withdrawal does not imply a disappearance in a negative sense, but rather his entry into communication in such a way that the tension between the horizons of the text and the reader is dissolved. This is what I have called the fusion of horizons’ (Gadamer 1998b:396)

Within the so-called Text Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA), Fairclough states that discourses constitutes objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms of ‘self’, social relationships, and conceptual frameworks (Fairclough 1992:39). Discourses as thus relevant objects of analysis in planning and politics since:

‘discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective identities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological practice constitute, naturalises, sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations’ (Fairclough 1992:67)

A crucial point of more epstimological character is Fairclough’s acknowledgement that a discourse analysis should be thought of:
‘as a research method for questions which are defined outside it’
(Fairclough 1992:226)

In this work, this statement is interpreted as the reason why any discourse analysis must be supplemented with an epistemological framework and a body of theories concerning the specific field and phenomenon in question. Thus the considerations concerning space, territory, globalisation, politics and economy that follows this discourse analytical framework.

A strong tool in the linguistic part of discourse analysis is the concept of ‘intertextuality’. By this is indicated that discourses has a history and relate to other discourses in various ways. With Kristevas words: intertextuality inserts history and society into a text, and this text into history (in Fairclough 1992:102). In manifest intertextuality, other texts are explicitly present in the text under analysis; they are ‘manifestly’ marked or cued by features on the surface of the texts, such as quotation marks (Fairclough 1992:104). But texts can also be in related by way of implicit intertextuality or by way of horizontal intertextuality where they can be seen as chains of texts related to each other, thus creating a more or less coherent corpus of discourse. The focus on ‘genre’, understood as a relatively stable set of conventions tied to a socially accepted discursive practice (Fairclough 1992:126-28), is also of importance. So it the ‘style’ of a particular discourse, understood as a specific rhetorical mode. In this mode we find different rhetorical and ideological investments in specific words and concepts. Thus the possibility of ‘semantic engineering’, which is the way the polysemia of a concept can be an object for different and often antagonistic investments of meaning. Here one must concentrate on key-words in the discourse in order to interpret their potential of meaning (Fairclough 1992:186-7). Thus the analyst must seek to find semantic slides or discrepancies in a specific concept or word. One of the more sophisticated ways of doing semantic engineering is by creating new lexical items. Either by way of making them up from scratch as ‘neologisms’ or by taking them from other discourses. A vital part of linguistic oriented discourse analysis concerns the use of metaphors in discourses. Not only are planning discourses very often saturated with (spatial) metaphors, but some theorists even stress that the very root of human knowledge is metaphorical in its essence. Thus the theorists Lakoff & Johnson puts it this way:

‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experience one kind of thing in terms of another ... We shall argue that ... human thought processes are largely metaphorical’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:5 & 6, emphasis in the original)

Human knowledge is metaphorical, and the metaphor is a linguistic expression of various installations of identity and difference. The metaphor accentuates certain aspects and ignore others, and is thus a part of ‘planning as worldmaking’ (Fischler 1995). The metaphor is the locus of the connection between language and power. By using certain metaphors (and omitting others), a specific constellation of meaning defines social reality. And because of the nature of metaphors, this is done by referring to concepts and phenomena from other semantic fields. Thus in the discourse analysis the various circulating metaphors might be seen as fruitful places to start the deciphering and interpretation. This amounts to a search for the metaphorically driving referentials of the discourse since:
‘Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:156)

The linguistic analysis of discourses could be seen as a de-construction of the texts, as the analysis is trying to seek out the ‘blind spots’ or moments of self-contradiction in order to analyse the ‘tension between rhetoric and logic’ in any given ‘text’ (Norris in Harley 1996:434) According to Kaarhus (1996:6) de-construction aims to reveal the construction of the text in question, by undermining the ‘authority’ behind the text. But we must of course keep in mind that ‘text’ should be interpreted in a very broad way. When interpreting a text, the de-constructive strategy would be to change the focus from the author to the reader. Thus the meaning of a text is not as much an quality of the text itself as it is an experience in the mind of the reader. This is a point that we also find within the theories of hermeneutics, but with less radical consequences. The question that any de-constructionist analysis pose is ‘how a text is working?’ rather than asking ‘what it means?’ (Dahlerup 1991:9). The principle of difference is a part of the analysis of opposition that is vital to de-constructionist analysis. So we cannot define what it means to be ‘woman’ without also having some idea of what is means to be ‘man’, that is defining the ‘Other’. Any conceptual definition depends on its opposite, its ‘Other’, making a difference such as; urban-rural, city-country, rich-poor, black-white, male-female, rational-irrational, truth-lie, culture-nature, good-evil, intellect-feeling etc. The point that the de-constructionists now make in opposition to the classic structural linguistics is, that these oppositions are actually suppressive and thus representing ‘hierarchies of violence’ to use the Derridian term (Dahlerup 1991:33). The way this code of inclusion-exclusion works is by marginalizing or even eliminating the oppressed part of the binary opposition. Thus when conducting a discourse analysis the interesting points are where these antagonistic oppositions either are articulated openly or where they are un-spoken. The way that language works rhetorically is of major importance within this approach. The rhetorical dimension of language is the ‘place’ of association and metaphors and thus where the ambiguous potential lies (Dahlerup 1991:52). De-construction as an analytical strategy is widely used within the study of various marginalized groups such as women, blacks and homosexuals in the contexts of planning and politics (Fainstein & Campel 1996).

1.3 Knowledge, truth & reason - the power-rationality part of discourse analysis

Michel Foucault points at the connection between power, rationality and truth. What we in our civilisation takes for granted, he shows us are indeed social constructions. His famous examples are madness and sexuality. So Foucault poses the question:

‘What is this reason that we use? What is its historical effects? What are its limits, an what are its dangers? How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to practising a rationality that is unfortunately criss-crossed by intrinsic dangers? One should remain as close to this question as possible, keeping in mind that it is both central and extremely difficult to resolve’ (Foucault 1984:249)
Foucault’s general research program started as a Nietzschean ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’. Thus he says that there is no reason to take departure in the Enlightenment’s idea of a teleological history of ever increasing happiness for man:

‘I say that is a bad method to pose the problem as: ‘How is it that we have progressed?’’. The problem is: how do things happen?” (Foucault 1980:50)

Foucaults interest was the overarching systems of thought rather than concrete sociological phenomenon:

‘my general theme isn’t society but the discourses of true and false, by which I mean the correlative formation of domains and objects and the verifiable, falsifiable discourses that bear on them; and it’s not just their formation that interests me, but the effects in the real to which they are linked” (Foucault 1980/96:116)

Every society has a ‘regime of truth’, and this ‘truth’ is intrinsic connected to power (Foucault 1977/95:132). So what is true is defined socially and set into the world as parts of discourses that has the ‘power of naming’. What is distinct of our contemporary civilisation is that the ‘political economy of truth’ is deeply embedded in the scientific discourses. Foucault’s examples of medicine and government rationality (governmentality) shows this, but professional planning practice could as easily be mentioned. Thus science is power, which is why other (competing) discourses often ‘steal’ elements of this discourse in order to legitimise themselves by the ‘aura of scientific discourse’. One of the main points in Foucaults power conception is that the attempts to think the ideal social organization in the realm of the Herrschaftsfreie communication is in vain. Thus the disagreement with Habermas, who insists upon the emancipative properties of the incomplete project of the Enlightenment (Habermas 1987). Foucault's power conception can therefore be said to be ‘positive’ in the sense that he sees power as a constitutive and unavoidable fact of all social relations, why he has no illusions of ‘dismissing’ power. But it is also a rather ‘fluid’ conception of power as Foucault tends to see power everywhere and without privileged centre (Foucault 1976/94:99). This is why Foucault made the famous statement, that political theory must ‘cut of the head of the king” (Foucault 1977/95:126). The point is, that the ‘classic’ notion of power relates this to the institutions and ‘juridico-discursive’ sovereignty, and thus misses the point that power saturates practices on all levels of society and is found in all social relations. In his analysis of the social discourses Foucault introduces the genealogical method. In the essay Nietzsche, Genealogi, History, Foucault says of his method of ‘genealogy’:

‘Genealogy is gray, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times’ (Foucault 1971:221)

The genealogical method is occupied with the decipherment of how different fields of knowledge and discourses are constituted through history (Foucault 1977/95:122-3). But not as a result of some sort of linearly historical process with a specific Ursprung, but rather as a result of multiple breaks and discontinuous events.” The genealogical discourse analysis is a de-ontologizing strategy that aims at de-masking human practices as what they really are:
object constructing. So various phenomena that are considered ‘nature given’ are in the prism of genealogical discourse analysis shown to be the result of specific structures and agent’s practices.

The Danish professor of planning Bent Flyvbjerg uses Foucault’s methodology as a foundation for his research (Flyvbjerg 1991, 1996a, 1996b). Flyvbjerg states that Foucault is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated (Flyvbjerg 1996a:13). From his own analysis of the relation between power and rationality in a specific planning case in Aalborg, Denmark (Flyvbjerg 1991), one of the crucial points is that the genesis as well as the implementation of plans are saturated with power and vested interests. Thus Flyvbjerg uses Foucault’s genealogical method to analyse planning in its concrete context but without the Habermasian notion of utopian zwanglos communication as the driving ideal (Flyvbjerg 1996a:16).

According to rationalist planning theories, thinking about power is perceived imprudent for planners. Power is thought to be the domain of politicians, rationality the domain of planners. Flyvbjerg proposes that:

> ‘What is lacking today in planning theory is an understanding of relations of power, an understanding of Realarationalität as opposed to ideal rationality, an understanding of actual as opposed to ideal processes of communication, and attention to details that make or break plans and programs during implementations ... Such ‘analytics’ would be based on genealogies, historiographies and narratologies of actual planning in particular contexts’ (Flyvbjerg 1996a:20, emphasis in the original)

Part of the Foucaultdian discourse analysis will therefore be an attempt to show how specific forms of discourse are related to authoritative places in the social field and thereby also identify ‘privileged speakers’. Planning and planning documents can be seen as examples of such authoritative discourses (Kaarhus 1996:42, Allen 1996:329). A Foucault inspired discourse analysis can involve the following three steps (Christensen 1994:12):

- How are objects/subjects/concepts/strategies ordered into categories?
- After what rules are these categories established?
- Which positive conditions exists to establish objects/subjects/concepts and strategies?

Tim Richardson uses Foucault’s theoretical framework on the planning of the Trans European Networks (Richardson 1996). The basic assumption is that one should not seek to avoid the power dimension but ‘accept the agonistic nature of planning by unmasking power’ (Richardson 1996:280). Richardson divides the discourse analytical planning theories into two categories, one Foucaultdian and another Habermasian. Not suprisingly, the Habermasian version is identified by an invalidating ‘power blindness’ (Richardson 1996:287). Richardson identifies two powerful discourses that has made the way for the Trans European Networks (TEN). One is a European discourse of political integration, the other is the economical discourse of the Internal Market. Both these discourses are articulated against a much weaker counter-discourse of sustainability (Richardson 1996:288). The two powerful discourses have defined the relevant issues, legitimised concepts and technics and controlled the access to the arenas of decision.
1.4 Agents, action & institutions - the practice oriented part of discourse analysis

Any discourse is embedded within a social field of actors, institutions and powers, hence institutionalisation is the key word:

‘To institute, to assign an essence, a competence is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so (or to be so). It is to signify to someone what he is and how he should conduct as a consequence... To institute, to give a social definition, an identity, is also to impose boundaries’ (Bourdieu 1994:120, emphasis in the original)

Bourdieu has it as a central point, that in any interaction the whole social structure is present and working ‘actively’. So the ‘weight’ of a social agent depends on the symbolic capital, which is the same as to say that the power of articulating and getting these articulations recognised, is dependent on the acceptance of a particular social field. This means that:

‘... the scientific analysis of discourse must take into account the laws of price formation which characterise the market concerned or, in other words, the laws defining the social conditions of acceptability’ (Bourdieu 1994:76)

The study of discourses should consider this process of ‘naming’ and the rites and institutions within which they are made. Language therefore seems to be the home of power. Here Habermas crosses the track again. Thus Habermas seems to think, says Bourdieu, that power lies within language. But power should rather be understood as arising from the social and institutional settings that gives language its legitimacy and surrounds its practice (Bourdieu 1994:107-9). So what is most vital for this conception of discourses, is that authority comes to language from outside, by way of the surrounding power relations and institutional settings of the given social field. And here Bourdieu breaks with the naive notion of power as something that only works by suppression from top to bottom. Symbolic power and thus legitimate language works only with the collaboration of those it governs. Or as Bourdieu has it:

‘...symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it’ (Bourdieu 1994:164)

Through the articulation of social relations, various discourses establishes linguistic spaces and language games wherein something can be said, by some actors. So politics is about making institutions from where a ‘language’ can be made and wherein means and ends can be articulated and connected (Lægrid & Pedersen 1994:274-75). A given political subject has to be ‘discovered’ and categorised before it can be applied within a discourse that has given rules for the way means and ends are combined (i.e. the European discourse of urban space). It is in the very linguistic creation of the political, that the adequate propositions are established for a political construction of meaning that lies within a rational horizon (Lægrid & Pedersen 1994). In order to break this code, one must analyse the agents (subjects as well as institutions) that operates within the discourse, what language and vocabulary they use and what sort of rationality this corresponds to. All of society’s social relations can be seen as institutional constructs. These institutions are productive in the sense that they creates
positions from where individuals and groups can see themselves as ‘rational agents’. So the institutions produce possibilities for social action. On the other hand, it must be understood that an institutional construction also are restraining. So the institutional ‘constitution’ is both enabling and restraining. This means that the institutional constitution makes rules for whom might participate within the institutional domain, and what will be accepted as ‘valid statements’ in this field (Andersen 1995).

In the ‘argumentative turn’ within planning theory (Healey 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, Fischer & Forester 1993, Hajer 1993, 1995, Kaplan 1993, Dryzek 1993), discourses are broadly seen as ‘systems of meanings’. The approach acknowledges that such systems of meanings needs interpretation, and thus that discourse analysis is a hermeneutic practice. It is also a basic premise, that through the communication that plans are medium of, we can get to a rational and democratic consensus between plural discourses. A framework for analysing development plans is illustrative of the way this discourse analysis is thought. Six distinct themes and questions can be identified within this discourse analytical approach (Healey 1993a:88-100):

- In what context is the planning taking place?
- In what format, or style is the plan presented?
- What is the basic theme of the plan?
- What discourses & discourse communities are presented within the plan, and how?
- Does the plan facilitates communicative work, and how?
- Which power relations are present, and how are they articulated?

Thus on the background of a Habermasian notion of communicative action, discourse ethics and universal pragmatics (Habermas 1991), the theory of ‘Collaborative Planning’ stresses some basic and essential questions (Healey 1996b, 1997). First of all, one should look into what constitutes the ‘arena of discussion’. That means we must ask:

‘Where is the discussion to take place, in what forums and arenas; how are community members to gain access to it?’ (Healey 1996b:222)

This means that one has to investigate the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms of the particular social field in question, seen in an institutional and organisational context. Next one must investigate in what style the discussion will take place? (Healey 1996b:233). Here the point is to consider the linguistic competences, vocabularies and articulations that characterise the social field. Thus language itself can function as an exclusion mechanism in a social field. The third question that is asked, considers whether the planners are able to clarify and condensate the semantic points in the discourse:

‘How can the jumble of issues, arguments, claims for attention, and ideas about what to do which arise in discussion be sorted out?’ (Healey 1996b:223)

This is a crucial point, since the sorting out of the ‘jumble of issues’ is a rather power oriented process. Who are to decide which issues that counts? The point refers strongly to the idea of the planner as a facilitator or mediator (Healey 1992). The crucial thing is of course whether
the discourses can absorb new strategies, wishes and desires into them. Thus the question is, how a strategy can be created that becomes a new discourse about how spatial and environmental change in urban regions could be managed? (Healey 1996b:223). The question here is whether the subjects or agents are considered empowered to make discourses that absorb new wants. One could just as easily state, that discourses have a structuring capacity that often lies beyond the reach of the subjects. The final question that the theory of collaborative planning raises is the question of how to relate to the strategy:

‘How can a political community get to agree on a strategy, and maintain that agreement over time while continually subjecting it to critique?’ (Healey 1996b:223)

This theme is highly relevant and perhaps even more problematic in the context of Europe, than in a context of a smaller territorial-political unit. Without going into the analysis here, it is safe to say that there is very little public awareness of the EU-plans for the urban space in Europe. The theory of ‘collaborative planning’ also stresses the fact that the various discourses of the stakeholders are articulated in a complex institutional field. Thus this theory identify various ‘interactive strategies’ whose purpose are to build relations among stakeholders (Healey 1996c, 1997). This strategic way of thinking and planning urban space is intimately connected to the various ways of ‘place-making’ and ‘place-promoting’ that saturates the urban policy discourses all over Europe today. The lesson learned for the researcher is that one must analyse the ‘ethnography of institutional practices’ in order to identify the social dynamics shaped by regulatory regimes and political, economic and social processes (Healey 1995:272). A special version of this discourse approach stresses the possibilities of mixing the Habermasian view, ethnography and interactionism (Peizerat 1995, 1997). Here the researcher should identify who speaks, the relationship between the agents and finally how objects are given meaning within these relations. The main point of this analysis is to identify the ‘driving referential’ of a given discourse (Peizerat 1995, 1997).

As another exponent of the ‘argumentative turn’, Hajer shows that the linguistic construction of reality is important for the discourse analysis. Thus the concept of ‘acid rain’ is a part of a discourse that relates to something bigger, namely the crisis of industrial society (Hajer 1993:44, 1995). Hajer’s discourse analysis has the focus on agency and the individual level as it is expressed through various ‘discourse-coalitions’. A discourse-coalition is at the general level, a group of agents that shares a social construction. Any social group is framing and constructing a given political theme through a coalition, that is born out of a context of other historical discourses that contains knowledge about how similarly phenomena was treated in the past (Hajer 1993:45):

‘Discourse is here defined as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer 1995:44)

Discourses provides the tool with which problems are constructed (Hajer 1993:46), and they are institutionalised by the practical use of the agents in the particular social field. The agents will often draw upon more than one discourse, so in a discussion discursive elements will be presented as a narrative or a ‘story line’ wherein various different discourses are combined
into a more or less coherent whole. In the case of planning and politics, the rule is more often than not, that very few agents has the breadth of view that makes them capable of mastering all involved discourses\textsuperscript{11}. Story lines has therefore an important organisational capacity, since these clusters of discourses are tied together by a discoursive affinity. This means, that arguments may vary in their origin, but they maintain an identical way of conceptualising the world. There can, for example, be said to exist a discoursive affinity between a moral discourse that sees nature as something worthy of respect, a scientific discourse that sees the nature as a complex and fragile eco-system and a economic discourse that argues that effective measures taken towards pollution will be the most profitable in the long run. Thus from various different discourses agents can put forward the same postulates about the world. The ‘argumentative’ approach to planning and discourse shows, that there are some very specific, context dependent and institutionally embedded questions and themes that must be dealt with in an analysis of planning discourses. The limitation of this approach to discourse analysis is that it downplays the fact that discourses have a structural capacity that lies beyond the reach of the agents. Thus the structural properties of a given discourse is an expression of a specific power and rationality configuration that this type of analysis tend to downplay.

This in not the case within the discourse analytical approach of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, often labelled ‘neo-Gramscian discourse analysis’. This approach is a de-construction of the Marxist tradition. The ontological point of departure is one of ‘weak realism’ (Dyrberg & Torfing 1995:116). This position advocates the point of view, that the existence of an objective reality outside our consciousness is undisputed. But also that we only have access to this reality through symbolic and linguistic mediated frames of meaning\textsuperscript{12}. So the existence of objects independent of human thought is not denied, what is denied is that such objects are constituted as meaningful objects outside a discoursive frame (Laclau & Mouffe 1985/94:108). Laclau & Mouffe defines a discourse as a relatively stable pattern of linguistic rules, social actions and material prerequisites:

‘a discursive structure is ... an articulatory practice which constitutes and organises social relations’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985/94:96)

A discourse is in other words the result of an articulation or meaning giving practice, that establishes a relation between elements in such a way that their identities are mutually modified. The specific discourse is thus a reality that we, as subjects, only has a limited influence on. Its world picture, view of nature, conceptualisation of being human etc. is cemented in various institutions of more or less stable character (Pedersen 1995:212). Here lies a fundamental difference to the Habermasian discourse theories that understands discourses as the outcome of human linguistic performance. The neo-Gramscian discourse analysis shows that discourses also have structuring capacities, and thus can be action guiding for humans in a much less voluntaristic way. The social is conceptualised as an open and relational totality that is organized in relatively coherent set of rules, norms and resources. So within this framework the concept of ‘identity’ is very central, since any social identity must be understood as constituted by its internal relations within a row of meaning giving sequences of a discourse. This conception of identity is similar to the one discussed under the strain of de-construction. Identity is established through a demarcation of ‘us’ or ‘I’ versus ‘them’ - the ‘Other(s)’. Without difference and demarcation no identity (Mouffe 1995:263). The differentiated identity concept is derived from the psychoanalysis of Lacan and Derridian de-construction. Thus identity is not the immanent quality of a monadic and isolated subject,
but a relational and social phenomenon. This is also an implicit concept of culture, since
culture can be conceptualised as different patterns of meanings or codes that makes us able to
differentiate and demarcate ‘us’ from ‘them’. In the context of a discourse analysis this is
useful information with regards to the ‘who’s’ of the very communication that is going on.
But also as an important lead to the underlying rationality of a given discourse. Within this
framework the identity is constituted in a ‘subject position’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985/94:109).
It is very important that one conceives this concept of identity as relational and not being
locked in a specific position, because:

‘... in an articulated discursive totality, where every element occupies a
differential position - in our terminology, where every element has been
reduced to a moment of that totality - all identity is relational and all
relations have a necessary character’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985/94:106)

The subject is thus a relational concept characterised by a subject position within a discursive
structure. So the agent is both in a subject position, as an object for the structure, and a
subject since the structure is incapable of reducing the agent to an object. This means that the
subject is in a non-blocked position and thus always-already engaged in producing and re-
reproducing itself as subject and the structure as object. On the other hand, the subject
position is part of the structural quality of a discourse.

In the realm of politics, antagonisms are being articulated in order to establish a ‘hegemonic
project’. To construct a hegemonic project amounts to unite various different political
interests into an accept of a political agenda. The hegemonic element is an accept of a given
position of dominance. But exactly because the social fundamentally is characterised by
contingency, the political field is always open, not-fixed and loaded with potentiality for
political action. Here we are at the core of the de-constructionist clash with the Marxist
tradition. So the neo-Gramscian discourse analysis does not deny that there are antagonistic
relations within the social. But it refuse the Marxian notion of these relations as a priori given
results of totalising and fundamen-talising structural societal properties. Thus the political is
an articulation of the social, and the constitutive powers of these relations are double sided.
So power is both subversive and constitutive. This means that power undermines identity
constructions as well as it construct identity positions, which is a power conception that has
some resemblance to that of Michel Foucault. So whether a given political strategy is
successful in establishing a hegemonic position or not, depends on its ability either to exclude
and negate certain positions or re-define and constitute itself as an exponent of a volonte
generale. But in this process the outcome cannot be a priori deduced since meaning about and
interpretation of the social is always only partially fixed.

1.5 Social spatialisation

In the socio-spatial processes concerning urban space in Europe today, discursive struggles
over representations are, as fiercely fought and as fundamental to the activities of place
construction, as bricks and mortar (Harvey 1996:322). The power to individuate, and thus to
create or reinforce identities are strongly connected to the power of naming. Harvey shows,
that the struggles between the native Americans and the English settlers was a struggle of
naming. The native Americans named places in order to turn the landscape into a map, which
gave the inhabitants information on how to cope with daily life (Harvey 1996:264). This
stood in sharp contrast to the English spatio-temporal system of Anglo-centred control. Thus political struggles over naming and representations of place and identity, must be understood as the fight over discursive representations:

‘The assignment of place within some socio-spatial structure indicates distinctive roles, capacities for action and access to power ... Placing, the making of place are essential to social development, social control, and empowerment in any social order’ (Harvey 1996:265)

Sites and places are never simply locations. They are always sites for someone and of something (Shields 1992:6). Thus the old search for the *genus loci*, or the ‘spirit of the place’ invokes a unravelling of the subjective meaning constructs that the places are endowed with. This amounts to a hermeneutical examination because of the epistemological insight that meaning is contextually located in the world, not found floating around as a transcendental essence outside experience (Dilthey, in Shields 1992:17). The important thing is then, to analyse these discourses of space as well as the spatial practices through an analysis of the process of ‘social spatialisation’:

‘The term social spatialisation will be used to designate this social construction of the spatial which is a formation of both discursive and non-discursive elements, practices and processes’ (Shields 1992:7)

Spatialisation is not to be conceived as a pure ‘cognitive’ structure, but as a set of practical paradigms which resembles the ancient Greek notion of ‘techné’. The relation between the social and the spatial is thus as much a practical as a theoretical endeavour. The analyst of spatial discourse must then practice a hermeneutic analysis since the subjective meaning contexts will need interpretation because the meaning of particular places is a compendium of intersubjective and cultural interpretations over time (Shields 1992:25). In this interpretative endeavour one must focus on the fact that social spatialisation provides part of the necessary social co-ordination of perceptions to ground hegemonic systems of ideology and practice (Shields 1992:46). Thus discourses of space are at their core expressions of the ‘social construction of reality’ and therefore also discursive practices that involves ‘place construction’ One of the ways to attach a specific meaning and power to a specific place is by creating a ‘place-image’:

‘Such place-images come about through over-simplification (i.e. reduction to one trait), stereotyping (amplification of one or more traits) and labelling (where a place is deemed to be of a certain nature)’ (Shields 1992:47)

Thus, this process of collectively creating places through the labelling of ‘place-images’ amounts to a set of ideas in currency, gaining value through conventions circulating in a discursive economy. When a collectively set of ‘place-images’ are brought together they form a ‘myth of place’ (Shields 1992:61). The point is that, on the one hand the European discourse of urban space is itself a myth of the place called the ‘European territory at large’, but also of the urban spaces in particular. On the other hand, the urban areas are themselves deeply involved in creating different myths of their particular spaces and places. The discourses of urban space are contested terrain and reflect the massive struggles over what the spaces should be like and what kind of development the ‘stakeholders’ would like to see.
These mechanisms are at work, at all spatial levels. Thus at the level of nation-states, a coherent and hegemonic vision of ‘the nation’ which binds and implicates people with territory and the history of these places is a ‘purely social construction’ (Shields 1992:62). We see this in the complex inter-relation of spatial discourses concerning the nation state or the spatial discourses of ‘Project Europe’. The identification with space can be seen as an expression of a politics of space and territory because:

‘If people are willing to act in terms of an imaginary community, to enact and actualise such cultural identities, then we may conclude that a term such as ‘society’ does have a real meaning and is empirically ‘real’ as a causative formation’ (Shields 1992:263)

1.6 Discourse analysis - a discussion and a model

The question is, whether it is possible to make a coherent approach to discourse analysis on the background of these various and very different theoretical and analytical approaches? There exists many incommensurabilities at the ontological level of the theories. There are approaches that views the social reality as basically harmonic and consensus oriented, where others see conflicts and antagonisms. Some see the social relations framed by rational behaviour, while others see them saturated with power relations. There is the classic sociological problem of the primacy of agency or structure, that also divides these approaches. There is a vast difference in the levels of analysis, from whole civilisation’s ways of thinking down to local community planning. Finally, there is the philosophical division line between proponents of Modernity / Enlightenment and of Post-modernity. Often the war of positions between Foucault / Lyotard and Habermas have been used to fix the positions in an un-productive stand still. Nevertheless, this work see it as its ambition to transcend some of these difficulties by opening up an complex interplay of these various approaches. This does not mean, that basic ontological and epistemological contradictions will wither away. However, it is an attempt to seek new inspiration and ways of analysis from a broad spectrum of approaches. Thus, this theoretical framework will have as its basic ontological and epistemological assumption, that discourses are both the outcome of relative autonomous agents actions, as well as they are endowed with structural properties. They are frames of power-rationality within which agents conduct their actions. However, the more actor and consensus oriented theories have a point in showing some more concrete and empirical themes that needs to be understood. The concrete actions and the specific linguistic practices, are such themes. So it is maintained that a discourse analysis is an analysis of the power-rationality configuration of particular practices and meaning-relations. The agents and institutions must be considered, as well the hermeneutic practice of interpreting documents and actions:

**Linguistic articulation**

- Language
- Representation
- Vocabulary
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2. SOCIO-SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES

Conceptions of space - which are central to any ontology - are part and parcel of notions of reality. Much more than simply a world view, this sense of space, one’s ‘spatiality’, is a fundamental component of one’s relationship to the world

Rob Shields, Places on the Margin - alternative geographies of Modernity

The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world ... The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less of a long line developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein. One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics oppose the pious descendants of time and the determined inhabitants of space

Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces

Geography matters. The fact that processes take place over space, the facts of distance or closeness, of geographical variation between areas, of the individual character and meaning of specific places and regions - all these are essential to the operation of social processes themselves. Just as there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes

Doreen Massey, Spatial Division of Labour

After this introduction to discourse analysis and some concepts concerning the way we think and relate to space, some theoretical explanations and concepts concerning the influential forces of socio-spatial transformation processes will now be addressed. By this is meant those economic, political, social and cultural changes that characterise the late-capitalistic world and its relation to space. These reflections are the necessary theoretical backcloth for understanding the European discourse of urban space.

2.1 Globalisation, economy & space-time

The socio-spatial transformation processes has been described as an expression of ‘space-time compression’ (Harvey 1989). These are processes that revolutionise the objective qualities of space and time in such a way that we are forced to alter, how we represent the world to ourselves. The word ‘compression’ denotes that the history of capitalism has been
characterised by an acceleration of the pace of life, while so overcoming spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to ‘collapse inwards upon us’ (Harvey 1989:240). In telling the story of the fundamental socio-spatial changes, the development of the forces of production and technology must be said to have had primacy. The development of various technologies such as the chronometer, the map, the print technology and the compass combined with the development of trade capitalism and the Enlightenment, serve as essential markers in the history of profound change (Habermas 1987, Harvey 1989). Later the changes made by industrial and Imperial capitalism, combined with new production & communication technologies and social organisation principles made the socio-spatial transformation processes accelerate even further. The diminuation of spatial barriers lead to a reaffirmation and realignment of hierarchy within what is now a global urban system (Harvey 1989:295). Thus, qualities of place stand to be emphasised in the midst of the increasing abstractions of space. The modern world-system is one of perpetual change as capitalist entrepreneurs constantly are shifting their focus in order to gain advantages in the market place:

‘Geopolitics and economic nationalism, localism and the politics of place, are fighting it out in a new internationalism in the most contradictory of ways’ (Harvey 1989:358)

The increasing intensity in global interrelations, may result in a tighter connection between locality and identity, thus:

‘The more global interrelations become, the more internationalised our dinner ingredients and our money flows, and the more spatial barriers disintegrate, so more rather than less of the world’s population cling to place and neighbourhood or to nation, region, ethnic grouping, or religious belief as specific marks of identity’ (Harvey 1996:246)

Some theorists would argue, that the socio-spatial transformation processes is best understood as influenced by new ‘economies of signs & space’ (Lash & Urry 1994). Thus the transformed political economy is said both to be ‘post-Fordist’ and ‘post-modern’, within a context of ‘time-space distinction’ (Giddens 1984, 1990). In terms of economic significance, the most important development in localisation is said to be one of ‘globalised localisation’ (Lash & Urry 1994:17). The decline of the nation state in the processes of globalisation means that transnational firms have a more enhanced role to play within the realm of this new economic situation (Lash & Urry 1994:22). Lash & Urry seek to underline the importance of knowledge, information, service and consumption by using the concept of ‘reflexive accumulation’:

‘Reflexivity is cultural, accumulation is economic. However, we use the term to enable us to capture how economic and symbolic processes are more than ever interlaced and interarticulated; that is, that the economy is increasingly culturally inflected and that culture is more and more economically inflected’ (Lash & Urry 1994:64)

This analysis connects the realm of economics with the realm of culture, and see the increasing aestheticization and reflexivity as distinct features of the contemporary socio-spatial transformation processes. Global tourism, with its reflexive and aesthetic rationale is a
prime example of the convergence of economic and cultural codes, as well as it provides an illustrative case of the socio-spatial transformation processes (Lash & Urry 1994:256). Thus we are said to be living in an ‘internationalised society’, which is characterised by the following features:

‘That power is both dispersed yet where found highly concentrated; that there are relatively few formal relationships between individuals so that the authority exercised by international organisations remains fairly weak and unpredictable; that there is an undeveloped sense of solidarity especially that fostered vis-à-vis others; that there are few international organisations to which people feel allegiance or loyalty; and that there is little consensus about society and how it may develop’ (Lash & Urry 1994:281)

According to Lash & Urry, the best example of these developments is ‘post-1992’ Europe. This is so for two reasons. First, the EC possesses powers to constrain individual societies. It is an ‘organised space between its nations and the global market’ (Lash & Urry 1994:282). Second, the EC increasingly addresses regions or localities. These often deal directly with Brussels, and are thus, in a way, bypassing the nation states. The result can be described as a ‘disorganised state’: pluralist; fragmented; competitive; anti-corporatist and regionalist (Lash & Urry 1994:283).

Following the school of regulation, the crisis of capitalism consists of a mis-match between a specific ‘mode of accumulation’ and a ‘method of regulation’ associated with it (Esser & Hirsch 1994:73). According to this analysis, the new mode of accumulation can be tentatively identified by trends towards various post-Taylorist forms of organisation of production and labour, a strengthened industrialisation of the service sector, increasing mobility of capital, goods and labour an individualisation and pluralisation of lifestyles (Esser & Hirsch 1994:77). Thus the method of regulation that seeks to match this development can be characterised by trends towards new relationships between branches based on advanced technology, a quantitative reduction and institutional fragmentation of the system of social security, the weakening of the trade unions and formation of new corporate forms (Esser & Hirsch 1994:78). Such tendencies in economic development also have spatial effects:

‘The ‘post-Fordist’ metropolitan city is less than ever the product of natural conditions of location but rather of economic strategies’ (Esser & Hirsch 1994:80)

Jessop links Fordism with the Keynesian welfare state as this helped to secure the conditions for Fordist economic expansion, as well as Fordism helped secure the conditions for the expansion of the Keynesian welfare state (Jessop 1994:256). Post-Fordist labour processes are characterised by flexibility within both processes, machines and workforce, a process of ‘flexible specialisation’. As post-Fordist accumulation is more oriented to world-wide demand, global competition could further limit the scope for general prosperity and lead to increasing polarisation of incomes (Jessop 1994:258). These processes and changes in the capitalistic economy lead to a new conceptualisation of the state. Thus new technologies, internationalisation and the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism, leads to the formation of a post-Fordist state. The decreasing autonomy of the nation state concerning national economic activities are of major importance here. Thus the macro-economic policy instruments of the
Keynesian welfare state lose their efficiency (Jessop 1994:261). According to Jessop, this development leads to a new state type termed a ‘Schumpeterian workfare state’ geared at international competition within the dynamics of global capitalism. This amounts to a ‘hollowing out’ of the nation state, that comes about because of the need for supranational coordination as well as local and regional powers that by-passes the central states (Jessop 1994:264). This is what is happening within the framework of EU where the supra-national level demands sovereignty from the nation states as well as regional and local forces articulate new demands and policies that often are directly targeted at Brussels. Within such a Schumpeterian workfare state three possible pathways exists. It can either take a neo-liberal, a neo-corporatist or a neo-statist form. Elements of such strategies can be combined within and across different levels of political organisation:

‘In the European Union (EU), for example, we find: a) the single market strategy premised on a neo-liberal approach to competitiveness, creating a Europe-wide market through liberalisation, deregulation and internationalisation; b) a neo-statist strategy through which the EU co-ordinates cross-territorial networks across different levels of government in different states as well as various semi-public and private agencies including institutions, research institutes, enterprises and banks in order to promote new technologies, technology transfer, etc.; and c) a neo-corporatist strategy oriented to a Social Charter which will prevent ‘social dumping’ and thereby underpin attempts to reskill and retrain workers in the interests of more flexible, responsible work ... These may not be inconsistent. Indeed, the European Commission has argued ... that the neo-liberal elements of its strategy for structural competitiveness can be seen as a catalysts and the neo-statist elements as its accelerators’ (Jessop 1994:268-9).

As a part of this development towards the hollowing out of the nation-state, supranational ‘regimes’ are growing. This is seen in the expanding role of supranational political regimes such as the European Union, as well as the other two ‘growth poles’ within the ‘triad’, that is the Asian Pacific region and North America (Jessop 1994:270). The other side of the ‘coin’ is the growing resurgence of regional and local governance. Here we find a crucial role for the state to play as the institutional framework of such governance. Thus rather than being dead, the nation-state has experienced a shift ‘downwards’ in its functions (Jessop 1994:272). Thus the shift from local government to local governance, which includes the local state’s attempts to facilitate the various new public and private institutional forms. Accordingly, the nation state still has an important role to play, but in another context:

‘The mechanisms of national economic management have been weakened, and direct ‘local-global’ contacts are increasing as localities compete to attract investment’ (Anderson & Goodman 1995:614)

This reflects the attempts to establish an European Monetary Union and a single currency. Such an institutionalisation of the Community’s economy will probably be linked with a spatial policy, partly as a mean of optimising the overall economic performance within the territory, but also as a compensatory or counterbalancing support for those regions and states that will suffer a loss in competitiveness as a result of the EMU (Williams 1996b:263).
Albrow considers the roots of the state to be separated from the nation in the ‘Global Age’. Thus the state has been uprooted and the origins of its rules are multilocal, polycentrically administered (Albrow 1996:64). In this context, a new discourse of ‘Globalism’ emerges with a mental orientation towards the world as a whole as its driving referential. Thus a global culture is in the becoming where humans espouse values which takes the globe as their frame of reference point (Albrow 1996:83). In this way the ‘globe’ occupies the vacant discursive space which the sovereign state occupied in national discourse. The communities of the ‘Global Age’ generally have no local centre. Thus individuals are engaged in multiple ‘decontextualized activities’, as for instance is seen in the ‘fleeting relationships’ between neighbours in a street. Such a ‘disconnected contiguity’ does not equal anomie or meaninglessness, but rather focuses on ‘disembedded communities’ where community is delinked from place (Albrow 1996:158). From this analysis Albrow states that there emerges various global communities that are tied together by values and interests that has no connection to the individual’s particular places. However, this is not very realistic. In a global age, there might be issues and themes of political mobilisation that cut across space and place, but very often this is only done by well educated and academic footloose discourse-communities or internationally oriented business people. So most people still connect to places and find in here the locus for both identity and politics. The elites might engage in a process of creating their own symbolic socio-spatial hierarchies through personal micro-networks that project their interests in functional macro-networks throughout the global set of interactions in the space of flows (Castells 1996:416). But there exists another dimension of social space, which is a lived space of place. Indeed:

‘The overwhelming majority of people, in advanced and traditional societies alike, live in places, and so they perceive their space as place-based. A place is a locale whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity’ (Castells 1996:423, emphasis in the original)

Thus the Castellian catchword ‘elites are cosmopolitan, people are local’ (Castells 1996:415). So the relationship between the space of flows and the space of places equals the relation between simultaneous globalisation and localisation, and this relation is not predetermined in its outcome (Castells 1996:425). Globalisation can thus be understood as:

‘The intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens 1990:64)

Some theorists consider such a way of defining the global socio-spatial relations to be an expression of teleology and historicism (Albrow 1996:88). One of the firm opponents of the theses of ‘Globalisation’ is David Harvey (1996). He sees it as a part of a discourse of multinational capitalism’s inevitable expansion. In a similar vein Amin & Tomaney states that:

‘The idea of an unstoppable process of globalization that is central to the rhetoric of neo-liberalism and a powerful justification for the project of European integration exemplified in the Single Market agenda and the Maastricht process’ (Amin & Tomaney 1995:180)
The talk about this inexorable globalisation can therefore be seen as an excuse for ignoring the questions of governance. That is the crucial issue of economics versus politics, which is one of the underlying themes of the European project as a whole, but also as an important dimension of the discourse of urban space. Thus a whole trend of analysts stresses the emergence of a new knowledge society where international capital creates innovative networks, entrepreneurial milieus and good business climates (e.g. Porter 1990, Reich 1991). Harvey, Amin and Tomaney holds that such an analysis seem to ignore the misfortunes of the selfsame dynamics. Nevertheless, it is important not to make a categorical mistake in this analysis. Thus it is right that many of the analysts of globalisation are more or less proponents of the dynamics of international capital. But that must not make us dismiss of the important fact, that international capitalism in cause have spread all over the globe with an unseen speed and pathos the last 30 years. So any analysis of the socio-spatial dynamics of contemporary multinational capitalism must acknowledge that we are facing a global phenomenon. This is not the same as saying that this phenomenon is of a particular positive quality without problems.

2.2 Territorialisation

The concept of ‘territoriality’ has recently been subject to a thorough investigation by the Danish sociologist J. C. Tonboe (1994, 1997). According to Tonboe the concept of ‘territoriality’ has been a contested concept often connotated with the ‘primitive’ side of human civilisation. So territoriality can be said to have two sides: the ‘ugly’ and the ‘pretty’, the outside and the inside, theirs and ours. It is thus an ambiguous and polyvalent concept concerning the way we perceive spaces and places, often with an aura of taboo attached to it. The concept can generally be defined as:

‘The tendency to identify with, or seize upon individually or collectively, and if necessary defend a larger or smaller piece of land against ‘intruding’ persons, groups or social functions’ (Tonboe ed. 1994:9, authors translation)

Territories are politically important, not only as objective and material imprints on space, but also as subjective identities, postulates and demands. They are ways of claiming things, that appeals to deeper lying ideologies and values (Crouch 1994:69). So as a part of the discussion of territoriality the theme of sovereign nation states seems fundamental. Some theorists see the development of a de-coupling of sovereignty and territoriality. Thus the emergence of major non-national and post-national social formations could be an indication of a new way of thinking of sovereignty and territoriality (Appadurai 1996:42). The changing socio-spatial relations from the local to the global, results in two challenges to the ‘post-national’ order. On the one hand, the production of locality challenges the order of the nation state. On the other hand, human motion in the context of changing nation states encourages the emergence of ‘translocalities’ (Appadurai 1996:42). Such translocalities are border zones, tourist zones, Free Trade Zones, refugee camps, migrant hostels and neighbourhoods of exiles and guest workers. Even cities can be conceptualised under the heading of ‘translocality’, since an increasing number of these are substantially divorced from their national contexts. Appadurai mentions Hong Kong, Vancouver and Brussels. The very essence of international competitive capitalism contributes to these new translocalities, where the social interactions and normative bonds are crossing the borders of the nation states. So in this process of socio-
spatial transformation, a divergence exists between the national rights of citizens versus a broader set of post-national geographic processes. The core of this process is a conflict where national space becomes different valorized for the state and for its citizens (Appadurai 1996:46). This is a very important process that has to do with the relation between identity and space, and with the possibility of thinking the political in the context of new socio-spatial dynamics. For many citizens, the ‘territorial referents of civic loyalty’ are increasingly divided among different spatial horizons: work loyalties, residential loyalties, and religious loyalties may create distinct registers of affiliation (Appadurai 1996:47). This is essential to the basic discussion of identification and loyalty not only towards the nation states, but also in the case of ‘Project Europe’. So on the global ‘market for loyalties’ new forms of social interaction, loyalty and interests are emerging:

‘The global competition for allegiances now involves all sorts of nonstate actors and organizations and various forms of diasporic or multilocal allegiance ... in short, the states are the only major players in the global scene that really need the idea of territorially based sovereignty’ (Appadurai 1996:48-9, emphasis added)

Accordingly, there is emerging a new post-national cartography, where the EU can be seen as a major continental translocal affiliation, among others of racial or religious origin (Appadurai 1996:50). These emergent cartographies do not appear to require horizontally arranged, contiguous, and mutually exclusive claims to territory. So what Appadurai argues is that the traditional thinking of the relation between humans, territoriality and identity must be re-addressed. Thus a process of ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘re-territorialisation’ which could be grounded on an imaginary of local autonomy instead of a national imaginary (Appadurai 1996:54-55). The problem is, of course that such processes of re-thinking and re-claiming the territorial just as easily can be thought of in terms of exclusive nationalism and various ethnocentric policies:

‘Discourses of the soil tend to flourish in all sorts of populist movements, both local and transnational, while discourses of territory tend to characterise border conflicts and international law. Loyalty often leads individuals to identify with transnational cartographies, while the appeals of citizenship attach them to territorial states’ (Appadurai 1996:57)

The problems of place, identity and politics is intimately connected to the discussion of how to organise and plan for the socio-spatial relation in such a way that the people living in the localities and places will find the plans worth their support.

2.3 Regionalisation

The concept of ‘region’ is important to the understanding the European discourse of urban space. One of the problems in this debate, is the lack of consensus regarding vocabulary and concepts. A language oriented conceptual analysis of the way the Danish Ministry of Commerce uses the concept of region, indicates that in the worst case it is totally unclear, and in the best case is a straight forward ad hoc concept, and thus all in all gives way to an interpretation of ‘regions as “pseudo localities’ (Jørgensen 1997:379). Any struggle over regional identity can be seen as a special case of the struggle over classifications, monopoly
of power to make people see and believe and to recognise a legitimate division of the social world (Bourdieu 1994:221). The etymology of the word ‘regio’ leads to the source of division, thus any region implies an act of demarcation of either groups, races, spaces etc. The ‘regio’ and its frontieres (fines) are the dead trace of an act of authority which consists in defining the territory. So the act of constructing borders and frontiers based on a notion of regional unity is backed by a discourse that must be capable of making things happen, in other words be performative (Bourdieu 1994:223).

Veggeland’s theory of regions (1996) will be a good place to start a discussion of the concept of region from. The point of departure is a dichotomy of ‘Europe of regions’ versus ‘Europe with regions’, thus framing the question of the sovereignty of the state as well as the discussion of subsidiarity. In this ideal typical split, a Europe of regions would be characterised by regions as political agents with influence on their own development (Veggeland 1996:15). Such a situation would be a situation of ‘horizontal order’, whereas the Europe with regions is a scenario of ‘vertical order’. An important point is that in a possible situation of a ‘Europe of regions’ it is not a situation of full regional autonomy. If that were the case, one would have to speak of a transformation of regions into states (Veggeland 1996:17). Other researchers have suggested, that we should consider a region in the context of European spatial planning to be defined in purely political terms. Thus a region in this context would mean, the political entity responsible for the administration of the principle of subsidiarity (Jørgensen 1996:26). This notion of region refers to a basic assumption of subsuming spatial planning under the logics of politics as opposed to the logic of economics. The various theories of regions can be split into two categories; a ‘utopian’ and a ‘pragmatic’ or realistic school. Set up against each other the utopian strain of regional theories can be said to connotate the ‘post-modern’ position, whereas the pragmatic version has affinity with the ‘modern’ or Habermasian position (Veggeland 1996:18). Put very broadly the post-modern position views the fragmented and multiple changes as a strength and as an example of ‘small is beautiful and harmless’ and ‘plurality in communities’. It is a ‘story’ of ‘petite narratives’ and plurality of lifestyles and cultures - a ‘Europe of tribes’. Thus the fusion of identity and locality becomes a central theme of this position. Veggeland ask the fundamental question to this position: how can the big common acts that Europe needs to engage in (human rights, social equality and the ecological problems), be anchored in this position of localism and pluralism? The pragmatic position describes a regional co-operation as a goal in itself and accepts the continuing existence of the nation state (Veggeland 1996:34). Thus it sees the situation of the regions like this:

‘The pragmatic sense of the regional political elites and policy makers is based on two basic attitudes. Firstly, there is (implicit or explicit) acceptance of the enduring nature of nation states, rather than questioning them. Secondly, the regional government’s strategies vis-á-vis the new developments of the European integration process is focused on claims about a greater institutional presence in EU decisions (for example, the claims about the establishment of a Committee of the Regions in the Maastricht Treaty) and by the effective setting up of specific initiatives such as interregional co-operation agreements and regional representation offices in Brussels’ (Borras-Alomar in Veggeland 1996:36-7)
Now these basic and fundamental positions are the background of Veggeland’s rather simple typology of regions: administrative, cultural/ethnic and functional regions (Veggeland 1996:37). The administrative region is characterised by being a part of the state-hierarchy and thus founded on the base of ‘vertical order’. The cultural/ethnic region is tied to ‘historic events’, emotionally anchored experiences and traditions, and is often transnational in its character. This type of region is also called a ‘region of identity’. The functional region is framed and defined by territorial collaboration forms, whether they are economic or cultural. The various city corporations are mentioned as an example of this category. The point is of course, that since these typologies are analytical, there exists various variations and overlappings in practice. Thus interregional co-operation can occur between administrative regions within a nation state or as a transnational co-operation. Another point is, that when an identity region tries to acclaim the status of a functional as well as an administrative region it is actually trying to settle as a nation state. One could therefore talk about a ‘bottom-up’ perspective versus a ‘top-down’ perspective. In another context Veggeland has also tried to introduce regions of dominants, regions of periphery, communicative regions, environmental regions and regions of city agglomerations (Hedegaard & Veggeland 1991:14-15). These types of regions seems to be, in one way or another, a derivation of the three types of regions. The normative position of Veggeland is that a Europe ‘of and with regions’ seems appealing as a regulative idea for the future development. Thus he subscribes to the statement of Borras-Alomar:

‘The place of regions in Europe is alongside that of national and non-nation actors. They are not, any more, mere statistical units or the sub-ordinates of the central governments, but neither are they anywhere near to replace the state ... It is this recognition that ought to guide the political discourse as well as academic analysis away from the ‘Europe of the Regions’ and towards a more differentiated appraisal of the realities of the ‘New Europe’ (in Veggeland 1996:50-1)

The future European regional development can be described by two opposite trends: the model of concentration and the ‘mosaic’ model (Kristiansen 1995:135). Apart from the fact that the mosaic model seems to be the most empirical verified of the two, this division is central to the whole discourse of regional development. Thus the rationale of the concentration model is the rationale of economic competitiveness and growth localisation in core areas as the ‘blue banana’, where concentration has become a political goal in itself (Kristiansen 1995:136). This model of concentration is, according to Kristiansen, subject to critique. The geographichal areas that this model takes in consideration are far to big. Thus within the ‘blue banana’ one will find areas in decline as well as areas in progress. Doubt could be raised whether the advantages of localising businesses in metropoles are superseding the problems of this strategy or not. And the environmental problems of the core suggests that they are already in a state of overload (Kristiansen 1995:137). On the other hand, the ‘mosaic’ model follows the distribution of regional growth on the basis of functional regions and regional alliances. There is support for this argument in the Commission’s strategy document Europe 2000 (Commission 1991) where the reduction in the ‘economics of scale’, the new telecommunication structures and the environmentally unstable situation in the territory’s core areas are documented. Thus a conceptualisation of the European space as in the model of ‘mosaic’, corresponds to the theories of a ‘Europe of regions’ and the imagined emancipatory and democratical potential of the regions.
The debate of regions could be said to have gained new momentum by the incorporation of the concept of ‘subsidiarity’ into the European Union’s policies. Thus according to Taylor (1991), regional geography is back, but this time with an aspiration to develop a Habermasian emancipatory politics rather than the technical and practicle solutions of previous times (Taylor 1991:184). But until now, the nominal definition of ‘region’ has not been precise enough to eliminate very opposite and antagonistic interpretations (Sörlin 1992:245, Williams 1996b:189). The concept has also been used in the fight over whether the EU should have a specific urban policy or not. Here, as other places, both the proponents and opponents have been using the principle of subsidiarity of Article 3B in the Maastricht Treaty, to argue their case. Some of the advocates of the ‘Europe of regions’ have given a radical interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity, so as to say that nobody has the right to stop individuals or geographical regions to define common goals, and to seek to realise the goals (Hedegaard & Veggeland 1991:11). Now this means that the citizens has a principal right to ‘abolish states’ and thus that the state is being ‘inverted’ so to speak. By this is meant that the regions are following the law of the states, not because they belong to a state but rather the other way around. So a state consists of regions that has accepted the organisational form of a state in order to get their interests looked after, rather than the reverse (Hedegaard & Veggeland 1991:12). Thus in a system of ‘inverted states’ a ‘Europe of Regions’ are emerging in a ‘flowthing system’ of individual localities that at one and the same time belongs to different regions of variable functions (Hedegaard & Veggeland 1991:12, Sörlin 1992:253). The fact that more and more city-regions dominate their closest territory and tend to engage in a fight for ‘relative autonomy’ indicates a development in the direction of a ‘mosaic of growing city-regions’, where nearness and networks are the dominant features (Hedegaard & Veggeland 1991:13). This corresponds well to the observation of Törnqvist when he says that exactly the lack of a consistent concept of region combined with the tendencies to city-growth perhaps should lead us in the direction of a ‘Europe of Cities’ (Törnqvist 1995). But not all analysts are convinced about the development trend towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’. Amin & Tomaney (1995) asses that there is no European super-state waiting to replace the nation state nor is the ‘death of the nation state’ in favour of a ‘Europe of regions’ very likely (1995:180). The nation-state has thus not disappeared, but is under pressure from (at least) three different angels: the global economy, international regulation and powerful city-states and regions (Newman & Thornley 1996:10).

The researchers that pay more attention to the flows of economy and transport find that we are not witnessing a stronger link with locality, but rather the opposite. So the socio-spatial development could be described as a transition from a space of locations to a ‘geography of movement’ (Nijkamp 1993:153). However this assessment stresses only the one relation of the two spatial logics that characterise the socio-spatial relations of today (Castells 1996). The rising interest in the regional theme are seen by some as an expression of the ‘crisis of Modernity’ (Joenniemi 1993:19). Thus the regional agenda gains importance as the states no longer are able to control the development. The question is, whether the regions themselves are able to control the ‘development”? But it stands to reason that connected to an institutional framework of the EU, with its regional policy instruments (i.e. INTERREG IIC), the regions might after all have some potential for navigating. Sociologically the phenomenon of regionalism can be seen as a territorial differentiation (Joenniemi 1993:21). Thus one could argue that regions both have a potential for integration through co-operation and the opposite through competition. So the regional development can be labelled by the notion of ‘territorial
competitiveness’ (Duelund 1992:235). By this is meant that regional policy no longer can be described as a mere question of levelling differences between regions in a nation. The new agenda is one of positioning regions within a larger territory, often by means of culture politics and economics (Duelund 1992), and where the state is seen to be in a new situation:

‘The result, within an increasingly regionalized EU framework, is that while the state has remained a central player it is no longer the central place in capital accumulation’ (Anderson & Goodman 1995:623)

There were two possible paths when it came to the making of European regional policy of the 1990's. One was to operate with massive interregional transfers of subsidiaries, the other to seek to increase the individual region’s competitiveness and ability to attract assets (Hall & Van Der Wee 1991). Needless to say the latter was chosen. Veggeland summarises the essentials of European regional planning into these basic goals: economic and social cohesion, a balanced and sustainable development, decentralisation, subsidiarity and finally representation of the regions within the EU system (Veggeland 1996:60). All of the analysis that indicates a move towards a ‘Europe of regions’ seem to underplay the possibility of a further move towards a ‘Europe of cities’. The European discourse of urban space might throw some light over the future role of the city in Europe. At least one has to say that much has happened since the French president de Gaulle on 5 of September 1960 identified the building blocks of ‘Project Europe’:

‘What are the realities of Europe? What are the pillars on which it can be built? The fact are that they are states ... the only entities which have the right to issue orders and to be obeyed’ (de Gaulle, in Tassin 1992:186)

2.4 The city and urban space

What then, is the object of this European discourse of urban space? Harvey suggest this, rather simple, idea that we should consider the ‘thing’ called a ‘city’ to be the outcome of a process called ‘urbanisation’ (Harvey 1996:418). And further, that capitalism has to urbanise in order to reproduce itself (Harvey 1992:54). Thus some researchers see a necessary link between the urban phenomenon and the organisation form of societal production processes. Going far back in history, the development of the urban fabric has been derived from a given society’s ability to provide a surplus from the economy (Kjærsdam 1995). Max Weber saw the creation of cities, as a phenomenon derived from trade and economy, but also from territorial politics (Weber 1978). The city, as a socio-spatial form, is of course much more than an expression of an economic logic. Life in cities are also cultural, social, political and aesthetical processes and practices. Thus a deeper understanding of what the urban is, obviously needs to address these themes as well.

According to Sassen, the West European urban system is by far the most balanced of urban systems in the world (Sassen 1994:39). There are nevertheless some tendencies of fundamental change to be observed. Thus several sub-European regional systems have emerged. A limited number of cities have strengthened their role in an emergent European urban system. And finally, few of these cities are also part of an urban system that operates at
the global level (Sassen 1994:42-3). Some researchers finds that cities are not just passive places for the multinational capital’s prestigious projects and investments, but have themselves become important actors in creating opportunities for economic development and influencing the new urban hierarchy (Newman & Thornley 1996:16). Thus the city-regions are engaged in the inter-urban competition by the means of image-making, place promotion and city marketing, but:

‘In a Europe of competitive cities there is a tendency to ignore the fact that there are only so many international business travellers, or potential stations on high-speed lines, or opera houses to go round. Competition has losers as well as winners’ (Newman & Thornley 1996:17)

Other researchers find, that towns in competition to establish industries hardly can be said to act as autonomous agents, but are rather seen as adapting themselves passively to conditions set by the world market (Esser & Hirsch 1994:90). The changes in global, national and local government can be analysed through theories of ‘growth coalitions’ and ‘urban regimes’ (Newman & Thornley 1996:81-85). It is important though, that the specific European context is considered. Thus the theory of ‘growth coalitions’ should be modified since the public sector plays a bigger role in urban policy in Europe than in the US (where the theory originates). Secondly, is should be noted that various anti-growth alliances tend to be ignored in the theory of ‘growth coalition’. Nevertheless can theories of ‘urban regimes’, understood as ‘relatively stable forms of governance combining public and private interests’ (Newman & Thornley 1996:82), in both a formal as well as an informal way, help us re-focus on the private and informal side of urban governance.

The Spenglerian notion of the City’s life-cycle from birth to death (Mumford 1938/70), still seems to have currency in contemporary analysis of the city-regions of Europe. Thus the Swedish City-region Report of 1990 operates with an urban cycle of urbanisation, suburbanisation, de-urbanisation and re-urbanisation (SOU 1990:22). This analysis also makes clear, that apart from being a node of infrastructure a city-region is also characterised by its innovative capacities and networking abilities. In other words this analysis supports the neo-Schumpeterian notion of innovative competition as the password to a privileged place in the urban hierarchy. The territorial competition that occurs between the cities of Europe (and the world) expresses itself in a number of strategies, where the city in question seek a competitive advantage. The problem is that many of these strategies has immense costs as well as the outcome must be said to be uncertain since it is the same strategies that all competitors are using (NordREFO 1992:3:45). Various culture-political strategies can be identified within this field of inter-urban competition. Among these is the competition between cities to become the European Union’s Cultural City (Bianchiani 1993a, 1993b). Thus the cities are active in the process of ‘place-making’ by the means of image promotion and place-myths. In other words, many towns and cities are being reconstructed not primarily as centres of production but consumption (Lash & Urry 1994:216), since:

‘Places ... become much more concerned about their ‘good business climate’ and inter-place competition for development becomes much more fine-tuned. The image-building of community (of the sorts which characterise Baltimore’s inner harbour) becomes imbedded in powerful processes of inter-urban competition’ (Harvey 1996:247)
Harvey suggests that the urban region within the capitalist society, can be defined as a ‘particular spatial configuration of a built environment for production, consumption and exchange’ (Harvey 1992:145). So the urban region can be seen as a geopolitical unit in the uneven geographical development of capitalism (Harvey 1992:155). In this perspective it means, that capital accumulation tends to produce distinctive urban regions:

‘The urban realm is, as it were, a ‘concrete abstraction’ that reflects how individuals act and struggle to construct and control their lives at the same time as it assembles within its frame real powers of domination over them’ (Harvey 1992:163)

Harvey sees, as many of the classic urban theorists, a distinct impact of the urban upon human consciousness. This can be traced within so different areas as individualism; class; community; the state and the family (Harvey 1992:231). But opposed to the analysis of Simmel, Weber, Wirth, Park and others, Harvey find that the urbanisation of consciousness has to be understood in relation to the urbanisation of capital. Across these themes cuts the competitive spirit of capitalism:

‘Inter-spatial competition between states, city regions, and localities in turn becomes a vital expressive dimension to consciousness formation, provoking nationalism, regionalism and localism within a universal global framework’ (Harvey 1992:247)

In the urban context, such inter-spatial competition can be said to coincide with ‘post-modernism’, here defined by a break with the idea that planning and development should focus on large scale, rational and functional design, and instead focusing on much greater eclecticism of style (Harvey 1992:258). The upcoming of urban entrepreneurialism and the rise of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ is the result of this increasing inter-urban competition.

There may be a new position for the urban regions within European territory. Thus a revision of the famous Giddensian statement:

‘My argument, in essence, is that the nation-state replaces the city as the ‘power-container’ shaping the development of the capitalist societies, as the old city-countryside symbiosis becomes dissolved’ (Giddens 1981/95:12)

seems in order, as the cities and regions regain some of their former centrality and capacity for growth, expansion and power generation. Within the framework of a socio-spatial development characterised by processes of deconcentration, deindustrialisation, reconcentration and regional shifts, the urban areas are now facing major changes. Many interpreters of the urban development trends seems to agree on the fact, that the increasing integration and globalising economic development will sharpen and concentrate the inter-urban competitiveness. In an interesting analysis of the spatial development of Europe, Masser et. al. has confronted professional planners, mostly within the field of transport, with three basic scenarios (growth, equity and environment) within various fields and combined these informations with other empirical sources (Masser et. al. 1992). They find that the regional development of European space is influenced by successfully central regions, that
urban regions continue to be more affluent than rural regions, the importance of industrial heritage and a growing dependency of regional markets on world markets (Masser et. al. 1992:93-7). Thus all signs point to a more polarised rather than a more equalised regional development in Europe (Masser et. al 1992:97). But within this spatial polarisation process there are various ways that the cities develop. The pattern of winner cities versus loser cities creates a new urban hierarchy that divides cities across national boundaries (1992:111). So it is possible to speak of a:

‘Growing specialisation and polarisation at the highest level of urban hierarchy in Europe, but also of a diminishing distinction between city and countryside towards a ‘urban’ continuum’ ... In other words, the future of cities and regions in Europe will be determined by *competition*. In order to survive, cities will be forced to grow at the expense of other cities and their hinterlands, because in a competitive market the only alternative to growth is decline (Masser et. al. 1992:119 & 122, emphasis in the original)

Many urban areas in Europe has had a development of urban deconcentration which has been further accentuated by technological inventions (the private automobile), increases in income, more working women and smaller households. Thus the phenomena of suburbanization and commuting did empty the city centres in European cities during the 1960's, as well as it created various environmental problems. Now cities seek to revitalise their inner cities, often with following ‘gentrification’ and sky high real estate prices and building rents as a result. Some even talk of a ‘reurbanisation’ phase or a renaissance of inner-city living in Europe (Masser et. al. 1992:116). This will, if measures are not taken to prevent the current trends, mean:

‘...a widening of the gap between winner and loser cities, further decentralisation of activities within urban areas and an erosion of rural settlement patterns. Without strong government intervention, the latter trend is likely to be reinforced by intensifying competition in the Single European Market ... To overcome the growing spatial disparities, some reconcentration of the power to plan and allocate resources and compensations at the national or regional level may be required’ (Masser et. al. 1992:116 &120, emphasis added)

The idea of re-introducing the ‘power to plan’ at the European level, is a very strong statement, that indicates that the withdrawal of politics in order to seek economic growth only can be reversed by returning to strong planning and policy measures. Which is another way of addressing the ‘primacy of politics’.

2.5 Conceptualising European space

The concept of ‘Europe’ derives from the classic Mediterranean view of the world (Taylor 1991:189). According to the Greeks this territory north-west of their own was ‘Europe’, thus a ‘territorial Other’. But from the Middle Ages the notion of ‘Europe’ changes to be the centre, and the rest of the world was seen as pagan. Thus Europe now defined the territorial Other as an ‘uncivilised and heathen rest’. From the Enlightenment time ‘Europe’ was seen as the symbol of emancipation and liberation by means of rationality (and distinctly non-
Oriental). The hunt for the ‘natural border’ or limit to Europe drew geographers to the Ural mountains in the 19th century and expanded in the ‘Age of Imperialism’. Now all this means that ‘Europe’ has had the connotation of continent, myth, cultural era, Christian Civilisation and political-administrative unit (Taylor 1991:189). It has served as the philosophical and ideological great unifier as well as the later dynamic centre of world capitalism. Thus there are (at least) three concepts of Europe: A political, a cultural and a philosophical concept (Tassin 1992:173). So Europe can be seen, not only a geographical site, but also as an idea inextricably linked with the myths of Western civilisation (Morley & Robins 1995:5). Part of the self-understanding of Project Europe’s proponents can be said to be linked to the dramatic changes in the geo-political structure since 1989. Thus, at least some, take their que from an analysis similarly to that of Francis Fukuyama (1992). So the breakdown of communist East and the victorious forward marching global capitalism, will culminate in the End of History and the Last Man. This means that history has ended in the best form of societal organization: liberal democratic capitalism. This notion is not necessarily an omnipresent one, but nevertheless one of great currency among many proponents of ‘Project Europe’ since it connects their visions with the depths of Hegelian telelogical philosophy of history.

A whole range of theorists are working on, how to conceptualise European space (Anderson 1996, Giannakourou 1996, Healey 1996c, Kunzmann 1996, Ruggie 1993 and Williams 1996b). According to Ruggie, the European Community has a very distinct character, thus:

‘... the institutional, juridical and spatial complexes associated with the community may constitute nothing less than the emergence of the first truly post-modern international political form’ (Ruggie 1993:140)

Thus Ruggie sees the EC as the first ‘multiperspectival polity’ since the advent of the modern era. So the constitutive processes whereby each of the member states define its own identity increasingly endogenize the existence of the others. The European leaders may then be thought of as ‘entrepreneurs of alternative political identities’ (Ruggie 1993:172). James Anderson’s notion of European space as an expression of ‘post-modern and medieval territorialities’ (Anderson 1996) is a follow up upon this idea of Ruggie’s. He suggests a notion of European space build upon the ‘bundling’ together of sovereignty over all aspects of social life on a territorial basis in the modern, territorial nation state (Anderson 1996:134). The movement into the totalling territorial bound authority of Modernity was (following Ruggie) a break with the medieval loose connection between authority and territory. What now seems to be happening is a ‘swinging back of the pendulum’:

‘We may now be witnessing an accelerated unbundling of territoriality, with for example the growth of ‘common markets’ and of various transitional (or, more strictly speaking, transstate) functional regimes and political communities not delimited primarily in territorial terms’ (Anderson 1996:134)

Anderson points out, that it has become increasingly more difficult, partly because of the space-time compression and ‘glocalisation’ processes, to find one fixed viewpoint or perspective from which to make sense of territorial sovereignty and distinguish unambiguously between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic affairs’, ‘outside’ from ‘inside’ (Anderson
The point is, that the EU is an example of partial and often contradictory processes, thus contemporary configurations of political space are a messy mixture of old, new and hybrid forms (Anderson 1996:136). There has been three main interpretations of European integration: the realist, the functionalist and the postnationalist positions (Anderson 1996:136-7). The realist school of international relations define integration in terms of intergovernmental relations between independent states, which leaves the traditional conception of territorial sovereignty intact. The Functionalist school started with an assumption, that the ‘low politics’ of economic or functional integration in civil society could bypass the ‘high politics’ of the nation state. Subsequently the neo-functionalists have recognised that the states cannot be bypassed. Finally the post-nationalist position takes departure in the transformative potential of globalisation and the increasing interdependencies and networks of a shrinking world and the ‘death of the nation-state’. Thus Anderson dismisses all three approaches by referring to a three-pronged ‘territorial trap’: an historical rectification of states as fixed units of sovereign space; a dichotomizing of domestic and foreign or inside and outside which obscures cross-border processes; and a view of the state as pre-existing container of society (Anderson 1996:139). Therefore there is a need for a new thinking that understand, that the modern state system of territorially fixed and mutually exclusive sovereignties is a historical unique form of spatial organization (Anderson - 1996:140). This is where the pendulum might be ‘swinging back’. The medieval territorialities is thus a metaphor for a socio-spatial organization where:

‘Postmodernity in political space may mean that the single-point perspective and singular sovereignty of independent statehood are being displaced by multiple and overlapping sovereignties’ (Anderson 1996:143)

According to this analysis, the socio-spatial conception might be one of fluidity and mobility without easy identified centres. But although multiperspectival in some respects, the EU is still territorial as seen in the notion of ‘Fortress Europe’ (Anderson 1996:149). Within Europe there is now a complex mixture of old, new and hybrid forms of socio-spatial relations. However there are still some trends that can be ‘read’ from the socio-spatial development. Kunzmann points at three distinct trends:

‘Three clear trends determine spatial development in Europe: an increasing spatial specialisation, the resulting spatial differentiation and a growing spatial polarisation ... Hence, global specialisation and intraregional differentiation lead unavoidably to further growth of the urban region in Europe, expanding more and more into a wider hinterland’ (Kunzmann 1996:145)

These development trends are, according to Kunzmann, paralleled by changing value systems, more privatised decision-making and deregulation at the political-administrative level (1996:145). This analysis identify the emergence of new spatial categories: international finance & service centres, ‘Technopoles’, ‘just-in-time regions’, urban backwater spaces, declining urban areas, gentrified areas, ‘Areovilles’ and leisure worlds (Kunzmann 1996:146-48). These spatial categories are linked into international and global information networks, they gain their own momentum and:

‘Reflect the growing fragmentation in Western society, where spatial competition clearly rules the game. As a rule the respective functional
specialisation is mutually reinforced once the particular image of such spaces is established’ (Kunzmann 1996:148)

This socio-spatial development is not driven by cultural traditions or communicative relations, but are driven by economic forces and political interventions. The crucial point is, whether the relation between the realm of economics and the realm of politics can be re-established as a relation based on the ‘primacy of politics’? Ending up with five scenarios (Euro-megapolis, Themepark Europe, A Europe of Sustainable Regions, Europe going East and Virtual Europe), Kunzmann concludes that the only feasible future scenario is ‘A Europe of Sustainable Regions’. This vision corresponds with the notion of ‘polycentricity’ but without the imperative of growth that lies at the heart of the Commission’s discourse of European urban space (Commission 1994a, 1994b).

The conceptualisation of European space involves the use of ‘spatial metaphors’, which must be understood as way of conveying meaning and intent. Spatial metaphors plays a critical role in the formation of human knowledge, action and imagination and is thus providing a quasi-logical framework of associations (Williams 1996b:95). So the metaphors are a vital part of the ‘spatial imaginary’ and refers to the processes of social spatialisation (Shields 1992:7). The metaphors in the various spatial vocabularies, are famous for their colourful and associative capacities. Notions of ‘blue bananas’, ‘bunches of grapes’ and ‘golden triangles’ (Williams 1993), are ways of imposing certain qualities of these metaphors and excluding others (Fischler 1995, Lakoff & Johnson 1980), and thus an expression of European ‘spatial rhetoric’ (Williams 1996a). This is even more strongly expressed in the socio-spatial imaginary of the cities and regions when they construct their place-promotional discourses in the inter-urban competition. Case studies of various European cities’ ways of discursively creating spatial metaphors, show direct links to notions of European space (see Healey 1996c).

2.6 The state of planning

Faludi (1996b) describes the European planning situation as ‘pre-doctrinal’. A planning doctrine being the ‘deep structures of values, assumptions and concepts that underlie plans’ (Faludi 1996a:75). This is a situation where antagonistic and competing discourses of planning and space confronts each other. To paraphrase Thomas Kuhn (1962), this pre-doctrinal situation might be seen as a pre-paradigmatic situation where the battle of concepts are yet to be solved, or as Faludi puts is:

‘Pre-doctrinal situations seem to be characterised by a struggle for meaning. The fascinating thing is that the struggle is not only for the meaning of planning, but above all for the meaning of geographically defined institutions as such’ (Faludi 1996b:17)

The various different national planning models and cultures has as a consequence that there is no consensus as regards to the essence of spatial planning in Europe. Thus contemporary European planning is in a state of ‘devolution’ (Nijkamp 1993:150). This is a state where there are raised questions of whether there is a case for planning at all. Seen in the light of increased market regulation, deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation this might not be the case. At least it seems as this process of devolution serves the course of economic
objectives, such as reduction of public deficits and an increase of the competitiveness of regions and cities (Nijkamp 1993:150). Zonneveld & Faludi argues, that besides the goal of economic and social cohesion, there is emerging a ‘new rationale’ namely that of ‘spatial cohesion’ (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:43). This spatial cohesion relates to the competitive position of Europe in a global capitalistic market. Thus the institutional context of the European discourse of urban space is understood as one of inter-governmental mode. That is, the institutional framework consists of co-operation between member states without surrendered sovereignty (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:44). This analysis could be contested, since the sovereignty part is far from clearly settled, not at least concerning the disputed concept of ‘subsidiarity’. The new rationale of ‘spatial cohesion’ implies that economic and social cohesion must be balanced against competitiveness (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:48).

Starting from the point where economic non-inflationary growth was the initiating factor, the Unions policy has been added the goal of social cohesion. This goal is the major driving referential of the discourse of European integration. Some observers seems to think, that there is a problem of scale within the EU cohesion policy. So Zonneveld & Faludi advocates for a more ‘outward-looking’ perspective, where less attention is given to the comparative positions of regions within Europe and more to the ‘competitive position of Europe’ (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:51). This amounts to prioritise the EU in a global context of world wide capitalistic competition. At present the discourse is shaped mainly by the attempted integration of urban development, ecological principles, economic growth, transport and logistics (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:57).

The main divider in these different spatial conceptions is the opposition between a core-periphery vision versus a polycentric vision of spatial development. Besides being object for empirical study, these conceptualisations are far from political neutral. Thus the move from a central hierarchy of regions and cities to a notion of polycentric development amounts to an idea of a multicentered ‘natural’ spatial development. This naturalised driving referential of the discourse implies that planning for an even socio-spatial development is a theme of the past. Zonneveld & Faludi argues, that there is given insufficient attention to the competitive position of Europe in a global economy. It is necessary to enable economic core areas to fulfil their role as the ‘power house’ of European economy (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:58). Thus these researchers advocates a spatial development strategy of centrality and hierarchy:

‘Like with the European Monetary Union, in planning, too, we perhaps need to accept a Europe of variable speeds’ (Zonneveld & Faludi 1996:59)

The central point is whether the notion of centrality and hierarchy implies a critique of competitiveness and an advocation for stronger state-led planning and control or, on the other hand, whether a notion of polycentricity and competition implies a market led neo-liberal competitive field, freed of state regulation? These two questions, are the basic underlying dilemmas of the European discourse of urban space. In analysing the European spatial policy formation Giannakourou (1996) finds that the basic ideological dilemma of European integration policy is between liberalism versus state interventionism. So the ‘spirit of competition’ is hovering over Europe:

‘The spirit of competition in the SEM is reflected in a sense of competition between cities and regions. Cities feel they are competing for attention, development and investment. City marketing and imaging are a response to
this, cities want to ensure that they do not miss out on funding opportunities so they set up European liaison offices (often in the UK staffed by planners), and several take the view that membership of one of the networks now proliferating is essential’ (Williams 1993:14)

But how should this ‘spirit of competitiveness’ be assessed? One way of saying it, is to show the links with the ‘neo-Schumpeterian paradigm’ (Nijkamp 1993:156). This is a paradigm which emphasises the entrepreneurial spirit of competition, the ‘creative destruction’ of outdated socio-economic organizations and the upsurge of innovative and knowledge based new localities. What this analysis forgets is, that the Schumpeterian waves of economic restructuring discriminates among various regions and cities. Thus the proponents of such analysis talk about ‘3C + regions’ (creativity, competence and connectivity) versus ‘3C - regions’ (congestion, criminality and closure) (Nijkamp 1993:156).

2.7 Multiple loyalties - towards a de-territorialisation of politics?

One of the questions that must be addressed in this context is, how the citizens of Europe will relate to such spatial policy and plans of the Commission? One way of dealing with this question is by examining the so-called ‘no-demos thesis’. According to this, there is no European ‘Volk’, and thus not any traditional territory-identity relation within the Community (Weiler, Haltern & Mayer 1995:6). It is a question of whether to seek for, or eventually invent, an organic and authentic form of European ‘demos’ versus understanding ‘demos’ in non-organic civic terms (Weiler, Haltern & Mayer 1995:12). This amounts to go for a procedural rather than substantial concept of democracy as well as to reactualize neo-Kantian moral philosophy by the dictum of ‘non-oppression of the stranger’. Such a ‘supra-national’ conception of the European project advocates a ‘double identity’ of nation-state identity and European identity and therefore ‘multiple loyalties’ (Weiler, Haltern & Mayer 1995:19). Some argue, that if we are to see the emergence of a democratic and empowering European Union, we must leave the idea of a ‘European fatherland’ and replace this notion with that of a public sphere of disparate communities (Tassin 1992:189). So the way to a more democratic European development, is seen to come about by the means of a ‘de-territorialisation of politics’. By this is meant a vision of democracy where the citizenship is separated from nationality and place, and instead founded on participation in the political institutions and philosophical principles of Europe. This idea of decoupling the territorial and spatial from the political, is a ‘solution’ that is opposite both to the notion of a ‘Untied States of Europe’ as well as it is in opposition to the notion of a ‘Europe of regions’. It is a notion of a ‘double citizenship’, with a deeper emphasise on the ‘universal’ side of citizenship, than of the territorial place-oriented side. This is a notion of a ‘dual identity’20. In much the same way does Albrow advocate for a ‘performative citizenship’ contrasting both the nation-sate and the EU, and instead finding its frame of reference in a concern for the public good, depending on constructed identities beyond the nation-sate, such as Black Atlantic Culture, Greenpeace, the idea of the Islamic nation and the feminist movement (Albrow 1996:201).

So a ‘Europe of Heimats’ will imply particularistic and localistic identities, combined with ‘universal’ identities. To be European can thus be said to implicate a threefold spatial identity
concept: that of continent, nation and region. Being an European is about managing some amalgam of these different scales of identity (Morley & Robins 1995:20). Lash & Urry holds, that we must establish ‘invented communities’ by means of our increasing ‘aesthetic reflexivity’ and thus actively decide which communities we will throw ourselves into (Lash & Urry 1994:316). Harvey points to the fact, that the capacity of most social movements is to command place better than space (Harvey 1989:302). Thus oppositional movements often have difficulties due to their clinging to a place-bound identity, why they tend to become part of the very fragmentation which a mobile capitalism and flexible accumulation can feed upon (Harvey 1989:303). So the problem of mobilising political legitimacy for place-bound identities, whether they are of the international labour movement, the ecological grassroots or the citizens of the European Union, are the same. Here Göhler’s analysis of political institutions might be a remembrance as to consider both a rule-oriented decision side of political institutions as well as an identity-oriented side:

‘To the extent that in our times supranational organizations are replacing the organisational form of the nation state, the question arises whether the collective identity has accordingly changed its character ... Symbols are the essentials of integration. They are particularly necessary when the number of citizens to be integrated is so large that a direct experience of participation processes is not assured’ (Göhler 1996:14-15, emphasis added)

Apart from connotating the Aristotelan notion of the city state that should confine its psychical size so that any grown man’s voice could be heard by all in the public debate, this analysis points at the problem of how to construct a political identity within a socio-spatial unit on the size and geographical dispersion as that of (expanding) Europe. On the background of this analysis, nothing seems to indicate the coming of a totally universal and de-territorialised political citizenship.

2.8 Towards a ‘progressive’ sense of place?

In order to think and theorise radical democracy spatially, Massey argues that the attempt to construct identities of place as singular, bounded and static essentials place loyalties, should be problematised (Massey 1995:284). So in order to think a more ‘progressive’ sense of place, the relation between space, power and identity must be re-addressed. The point is, that it must be acknowledged that people project meaning into places as well as they attach emotionally to places. It is no good, to operate with universal political subjects, torn apart from time and place. Instead the challenge lies in the recognition of the importance of places to identity construction. And here after, to scan the social field for possibilities of constructing a non-exclusionary and non-essentialistic place-identity discourse. We must thus acknowledge, that even though we seek to avoid the ‘blood and soil’ discourses of identity and place, the history or temporal dimension cannot be ignored. This means, that new identities are formed on the basis of a legacy of past and coexisting identities (Massey 1995:286). The point is, that we cannot imagine a relation between place and identity as totally dis-located from the history of socio-spatial practices. On the other hand, it is an major political question how we recognise this importance of place without subscribing to ‘regressive’ and an exclusionary socio-spatial imaginary. The task is to see, if it is possible to develop a progressive sense of place; not self-enclosing and defensive? (Massey 1991:315).

Thus:
'There is a need to face up to - rather than simply deny - people’s need for attachment of some sort, whether through a place or anything else. None the less, it is certainly the case that there is indeed at the moment a recudescence of some very problematical senses of place, from reactionary nationalism, to competitive localisms, to introverted obsessions with ‘heritage’. We need, therefore, to think through what might be an adequately progressive sense of place, one which could fit in with the current global-local times and the feelings and relations they give rise to, and which would be useful in what are, after all, political struggles often inevitably based on place. The question is how to hold on to that notion of geographical difference, of uniqueness, even of rootedness if people want that, without it being reactionary’ (Massey 1991:319, emphasis added).

The challenge lies in the political project of constructing a progressive ‘sense of place’. In the context of European spatial planning, this amounts to acknowledge that people might be capable of holding multiple identities and various relations to place and space. But, any socio-spatial strategy or plan, addressing the development of the European territory at large by the means of changing local relations such as in the urban system, must recognise that even though ‘translocalities’ of a post-national order (Appadurai 1996:42) might emerge, the chances of establishing such ‘disembedded communities’ (Albrow 1996:158), are facing severe problems concerning democracy and legitimacy. Thus, any attempt to re-think and re-imagine the socio-spatial development by means of planning should be well aware of the citizens interest in (and right to!) participation and information.
3. A SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be “purely” formal, the epitome of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident on the landscape. Space has been shaped and moulded from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies.

Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the Politics of Space

As mentioned, this work is only a part of a larger effort: namely to analyse and understand the EU plans and the Danish plans for the urban space. The essential points that should be understood in order to analyse the European discourse of urban space, will therefore be summed up in form of two checklists.

3.1 Key-points when analysing discourses

- Discourses are more or less coherent and repeatable linguistic and material practices, that results in specific power and rationality configurations
- The world is only consciously meaningful for us in a linguistically mediated context, thus any discourse analysis is a hermeneutic and interpretative practice
- Discourses has both a structural capacity to work ‘behind the back’ of the agents, as well as they are the (enabling) outcome of agents conscious actions
- Discourses are the bedset of ‘truth’, the ‘power of naming’ and hegemony
- Discourses are ‘framed’ by institutions, with rules and positions for the agents
- Access to discourses is governed by criterias referring to linguistic, juridical, economic and cultural competences and ‘capital’
- The meaning of any given discourse cannot be deducted a priori as either consensus or conflict
- Any discourse analysis should consider both linguistic and non-linguistic, as well as material and non-material ‘facts’

3.2 Key-points when analysing the socio-spatial transformation processes

- Global capitalistic competition is transforming the socio-spatial relations in a dynamic process of interaction between the local and the global. Concrete spatiality is a competitive arena for social struggles, thus space is political
- Space and place are vital factors in the socio-spatial transformation processes of identity construction. Thus people attach emotionally and politically to space and place through symbolic constructions of the meaning and identity of places and spaces
Global socio-spatial transformation processes are characterised by space-time compression; multinational competitive capitalism; local-global dialectics; reflexive accumulation based on new forms of aesthetic and cognitive codes and various forms of post-Fordist production processes.

The role of the nation state is changing in a world of increasing global and local significant practices, and it is under pressure from the global economy; international regulation and powerful city-states and regions. However, a hollowing out of the nation state is not a withering away but a re-positioning of the nation state.

Global-local dialectics are not a priori guarantees of a de-territorialisation of politics, which for example is seen by the fact that there is a social difference in the way agents relates to the globalised space of flows: ‘elites are cosmopolitan, people are local’.

The meaning of place is the result of processes of social spatialisation, often by means of place-images and place-myths.

Processes of territorialisation and regionalisation reflects vital ongoing changes of the European territory. The concept of region is partly a normative element in a performative socio-spatial political discourse of the ‘Europe of Regions’, and partly a typological and analytical concept. Thus regions are found as functional; administrative or cultural/ethnic/identity regions.

By the term ‘urban space’ is understood the relational socio-spatial configuration of cities and urban agglomerations within a given territory, and not questions of aesthetic and design in a ‘micro-spatial’ context. The structure of the urban space of Europe is defined by a hierarchy of competing cities within the framework of a global economy. The cities are economic, social and cultural nodes with a specific configuration of production, consumption and circulation of goods and services.

Bearing these statements in mind, the theoretical foundation for analysing and understanding the European discourse of urban space has now been laid out. This theoretical framework is thus the precondition for the analysis carried out in the working-paper with the title: A ‘green room in the European house’: Converging discourses in European & Danish spatial planning.
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NOTES

1. The term ‘urban space’ covers the relational socio-spatial configuration of cities and urban agglomerations within a given territory, and not questions of aesthetic and design in a ‘micro-spatial’ context.

2. Pre-judices are in Gadamer’s understanding, the inevitable judgements, notions and ideas that any interpreting subject meets the world with.

3. An interesting connection between space, language and our perception of reality comes to foe in the phenomenon of orientational metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:14). These are metaphors that has to do with spatial orientation (up-down, in-out, front-back etc.). These orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies and thus move in our physical environment in accordance with physical laws and human experience. The point is, that such spatial metaphors are not arbitrary, they have a basis in our physical end cultural experience. Lakoff & Johnson uses a lot of examples of this point: Happy is up, sad is down (i.e. ‘I’m feeling up’ versus ‘He’s really low these days’), conscious is up, unconscious is down (i.e. ‘Wake up’ versus ‘He sank into a coma’) (1980:15). What this seem to indicate, is that our physical being-in-the-world are intimately connected to our abilities to talk and think about it. This equals the phenomenological philosophy’s critique of the Western mind-body split. Philosophers as Heidegger and Merlau-Ponty has shown that man has a ‘deeper’ relation to his environment than as an isolated subject standing before an isolated object. Now these points are of crucial importance for our understanding of the socio-spatial relation as well as our ability to talk, think and theorize over this relation. Since this is not the time or place for a deeper investigation into these matters, I have just hinted at where some more theoretical research needs to be done in the future.

4. Which amounts to the same exercise as in the field of semiotics, where the question is how a sign means anything rather than what it means.

5. Heidegger showed that this type of ‘binary thinking’ is an underlying character of Western metaphysics, that restrains man from coming to grips with the meaning of being (Heidegger 1927/92).

6. Jean Hillier has made a deconstructionist discourse analysis of the way women are incorporated in planning discourses. In the article Deconstructing the Discourse of Planning (Hillier 1996), she shows how planning and planning language defines women as ‘Other’ in a marginalising way in the discourses. She finds that: ‘planners translate contested political interpretations of people’s - especially women’s - needs into a seemingly neutral legal, administrative, and therapeutic language. This system thus implements political policy in a way that appears to be nonpolitical but is, in fact, subordinating, depoliticizing, and disempowering’ (Hillier 1996:293). After this conclusion, Hillier states that planning has no meta-narrative, but that the planning discourse must be reconstructed as a flexible network of language games that connects women interests across social divisions (Hillier 1996:295). Thus reflecting the point that any de-construction will be followed by a ‘re-construction’ of the discourse in question. But it is essential that we understand, that de-construction cannot be made out of the blue. One has to know the authors (theoreticians) and texts as well as the ‘readings’ that preseeds them, before de-construction and re-construction of a given discourse has any meaning (Hauge 1995:143).

7. Thus Foucault’s major source of inspiration, Friedrich Nietzsche says; ‘What is then truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations that poetically and rhetorically enforced, was transmitted and ornamented, and after a long time of use seemed people to be solid, canonical and enforcing: Truth is illusions that one has forgotten is illusions, metaphors that has become stale and sensuously
powerless, coins that has lost their stamp and now are considered metal and not coins’ (Nietzsche 1872/1995:103, authors translation).

8. It should be noted that, Michel Foucault’s methodology changes over the years from an approach labelled ‘archaeology of knowledge’ to his genealogical method. Being far from coherent, Michel Foucault’s works thus also implies a discussion of what part of his authorship one is submitting to. There are various interpretations of what is the difference between these two approaches. The most obvious difference is that of time. Thus the archaeological approach makes a synchronous cut into a given formation of knowledge, whereas the genealogical approach are considering the historical and diachronous conditions under which something gets constituted as an object for knowledge (Kristensen 1985:63).

9. Foucault’s genealogical method can thus be said to be radically opposed to the Hegelian notion of history as a linear process with a ‘telos’: ‘I adopt the methodical precaution and the radical but unaggressive scepticism which makes it a principle not to regard the point in time where we are now standing as the outcome of a teleological progression which it would be one’s business to reconstruct historically’ (Foucault 1980:49).

10. Thus making some resemblance to the Giddensian concept of ‘structuration’ (Giddens 1984).

11. Which corresponds to the critique of an a priori assumptions about the rational agent within politics. In planning and political science, it is not wise to project a coherent theoretical framework into the heads of real life agents!

12. This ontological assumption is however often contested as a part of the discussion about the relation between language and reality. Opponents would say, that it is clear that our bodily, biological and material existence in the world provides us with experiences that not necessarily becomes subject to symbolic and linguistic mediation. Also the whole theme of our sub-consiousness cannot be addressed under such an ontology. Se also note 3.

13. This on going proces of ‘identity construction’ is parallel to Anthony Giddens’ analysis of Identity within Modernity (Giddens 1984, 1991).

14. Due to natural constrains of this particular piece of work, the social and cultural changes are downplayed. This is not an expression of their insignificance, but rather of a deliberate choice under restrained resources.

15. The Danish antropologist Anne Knudsen advocates that we have to change our perception of the connection between territoriality and political power in order to rethink the meaning of subsidiarity and thus our possibilities for institutionalising ‘heterogenous political organizations’ (Knudsen 1993). Some of her points corresponds to the ideas of Anderson (1996). The interesting thing about Knudsen’s approach is her questioning the profound way we perceive territory and territorial boundaries. We are almost not capable of thinking non-territorial politics (Knudsen 1993:24). But by making a distinction between the ‘law’ and the ‘rule’, it is possible to arrive at an understanding of the political not based on territoriality. The ‘law’ is basically founded on the reality of power and the existence of violence and death. The ‘law’ does not take care of every thing, but it stands as a guarantee for the maintenance of order. ‘Every thing’ is coordinated in a certain way, that is be the means of the ‘rule’. What characterize a ‘rule’ is that is only regulates certain activities and under certain conditions. The ‘rule’ rules the ‘game’, and the game has no territory only time. So the point is that the ‘rule’ does actually not depend on power, but on an agreement between equal partners within the game. Whereas it is
in the capacity of subjects that we obey the law, it is in the capacity of players that we obey the rules. This amounts to say that there has to be a law, but within this framework many rules are possible. Thus the concept of subsidiarity should not be thought of in terms of territory, but rather in terms of sectors. So the law governs the territory, but the rules govern various spheres of activities or sectors. Which brings Knudsen to the conclusion that it probably will be more useful to think in a organizational mode of thought rather than in a territorial mode of thought when one considers the concept of subsidiarity (Knudsen 1993:29).

16. Theoretically many sociologists have tried to grasp the relation between man and environment in various ways. Thus the idea of Emile Durkheim that the mere density and size of populations had a big say in the way societies develop their division of labour as well as their forms of moral cohesion (Tonboe 1997:234-36). Georg Simmel saw space and territory, as entirely socially derived categories, as an appearance of ‘sociation’. Thus the famous ‘blasé’ personality characterized the modern urban life as a result of overstimulation of the senses in the every day life of metropolis (Tonboe 1997:236-7). Simmel also theorized over the concept of ‘border’ which in this context is a very relevant concept. There seems to be a strong connection between borders, identity and our perception of spaces and places. So borders are to be crossed in order to make us define ourselves and our specific relation to places from the ‘outside’, in a process of territorialisation. Pierre Bourdieu connects these processes to the economic, social and cultural capital that is used to produce distinctive life-styles located, practised and displayed in certain places, locales or territories (Tonboe 1997:238). The ‘tourist phenomena’ could be mentioned as a final example of this process of envesting meaning in spaces and places through the process of territorialisation. Thus Lash & Urry shows that the ‘tourist gaze’ is a contemporary model of how we approach destinations and (other people’s) places or territories as increasingly aestheticized objects of consumption (Tonboe 1997:240).


18. See note 1 for a definition of the term ‘urban space’ as it is used in this work.

19. In relation to the way that culture politics are drawn upon when it comes to positioning in inter-urban competition, city marketing and place making, it is worth to remember the German sociologist Georg Simmel’s assessment of the Berlin Trade Exhibition in 1896 (Simmel 1991). Here the metropole’s strategy of attracting goods, money and attention is seen as a reflection of the attempt to: ‘Form a monetary centre of world civilization, assembling the products of the entire world in a confined space as if in a single picture. Put the other way around, a single city has broadened into totality of cultural production’ (Simmel 1991:120). What Berlin tried, by means of creating a commercial place-myth, was to position itself as a ‘World city’, that is: ‘A single city to which the whole world sends its products and where all important styles are put on display’ (Simmel 1991:121). Bearing in mind the rhetorics of inter-urban competition that surrounds the various world fairs and European culture cities, this is a strategy that has a rather familiar ring to it even these days.

20. Whether this is the likely outcome of the European discussion is hard to say. It corresponds with a notion of ‘identity’ as something concerning processes rather than a static core (Giddens 1991, Laclau & Mouffe 1985/94).