Jordan Siegel White Collar Crime
This seminar has been organised by the SIBS research community.
About the speaker
Our guest speaker is Professor Jordan Siegel - Professor of Strategy at the University of Michigan Ross School of Business.
Jordan Siegel is a Strategy Professor at the University of Michigan Ross School of Business. He also serves as a Research Fellow at the William Davidson Institute and an Associate-in-Research at the Harvard Korea Institute of the Harvard Asia Center. Professor Siegel specialises in teaching how companies can outperform their competitors by using global strategies effectively.
His research focuses on how businesses use both the formal rules like laws and informal cultural values to their advantage to stay ahead in the market. Siegel has shown that even companies that focus mainly on their domestic market can benefit by integrating these global norms into their strategies.
His findings are published in prestigious journals such as:
- Management Science
- the Journal of Financial Economics
- the Strategic Management Journal
They offer valuable insights and strategies for businesses aiming for sustained success.
Research title
"High-Profile Enforcement Efficiently Deters White-Collar Crime: Paul Manafort’s Prosecution Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act ".
Abstract
We present enforcement against high-profile white-collar criminals as an understudied, resource-efficient strategy for enhancing white-collar rule of law. In so doing, we apply insights from the management and sociology literatures about status spillovers.
These enforcement actions demonstrate law enforcement agencies’ willingness to pursue criminals with even the most resources to evade punishment, which generates widespread fear of prosecution among the broader population of potential white-collar criminals and a consequent far-reaching increase in rule of law.
We examine this “Big Fish” hypothesis in the context of high-profile enforcement against Paul Manafort in 2017 for violating the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Comparing compliance under FARA to compliance under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we demonstrate that enforcement against Manafort caused a widespread, sustained, and economically significant increase in FARA compliance.
We present evidence that this effect was driven by a Beckerian cost-benefit mechanism wherein lobbying entities came to disclose reputationally hazardous relationships they would have otherwise kept concealed.
Join online
Once you have registered, you can join this seminar online via Zoom, using this link:
https://newcastleuniversity.zoom.us/j/86061878793